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Preface

It is in the interest of those who control the bureaucratic organizations in
contemporary societies to have their employees, their clients, and the general
public believe that such organizations are purely administrative entities. The
myth of administration defines organizations as efficient and effective
instruments for the realization of publicly proclaimed goals. All too often
social scientists have accepted the idea of pure administration and used it as
the basis of their analyses of bureaucracies. Even when they have challenged
claims of efficiency and effectiveness, they have not attended to phenomena
that contradict the very possibility of an administrative entity. Most of the
neglected phenomena involve political processes such as conflict, domination,
abuse of power, and deception, which are ubiquitous in organizations.
Although disputes over goals, policies, and their implementation are not
supposed to occur outside of proper "channels" they arise continually in daily
bureaucratic life. Their neglect by social scientists shows a bias, often
unintentional, in favor of elite perspectives, and this has perpetuated a
distorted and one-dimensional image of organizations.
A critical
interpretation, which is the aim of this study, does not take official
definitions at their face value and does not merely argue in favor of a
"conflict approach," but demonstrates concretely the political dimension of
activity within bureaucracies.
This book is an attem pt to show that contemporary bureaucratic
organizations are not only administrative entities but are also political
structures in the sense that power, conflict, and domination are normal within
them. The specific means used to demonstrate this general thesis is the study
of oppositions to administrative authority by subordinates whose activity is
not officially legitim ate. Bureaucratic opposition is unequivocally political
and its occurrence refutes the myth that organizations are merely
instruments to achieve externally prescribed goals efficiently and effectively.
The study of such oppositions shows how organizations "go wrong" according
to their own criteria and how employees become political actors, and so
transcend their roles.
Making bureaucratic oppositions a focus for inquiry can be viewed as an
ix
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extension of the current research in organizational analysis, which began
more than 40 years ago, directed to revealing the ’’informal11 dimensions of
behavior within bureaucracies. The studies of informal groups and networks
of rules have, for the most part however, stressed adaptive mechanisms and
have kept the officially defined context intact. Informal mechanisms are not
direct challenges to authority, although they often serve to make authority
bearable. Bureaucratic oppositions do, in part, challenge the authority
structure and show that the myth of administration cannot be upheld.
Reactions to them by officials clearly demonstrate that the organization is,
among other things, a power system.
This study not only has links to a tradition in organizational analysis, but
is also part of a wider project aimed at revealing the ubiquity of political
processes in contemporary complex societies. Hence, it should be interpreted
in conjunction with the author's work on the political dimensions of the
sociology of knowledge, the critique of the myth of the ’’scientific
community," and the general critique of functionalism. (1) The basic intent
of this body of work is to show that underneath the claims of value neutrality,
public service, disinterestedness, and good intentions made by apologists for
institutional elites lies a world of political conflict and competition. Bringing
this world to view is one of the tasks of criticism, which is an intellectual
preparation for freedom.
The method implicit in this study might best be called ’’ethico-empirical.”
The assumption is made that social existence is an uneasy synthesis of the
conflict among interests and the appeal to principles or moral grounds
(ideals). Ideals cannot be reduced to interests, as the positivists claim, nor
can interests be reduced to ideals, as the idealists contend. No conceptual
synthesis of the "m aterial” and "ideal," is possible whether on Marxism,
Hegelian, or even Parsonian (dualistic) grounds. The best that can be done is
to try to detect the interplay of the two dimensions in actual cases, in much
the way that Max Weber, Georg Simmel, and C. Wright Mills attem pted to do.
The results of such an investigation will not fit a systems model or a "flow
chart," but they will not lack coherence. That coherence, however, will not
be linear, but will reveal a dialectic between transcendence of partial
interest and subservience to such interest. It will not suggest any middle
term or mediation between what Kant called "inclination" and "duty."
Keeping this distinction clear is the essence of what Kant meant by criticism
applied to social life. This study, then, draws upon many cases of opposition
which illustrate concretely the tension between principle and interest, and
show the paradoxes and ambiguities of political struggle.
The plan of this work follows its critical aim and its ethico-empirical
method. The first chapter outlines the myth of neutral administration and
proposes the alternative political interpretation of organizations, drawing
upon contemporary thought and research on oppositions in the polity.
Chapter 2 systematically details the grounds or "good reasons" for oppos
itions, their normative justifications. The third and fourth chapters add the
"empirical" dimension, detailing the barriers that oppositions confront in
getting underway and the strategies that they employ once they have been
initiated. Chapter 5 analyzes some of the responses to oppositions by the
official hierarchy and discusses some of the policies that have been proposed
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to eliminate the abuses uncovered by dissidents or to "institutionalize"
dissent. Hence, the design of the work defines a "process" of opposition,
beginning with the circumstantial and normative bases for politics in
bureaucracies, and then considering the initiation, methods, and consequences
of oppositions. The identification of a process, with various phases, dictated
the decision to draw upon case m aterial to illustrate general statem ents
rather than to draw general statements from exhaustive case descriptions.
This does not mean, however, that the method is "deductive" rather than
"inductive." Whether case m aterial is used illustratively or exhaustively
there is always a reciprocity in actual research between general statem ents
and particular data.
Many people have helped to bring this project to completion, whether or
not they were aware of giving such assistance. I am grateful to my students
at De Paul University, graduates and undergraduates, who informed me about
the particulars of the bureaucratic oppositions in which they or those close to
them took part. Long after courses were completed some of these students,
especially Ms. Edie Zukauskas, continued their interest in my project,
discussing it and doing further research in the area. Many of my colleagues in
the social science disciplines have been kind enough to speak with me about
the general issue of politics within organizations and about bureaucratic
oppositions. It was in discussions with Fred Homer that the idea of
bureaucratic opposition first arose. I am indebted to him and to Larry
Spence, Marie Haug, James Stever, Arthur Kroker, and Robert Perrucci.
Finally, this book could not have been written were it not for the active,
sympathetic, and intelligent collaboration of my colleague Dr. Michael
Weinstein. I cannot thank him enough, and fortunately he does not demand
such gratitude.
NOTE
(1)
See, for example: Deena Weinstein and Michael A. Weinstein, Living
Sociology: A Critical Introduction, New York: David McKay, 1974; Deena
Weinstein, ^Determinants of Problem Choice in Scientific Research," Socioloical Symposium #16 (Summer 1976): 13-23; Deena Weinstein and Michael A.
fe Instein, "Sociologies of Knowledge as Rhetorical Strategies," Free Inquiry
16, //I (May 1978): 1-14; and Deena Weinstein and Michael A. Weinstein, f,The
Sociology of Non-knowledge: A Paradigm," in R.A. Jones, ed., Research in
Sociology of Knowledge, Sciences and Art: An Annual Compilation,
Greenwich,"Connecticut: i.A.I. Press, 1978, pp. 151-166.
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i Bureaucratic Oppositions:
The Phenomenon

As long as the world shall last there will be wrongs, and if no
man objected and no man rebelled, those wrongs would last
forever.
Clarence S. Darrow in an address to
the jury at a Communist Trial,
Chicago, 1920 (quoted by Arthur
Weinberg, Attorney for the
Damned, New York: Simon and
Schuster)
What do the following accounts have in common?
The regional sales manager of a prominent book publisher advocated
various forms of bribery to get professors to adopt his company's textbooks.
To demonstrate one of his techniques, he and a subordinate entered a
professor's office and asked his judgment of their introductory text. The
professor unceremoniously told them that he thought the book was terrible.
This professor, however, was in charge of mass sections of the introductory
course in his discipline, so, without missing a beat, the sales manager offered
him a deal. If he adopted the text for the fall, the manager would send him
400 free copies which could be sold to students at a profit of over $2,000.
The professor decided to assign the book to his students.
At sales meetings the manager asked each of his staff members to discuss
their "creative" means of selling, that is, the kinds of bribes that they offered
and how they proffered them. All of the salesmen were opposed to such
methods and preferred to seek adoptions by appealing to the merits of their
books. When the manager continued to insist on his methods, five of the six
salesmen sent a letter to the main office of the corporation, threatening to
resign collectively if their supervisor was not dismissed. The manager was
not fired, however, but merely admonished. For several months he kept a low
profile and then vigorously renewed his efforts to have his subordinates use
his sales techniques. Within the ensuing half year all of the salesmen
resigned. Shortly afterwards their supervisor was dismissed.
1

2

BUREAUCRATIC OPPOSITION

In a large metropolitan school district in which the students scored below
average on standardized examinations, a principal of one of the elementary
schools directed his teachers specifically to teach the contents of the exams
and to increase each pupil's test grade by several points. The teachers feared
informing the administrators in the Board of Education because of two
possible reprisals: they might be transferred to a school in a "bad"
neighborhood or such formal rules as having to turn in a lesson plan book each
week might be enforced against them. They did, however, secretly inform
the local P.T.A. and helped the parent's group draft a letter to the Board of
Education exposing the principal. The Superintendent sent an investigating
team , composed of six other principals, to the school. The principal was not
fired and continued to try to implement his policies.
Frank Serpico's story, which was made into an interesting movie and an
uninspired television series, is widely known. Serpico, a police officer in New
York City, wanted to put an end to the rampant corruption in the
Department. First he attem pted to speak to high-level administrators, but
discovered that some of them were involved in the very activities that he was
trying to curb. The other administrators took no action. When he broadened
his campaign by seeking aid from politicians he was similarly frustrated:
...he was repeatedly rebuffed in his efforts to get action from high
police and political officials, continually risking discovery at any
moment by the crooked cops he rubbed shoulders with every day, and
finally out of desperation... he went to a newspaper with his story. (1)
What do these three accounts or the numerous others that could have been
cited in their stead have in common? They all relate attem pts to change a
bureaucracy by those who work within the organization but who do not have
any authority. These attem pts, which will be called "bureaucratic oppo
sitions," are probably ubiquitous, but are not frequently discussed in social
science literature for reasons that will be elaborated. Most people who have
worked in a large organization for several years are familiar with at least one
instance similar to the ones described above, and every so often the press will
make such a case public.
It is significant that there has previously been no term in the literature of
social science that identified bureaucratic oppositions. This phenomenon has
occurred frequently in both private and public organizations, and has been
perpetrated by one person or small groups, utilizing any of a number of
tactics and meeting with a wide range of outcomes. These attem pts at
change from below, which em anate from those who lack authority, are
labeled bureaucratic oppositions because they occur outside the normal
administrative routine and are challenges to authority. However, their aim is
not to usurp the machinery of power but to alter practices and personnel.
Why has bureaucratic opposition, a common phenomenon in organizations,
been ignored by students of the organization? In essence, contemporary
organization theories screen out this phenomenon by the limitations of their
guiding concepts.
The idea of theory in social science that guides the present discussion is at
variance with the common-sense notion that facts are immediate perceptions
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of an objective world which spontaneously generate theories when they are
properly related. The actual process of theorizing is the reverse of common
sense: the concepts that make up our theories direct us to some phenomena
and exclude our attention to others. Metaphorically, theories are beams of
light forming an intellectual spectrum that allows us to "see" certain things
while leaving others imperceptible. (2) Other beams bring a different
selection of facts to light and do not make apparent another, residual, set.
The assumption is that no beam covers the entire spectrum; indeed, that
different beams have varying band widths which cover distinct portions of the
full spectrum. The phenomenon of bureaucratic opposition, then, is identified
by a particular theoretical perspective which is quite different from the
dominant perspective in contemporary organization studies, for which this
phenomenon is all but invisible. A brief description of the currently dominant
perspective and its limitations will precede an analysis of the alternative
view, within which bureaucratic opposition can be understood.
Although there are many variations on the theme, prevailing theories of
organizations are essentially based on a "rational model" which explains
"organizational patterns - social structures, motivational strategies, coordi
nating mechanisms, etc. as outcomes of a goal-seeking or need-fulfilling
tendency of the organization." (3) One of the ways in which theories
"discover" facts is by directing inquiry to a specific problem. In the case of
the prevailing organizational analyses, the problems explored are those of top
management and the perspective generated is the manager’s.
That is, research questions have been posed from the standpoint of a
powerful actor concerned with the essentially technical adjustments
necessary to enhance the effectiveness of the organization. (4)
The bias of most organization theory towards the cares and concerns of
particular actors within the object of study has often resulted in descriptions
of bureaucracies that do not so much reflect the complexity of the total
situation as they express the managerial vision of what "ought" to exist.
Supporting this contention, Randall Collins claims that spanning a 30 year
period the "neo-rationalist line of managerial theory from Chester Barnard
(1938) to James D. Thompson (1967) ... is designed as a practical guide for
managers as well as a general theory." (5)
Max Weber's ideal-typical description of the bureaucratic organization has
been the model imitated by contemporary organization theory. The features
of Weber's construct, such as a hierarchy of authority, hiring and promotion
based on competence, and specific and written duties for each organizational
role, can be summed up by the term rationalization. This concept identifies
the process by which instrumental rationality, in which the means to an end
are related according to the criterion of efficiency in a predictable pattern of
cause and effect, becomes the overriding principle of social activity. In the
ideal of a rationalized organization, decisions are made by those at the peak
of the hierarchy of authority in the name and interests of constituencies such
as citizens or stockholders. These decisions are then implemented efficiently
by subordinates. Organizations are interpreted as tools for accomplishing
ends, and so the human beings composing them are primarily interpreted as
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means and not as ends-in-themselves.
Much of the theory and research concerning organizations concentrates on
the impediments to maximum efficiency and centers on how management
might overcome the irrationality of workers, whose informal groups may
reinterpret the rules, and their own misunderstandings of workers. C. Wright
Mills concludes that the managerial perspective assumes "the classic
formulae of a natural harmony of interests," efficient coordination which,
from time to time, is "interfered with by the frailty of human relations, as
revealed by the unintelligence of managers and the unhappy irrationality of
workmen." (6) Conflict, when acknowledged at all, is usually subsumed under
the concept of disorganization. As such it is interpreted as being irrationally
motivated and inimical to the ends of the organization, both substantive and
technical.
The bias of conventional organization theory, which excludes phenomena
evincing conflict, is paralleled by the efforts of organizational elites to
eliminate conflict. For both organization theory and managerial ideology,
action is divided into two categories. Rational action corresponds to the
bureaucratic ideal in which orders flow down the hierarchy of authority and
obedience follows, enhancing efficiency. As Weber puts it: "The official is
entrusted with specialized tasks and normally the mechanism cannot be put
into motion or arrested by him, but only from the very top." (7) The second
category of action, which is really residual, is labeled irrational and is
defined as all behavior inimical to the efficient attainm ent of organizational
goals. Maintaining this false dichotomy, organization theorists fail to
recognize as rational activity whatever does not emanate from the hierarchy
of authority.
In a broader sense than the organization theorists use it, rationality may
refer to the use of appropriate means to solve a problem, to reach a goal. In
this sense the rationality of an action is evaluated according to its adequacy
to the actor's goal. The fallacy underlying the false dichotomy in managerial
theories of organization is that of referring all action to the goals of upperlevel management, and thereby taking an ideological or partial perspective as
the basis of scientific theory. Thus, when subordinates disobey orders or
attem pt to change policies, the managerial theorists view their actions as
irrational because of assumptions that 1) those in authority know and order
appropriate means to reach universally shared goals and 2) there is agreement
on the goals themselves, whether they be efficiency, profit or, more usually,
subgoals which are simply means to other ends. Both these assumptions of
managerial theory are utterly unwarranted.
It is little wonder, then, that those holding the assumptions of managerial
theory would fail to recognize bureaucratic oppositions, which are essentially
rational activities that challenge the validity of one or both these
assumptions. Belief in shared goals and rational management perpetuates a
myth of organizations as systems of purely administrative activity. Criticism
of these assumptions discloses another view of organizations in which they
appear as semi-congeries of administrative activity interlarded with political
processes. Those perspectives which do not acknowledge political activity,
then, can neither observe nor name the phenomenon of bureaucratic
opposition.
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The perspective guiding the present discussion includes the administrative
or managerial interpretation of the organization within it, defining adminis
tration as a special case of political processes. Where there is complete
agreement on or acceptance of goals and procedures and their implementa
tion, organizations are merely administrative entities in which there are no
grounds for opposition or dissent but subjective will or emotion (irrationality).
Of course, such agreement is hardly ever present in an organization, and so if
there is no overt opposition one may assume that it is suppressed by fear,
resignation, or prudence, the grounds for reluctant obedience to authoritarian
regimes. Only in the case of perfect agreement is Lenin’s dictum that
politics be reduced to administration realized. Curent organization theory
rests on the myth of administration, and systematically ignores phenomena
contradictory to that myth.
The administrative myth contains its own interpretation of the human
condition or what Alvin Gouldner has called domain assumptions. Talcott
Parsons, who applied the managerial viewpoint to contemporary society,
makes these domain assumptions. He "defines the human being as an
organism seeking short-range pleasures, which must be controlled and
directed to sacrifice these desires for the maintenance of collective projects.
These collective projects, mediated through organizations, result in providing
the conditions for the survival of the organism. The person who holds such a
conception of human nature believes that human beings need religion, the
nation, the family, the state, and corporate economic enterprises to save
them from their own tendencies toward self-indulgence, self-destruction, and
the destruction of others." (8)
In contrast to managerial theory, the domain assumptions of the present
discussion, which support the idea that organizations are political systems,
interpret human beings as purposive actors who have the potential to act on
motives that are not rooted in fear, resentment, or selfish enjoyment, and
who are sometimes able to question the prevailing "definition of the
situation" and to act on their critical insight. The dominant value of this
perspective is neither control nor instrumental rationality, but the freedom of
the person as a moral actor, which is not factual but must be achieved
through struggle. Bureaucratic oppositions, whether they are successful or
not, are consistent with the motive of freedom, if only the negative freedom
of eliminating some perceived abuse. The perspective guiding this discussion
does not deny the existence of the motivations identified by Parsons, but
balances them with the freedom of the autonomous moral person.
In summary, the basic contention of the political perspective on
organizations is that administrative action is not capable of encompassing all
of the activities within an organization because 1) all goals and sub-goals are
not shared (that is, there is disagreement about whether certain goals should
be pursued) and 2) administrators do not always act "rationally" (that is, those
in managerial roles do not always conduct themselves in accordance with
universal criteria). (9) Organizations, then, are not fully rationalized: instru
mental rationality, in which the means to an end are related as steps in a
predictable pattern of cause and effect, is limited by other human processes.
Where work is not totally machine-like and so routine that the laborers are
merely extensions of the tools that they use, there are possibilities for
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different interpretations of what should be done, what aspects of the
occupational role should be emphasized, what constitutes justice with regard
to rewards and punishments, and when decisions about work become
commentaries on the worth and dignity of the worker.
The political perspective on organizations developed here draws upon Karl
Mannheim's distinction between routine and political activity. According to
Mannheim there are two aspects of any social situation: "first, a series of
social events which have acquired a set pattern and recur regularly; and,
second, those events which are still in the process of becoming, in which, in
individual cases, decisions have to be made that give rise to new and unique
situations." (10) The advantage of Mannheim's distinction is that political
activity is not identified with coercion or with any other technique of social
control but, instead, with uncertainty, diversity, and dispute. Mannheim was
mistaken, however, when he identified routinization with rationality and
politics with irrationality, arguing approvingly that the "chief characteristic
of modern culture is the tendency to include as much as possible in the realm
of the rational and to bring it under administrative control - and, on the other
hand, to reduce the 'irrational' element to the vanishing point." (11) In
contrast to Mannheim's position, the present discussion is based on the notion
that political disputes are not "irrational" at all, but reflect, primarily,
disagreement on the criteria for evaluating goals. To say that political
activity is "irrational" is to imply that it is possible to achieve a universal
agreement on goals merely by perfecting means.
Except for those parts of production organizations in which the role
definition of the blue-collar worker is relatively unambiguous and program
med by machinery and other tools, and in which opposition to the possibly
immoral consequences of production is excluded by the terms of the
"contract," organizations are pervious to political processes. For example,
much activity within organizations relates to people as clients, subordinates,
or the public. In the modern cultures of the West there has been a tendency
to distinguish between the realms of things and persons (Kant's differentiation
of the phenomenal world from the "kingdom of ends" is perhaps the most
lucid example), each realm having its distinctive standards. Organizations
which, for the most part, interpret human beings as means rather than as
ends-in-themselves provide many occasions for their morally sensitive
employees to dispute policies, and even overall goals. Further, even where
there is agreement on principles, those who handle "claims" or "cases" are
interpreting systems of rules and are likely to have their own "judicial
ideologies" which may clash with those of their superiors. Finally, above the
middle-level of organizational hierarchies, politics is inevitable because at
these upper levels decisions are made concerning routines. Logically, such
decisions cannot themselves be routine and there may be conflict over
alternative policies and disagreement about whether a particular decision was
"right" or "in the best interests" of the agency or sub-unit.
Political activity in organizations is also precipitated when promotion and
firing, as well as working conditions (for example, scheduling in hospitals or
academic institutions), are not routinized according to specific procedures.
Competition for preferm ent, attem pts at undermining rivals, and resentment
at being passed over are not bureaucratic oppositions, but may encourage,
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lead to, or deepen them. Attempts to make things seem as though they are
routine or that they are determined by ’’objective" standards of efficiency or
productivity are essentially rhetorical strategies which, like the managerial
viewpoint, have the political import of minimizing challenges to authority.
Traditionally, politics has been interpreted as the aspect of human
activity in which decisions are made about such issues as the proper definition
of function, policy, and justice. Politics has meant the possibility of choosing
among alternatives within a public situation; hence, discretion and the
possibility for varying interpretations are essential aspects of political
relations. Economic or instrumental activity can be programmed; this is not
the case for political activity in which contradictory values may be at stake.
We are concerned here with bureaucratic oppositions, which have been
defined as attem pts to change organizations from within by those who lack
the authority to make such changes. Organizational policy and personnel can
also be opposed by those who are outside the organization, such as clients,
consumers, or anyone affected by the organization including the public at
large, as evidenced by environmentalist groups. The study of opposition to
organizations from the outside is an important part of the study of
bureaucracies as political systems, but it is the subject of another
investigation than the one undertaken here.
The political process, whether it occurs in the state or in a bureaucratic
organization, involves opposition when some members of an authority system
do not acquiesce in decisions that have been made, in the procedures for
making them, or in their implementation. With regard to opposition, the
essential structural difference between authority systems is whether they
have institutionalized procedures for dissent or have not recognized the
legitimacy of dissent. Representative systems, in the contemporary world
democratic states, institutionalize dissent by allowing for "loyal" oppositions
which do not violate constitutional procedures, while authoritarian systems do
not make such provisions. Most complex organizations have an authoritarian
structure, or at least severely limit representative decision making, and so
oppositions within them will be more similar to those in authoritarian states
than to those in democracies.
There is a good case, then, for drawing analogies between bureaucratic
oppositions and oppositions to authoritarian states. Although a corporation
does not have absolute authority over a given geographical area as does a
state, both are systems of authoritative decision making which do not
officially acknowledge opposition. Employees, like citizens of authoritarian
regimes, lack freedoms:
... no freedom of speech - if they gave their subordinates or the press
details on the incompetence of their board they would be liable to be
fired, and if this is not the death penalty, it can still shatter (one's) life
as much as banishment; no right of trial, and no judiciary which is
independent of the executive - their career can be blighted and
promotion stopped for utterly unjust reasons ... and they have no sort
of representation in the councils which decide how the firm shall be
run, no say in its government, however much the decisions may affect
their lives. (12)
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The Chairman of the Board of Sears, Roebuck, and Company concurs:
... we complain about the totalitarian state, but in our individual
organizations ... we have created more or less of a totalitarian system
in industry, particularly in large industry. (13)
The strategies and tactics of oppositions, both against states and
organizations, vary according to circumstances and are not definitive of the
phenomenon of opposition itself. Contemporary political scientists, for
example, often differentiate between violent and nonviolent oppositions. At
the violent end of the continuum are internal wars. An internal war is
defined by Eckstein as "any resort to violence within a political order to
change its constitution, rulers, or policies." (14) Under this concept he
subsumes revolution, civil war, revolt, rebellion, uprising, guerilla warfare,
mutiny, jacquerie, coup d'etat, terrorism , and insurrection. According to
Kornhauser, who is specifically concerned with rebellion, such processes are
"alternatives to established ways of making demands on authority in an
orderly manner ... ways of performing political functions in the absence of
political structures capable of accommodating political demands." (15) Such
alternatives, of course, need not be violent, and there are many types of
nonviolent opposition to both authoritarian and formally democratic states,
ranging from clandestine disobedience to public and principled "civil
disobedience" such as that advocated by Thoreau.
Bureaucratic oppositions are usually nonviolent because of the state's
monopoly of force, although where the organization is a repository of this
force (for example, a police department) conflict may become violent. Most
bureaucratic oppositions use the tactics of dissenting groups in entrenched
authoritarian states, such as clandestine informal organization, symbolic
protest, publicity, appeal to higher authority, and, when possible, manipu
lation of procedures. In many respects, bureaucratic oppositions are similar
to the nonviolent protests of dissidents in contemporary Eastern European
states.
A political perspective on organizations not only directs attention to the
previously neglected phenomenon of bureaucratic oppositions but also opens
up the resources of political science for organizational studies. Oppositions
within the polity, particularly revolutions but also rebellions, other internal
wars, and protest movements, have been extensively studied. A review of
some of the pertinent categories and conclusions of the political science
literature is useful for providing analogies, parallels, and contrasts between
oppositions in the polity and those in bureaucracies. Such comparison also is
an aid to understanding the nature of political processes in a more general
sense than that attainable when interest is focused exclusively on the
institution of the state.
The host of oppositional movements within the polity have been
distinguished from one another on the basis of purpose and strategy.
Revolutions aspire to a total alteration in the socio-political system.
Revolutionary change is aimed initially at the political/governmental
machinery. In this sense political revolution involves a power transfer,
a change in the distribution of political power, a transformation of the

BUREAUCRATIC OPPOSITIONS: THE PHENEMENON

9

ruling class. ... This power transformation aims at, seeks, or sets the
stage for broader social change. Political revolution entails an array
of disruptions on all fronts: political, economic, psychological,
social. (16)
Less drastic and total forms of opposition than revolution are aimed at
changing certain policies and/or replacing particular personalities. Thus,
rebellions, coups, and civil disobedience, for example, are reformist rather
than revolutionary. Bureaucratic oppositions are necessarily reformist,
because a revolutionary opposition in an organization would presuppose
transforming the social structure in which the organization was embedded or
using the organization to transform that structure. While opposition intended
to use the organization as a revolutionary weapon is not only possible but
occurs in cases of "infiltration,” such opposition does not seek to transform
the organization in order to improve it but merely to use it. Bureaucratic
oppositions, then are generally both nonviolent and reformist, and are parallel
to similar oppositions within authoritarian states.
A subsidiary distinction refers to the scope of opposition. Some
oppositions are pursued within the boundaries of the organization or the
polity, and others attem pt to draw aid from outside. The "human rights"
policy of President Carter, which arose partly in response to the appeals of
dissidents in various authoritarian states, is an instance of nonviolent
oppositions in some polities gaining support from another political system.
"Whistle blowing," in which a dissident member of an organization seeks the
aid of communications media or governmental institutions, is a case of
bureaucratic oppositions going "outside," widening the scope of conflict.
The preceding distinctions among the strategies, aims, and scopes of
oppositional activity both in the polity and the organization will provide the
general categorical framework for the chapters to follow. Other distinctions
from the political science literature, such as those referring to leadership,
the conditions for opposition, and the stages of oppositional activity will be
introduced, clarified, criticized, and adapted where they are appropriate.
Further elucidation of the practice and problems of bureaucratic opposition
will be provided by many examples. These examples have been collected in
various ways and should not be viewed as necessarily representative of all
such cases. The "universe," as statisticians call it, of all bureaucratic
oppositions is unknown, and possibly unknowable. Many of the examples have
been gleaned from the mass media, while others originated from non-random
interviews with people who work within organizations, including my students.
Interestingly enough, no one who had be^en employed in a large bureaucracy
for more than a year was unaware of at least one bureaucratic opposition and
many had participated in one or more struggles. Rather than proceeding
inductively, the examples will be used to illustrate generalizations derived
from theory about bureaucratic oppositions. Attention will first be directed
to the causes, conditions, and settings within which bureaucratic oppositions
arise. Second, the processes and problems of opposition group formation from the overcoming of "habits of obedience" to risk, trust, and leadership will be examined. An exploration of the various strategies and tactics of op
positions will precede an evaluation of their prospects, outcomes, and
significance.
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Grounds for
Bureaucratic Opposition

The greatest of faults, I should say, is to be conscious of none.
Thomas Carlyle, Heroes and
Hero Worship
Organizations are fields for political activity, not the purely administra
tive entities that are described by their apologists and elites. They differ
from democratic political structures, however, because, like authoritarian
states, they do not have institutionalized oppositions. Organizations do not
have routine procedures for the expression and implementation of the
demands, or proposals for change, issuing from those who are intimately
affected by them but do not have formal authority. Attempts to effectuate
change from below, to influence the circumstances within the organization in
which one is employed, necessitate initiative, energy, and risk-taking beyond
the voting and letter writing that characterize most participation in mass
democracies. In subsequent chapters the kinds of initiative, risk taking, and
strategy guiding bureaucratic opposition will be discussed. In the present
chapter the preliminary issue of why people take such extraordinary measures
within their organizations will be addressed. Why are bureaucratic
oppositions undertaken? What are the reasons why people overcome inertia,
which is supported by the managerial myth, and come to believe that they
might and should struggle for change?
The question of why bureaucratic oppositions are undertaken is ambiguous.
In the contemporary social sciences the reasons for a phenomenon are
normally interpreted to be efficient causes, the observable conditions
antecedent to the appearance of the phenomenon. However, there is another
meaning of ’’why" in accounts of human activity which refers to final causes,
the legitim ate grounds or justifications for a certain kind of conduct. The
distinction between causes and grounds is central to the analysis of social
action, but it is often blurred in everyday life and even in the social sciences.
The efficient causes or antecedent conditions sought in empirical science are
11
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observable phenomena of the same type as the effects to be explained. For
example, when Pareto explains opposition he correlates successful dissent
with elite incapacity for effective violence and/or effective manipulation. (1)
Similarly Gurr associates opposition with relative deprivation, the "perceived
discrepency between men's value expectations and their value capa
bilities." (2) Both elite incapacity and relative deprivation are empirical
conditions, not grounds or justifications. The facts of elite incapacity or
relative deprivation become related to grounds only when they are compared
to an ideal normative standard, which is not an Empirical phenomenon. For
example, if one believes that government should be strong enough to enforce
its directives, elite incapacity would be a ground for opposition, as it was for
Hobbes. That Hobbes also believed that elite Incapacity was a condition for
opposition does not destroy the distinction between cause and ground.
Similarly, if one believes that one's value expectations should be realized,
then relative deprivation would be a ground for opposition^ Grounds, then,
are associated with "ought" statem ents while causes are associated with "is"
statem ents.
The confusion between grounds and causes in ordinary discourse and in
social science arises most frequently from interpreting grounds as causes.
Brinton, for example, in his discussion of revolutions, states that "men may
revolt partly or even mainly because they are hindered," but that "also to
themselves - they must appear wronged": (3) "'Cramp' must undergo moral
transfiguration before men will revolt." (4) In the term s of the present
discussion, "moral transfiguration" means giving grounds for opposition by
reference to an ideal. The ideal itself, however, is not a cause, although
commitment to the ideal or the desire to realize it may function as causes. It
may even be a necessary condition for oppositions that grounds be given for
them, that at least some participants are committed to grounds, or that
grounds be used as rationalizations for interests. Regardless of how grounds
become motivated, however, they make the phenomenon of opposition public
and intelligible by offering putative justification for it. Every social
organization has a normative or ideal dimension in term s of which its
performance may be judged. Often there are competing or complementary
sets of criteria by which performance may be judged. Criticism in term s of
such ideal criteria takes the form of offering grounds.
The distinction between grounds and causes is rooted in Kant's distinction
between practical anthropology and ethics. For Kant, practical anthropology
was the study of the causes of human conduct, the laws of inclination or
interest, while ethics was the study of the principles by which conduct is
justified. (5) Kant believed that the ideal of right conduct had to be
motivated by a good will to be effective, but that it made such good will
intelligible by defining its form. The present discussion does not depend upon
a single ethical ideal, but follows Kant by differentiating the ideal from the
empirical dimension of conduct. Were grounds irrelevant to oppositions, then
oppositions would merely be clashes of interest. The use of grounds, even if
only as rationalizations for interest, give oppositions an ideal dimension.
Whether commitment to grounds is in good faith or not is an empirical
question, the answer to which will vary in different cases. The ideal
dimension, however, gives oppositions their public meaning and purpose.
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The analysis of the grounds for bureaucratic opposition has both psychological
and social dimensions. Although most of the motives for opposition are
grounded in the organization’s structure or in wider social norms there is a
category of motives which are purely personal and subjective, or "un
grounded.” For example, members of an opposition may be motivated by
idiosyncratic whim ("my boss has a certain je ne sais quoi which makes me
hate him and want to do him in”), personal ambition r i i this policy can be
changed I will have a better chance of being promoted”), and psychiatric
malaise (the person is just disruptive for one reason or another). The
presence of subjective motives for oppositional activity is used by
administrators to brand all such activity as arbitrary, pathological, irrelevant,
and ill-advised. Hence, in any extended oppositions such motives must be
concealed and publicly replaced by references to grounded abuses. Those
with subjective motives for opposition, then, usually join or recruit others
who are committed to more ’’noble” aims.
Although the evidence is not as complete as one might wish, it appears that
at least one member of any bureaucratic opposition is impelled by ungrounded
motives, which may or may not be supplemented by concern to eliminate
perceived abuses.
..
An example of the interplay between grounds and motives in an opposition
is reported by a minor executive at a small but very successful manufacturing
firm which was incorporated into a large conglomerate. (6) According to this
executive, an incompetent superior, who was afraid to make any decisions,
stymied the effectiveness of the small group under his authority. Although
all of the four subordinates were frustrated, my informant indicated that he
did not think that any action would have been taken had it not been for the
overweening ambition of one member of the group. In this case, the efficient
cause for the opposition was ambition while the ground was deviation from
the ideal of efficiency. In other oppositions the efficient cause can be
commitment to an ideal.
The grounds for oppositions are relative to the ideals brought to bear on
concrete situations. Many bureaucratic oppositions are grounded in r^s^~
tance to violations of purely bureaucratic norms, such as those defined by
Max Weber in his ideal-typical bureaucracy. (7) Such conditions as injustice,
dishonor, and incompetence are infractions of administrative rules and
provide justification for opposition. Similarly, inefficient or ineffective
policies violate the principle of instrumental rationality, the regulative i ea
of administration. However, bureaucratic oppositions may also be groun e
in wider moral norms such as fairness or some such ultim ate ethical princip e
as the categorical imperative to treat others as ends, never as means °™y*
Despite the various criteria, however, all grounds have in common their
appeal to ideal standards and their aim at justification.
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ABUSES GROUNDED IN DEVIATIONS FROM
THE BUREAUCRATIC IDEAL
Abuses related to deviations from the administrative ideal involve issues
of justice, efficiency, or honor. In Weber's discussion of the bureaucracy,
workers are interpreted as mere functionaries who perform only their
prescribed tasks and who treat every problem in accordance with the written
rules, which refer to the proper handling of cases, not of people. One is to
conduct one's office "without regard for person." Rules, rather than passions,
are supposed to govern the bureaucrat's activities. Of course, rule
compliance has just as much of an emotional basis as has rule violation, if the
impact of habit is eliminated. According to the bureaucratic ideal, however,
only those emotions which support rule compliance are admitted. Failure to
perform according to the rules, either because of total disregard for them
(arbitrary despotism) or because of subjective considerations such as racial
prejudice, greed, or sexual attraction, constitutes bureaucratic malfeasance.
Malfeasance is defined here as the inconsistent application or disregard of
"the rules." The charge of malfeasance as a ground for bureaucratic
opposition implies that all parties agree on the way in which the rule should
be applied. When there is disagreement on the interpretation of the rules
(which rules should apply to given cases and what a rule means) the grounds
for opposition concern policy differences and not malfeasance. Although the
distinction between policy differences and malfeasance is conceptually clear,
the lines are blurred in practice because accused malfeasants often claim
that oppositions against them are based on substantive disputes.
Charges of malfeasance can focus on the formal equality of rule
application or on substantive effects of rule violation. Justice within
organizations refers to the consistent, fair, and universalistic application of
the rules. Injustice can be directed against subordinates or against relevant
publics. In the latter instance, the groups, such as taxpayers, welfare
recipients, or customers, may organize in opposition to the organization, but
such activity is not a bureaucratic opposition. Subordinates who witness or
experience injustice or unfairness often feel a sense of moral outrage,
particularly if they have little authority. A worker in the cost accounting
departm ent of a large industrial corporation communicates such outrage in
less than impeccable grammar:
My climatic opposition with Mr. V began when Gloria and I implored
him to show us where it is a written policy of the company that allows
him to deviate so far from the normal practices of the company. We
wanted to know how he was personally perm itted to set double
standards (where only the male accountants could go on paid trips to
various plants) for his employees, when he knew some of the rules he
enforced were based on convention. N.C.'s corporate office has a
reputation of being very liberal in regards to its employees as far as
benefits, promotions, etc. for both sexes. That is why it was so
difficult to accept or conform to the stringent rules of this one
maniac. (8)
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In another case, the supervisor of the research staff in a production
department regularly issued "discriminatory task assignments." A bureau
cratic opposition began when
... only those members of the Staff who felt that they had been dis
criminated against because of race or sex, took the initiative to meet
with the Office Manager (supervisor’s superior) ... The complaints were
never investigated and the Office Manager reported the visits to the
Supervisor. ... In an effort to discourage and prevent future contacts,
he scrutinized the work of these employees who visited the Office
Manager. When mistakes were found, no m atter how insignificant, the
employees were told that they were fired. (9)
In both these instances the bureaucratic opposition did not meet with initial
success. The eventual achievement of their goals, the removal of the mal
feasants, was secured by informing higher administrators of the dysfunctional
consequences of norm violation. Administrators' awareness of the violations
themselves was not sufficient to secure remedial action. These cases are
indicative of a general pattern in which injustice, in itself, is insufficient to
cause removal.
Fortunately, from the viewpoint of oppositionists, injustice, including the
use of arbitrary power, rarely fails to violate the norms of efficiency and/or
honor. Further, many instances of injustice also fall under the category of
corruption, and thus are viewed by higher authorities as serious infractions, so
long as these authorities are not themselves involved in the corrupt practices.
David H. Bayley, a political scientist, states that corruption, "while being tied
particularly to the act of bribery, is a general term covering misuse of
authority as a result of considerations of personal gain, which need not be
monetary." (10) This definition can encompass activities within both public
agencies and "private" profit-making corporations. Yet the literature on
corruption has been confined for the most part to the polity and its
organizations. (11) This lopsided emphasis on corruption in the public sector
is due, perhaps, to the widespread idea that business organizations are subject
to the discipline of the marketplace and will simply go bankrupt at no one's
loss but their own if they are too corrupt. Government, on the other hand, is
supported by the taxpayer's money and, according to the conventional
wisdom, has no institutional check on its inefficiency. Business corruption,
then, is widely interpreted as being harmful only to the business, while
governmental corruption is interpreted as being harmful to the public. In an
economy ruled by oligopolies which are bailed out by government when they
are on the verge of bankruptcy, the distinction between business and
governmental corruption has little practical meaning. However, persistence
of the myth of market discipline influences the relative importance of
charges of corruption in different organizations and, therefore, the strategies
pursued by bureaucratic opposition groups.
As implied in the definition, the motive for corruption is to obtain
personal benefits beyond those stipulated in the contract of employment.
One major characteristic of all modern bureaucracies is that an incumbent
does not own his or her office. A salary is paid and perhaps other clearly
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specified perquisites are provided, but there is a prohibition on exchanging
the power of one’s office for additional benefits. In some organizations the
separation of office from personal benefit is widely honored, while in others
it is barely existent. The distinction between corruption committed by an
isolated individual and corruption endemic to an organization is crucial for
understanding bureaucratic oppositions. Confronting and attem pting to
remove or change the behavior of a lone malfeasant is quite different from
being embedded in an organization in which corrupt activity is a common
practice. Corrupt organizations often respond to opposition by trying to
make it appear that infractions were not condoned and that isolated violators
will be punished. In his efforts to clean up the New York City police force
Serpico’s initial failures were largely due to his naive judgment that the
corruption was an individual and not an organizational phenomenon. When the
truth finally got through to him, rather painfully, he changed his oppositional
tactics. Of course, as will be indicated in subsequent chapters, the most
appropriate tactics do not guarantee the success of a bureaucratic opposition.
When corruption is widespread within an organization it is often
interpreted as normal behavior and scarcely perceived to be a norm violation.
In speaking with numerous policemen in the service of a large midwestern
city, only one complained, and did so bitterly, about the ubiquitous
corruption. He was clearly pained by the disregard of his colleagues for "the
rules." He himself accepted no bribes, either in goods or cash, from drug
dealers trying to avoid arrest. He claimed that he knew of only one other
officer with such scruples. His inability to act in ways that he thought proper
led him finally to resign from the force. His crise de conscience aroused mv
interest. Why had none of the others complained? When I asked them how
they handled corruption a pattern emerged. All of those to whom I spoke,
with the exception of the officer discussed above, had relatives who were
policemen. It was through them that they had learned what to expect. They
were convinced, before personally confronting the corruption, that things
were as they should or "had to" be and, thus, that there was no need to change
them.
Another consideration with regard to bureaucratic opposition to corrup
tion is who benefits when there is pervasive corruption. That is, when the
rules are broken do the gains devolve directly to the individuals involved or
does the organization as a whole stand to benefit from the practices? (12)
When the primary beneficiary is the organization itself, the ground of
opposition ought not to be classified as rule violation. Whether the instance
is bribes paid to foreign officials by American multinational corporations, or
surveillance of civilians by the military, or a company’s keeping two sets of
quality-control books to deceive health inspectors, such cases have more in
common with disputes over policies and their implementation.
When incumbents of bureaucratic roles break the organization's rules,
however, whether by applying the rules with partiality or by ignoring the rules
altogether, their actions constitute formal breaches of justice. As noted,
such infractions may and do, by themselves, constitute grounds for some
bureaucratic oppositions. Structurally, rule infraction may be considered as
an abuse or misuse of authority, while motivationally it is a spur to moral
outrage over inequity, unfairness or dishonesty.
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The consequences of deviations from organizational norms may, inde
pendently or in conjunction with injustice, constitute grounds for bureaucratic
oppositions. Perhaps the most important possible effect of rule infraction is
the reduction in or elimination of the organization's efficiency. One of the
common justifications for bureaucracy is its supposed greater efficiency than
preceding organizational forms. Efficiency refers to the effective achieve
ment of the organizational goal, whatever it may be. Explicit division of
labor, hierarchy of authority, conduct of office without regard for persons,
and appointment and promotion of individuals to positions on the sole basis of
their competency are defining characteristics of a bureaucracy, all of which
are designed to augment efficiency. Specific sets of rules cover each of
these general norms and when such rules are violated the organization is
likely to become inefficient. Of course, inefficiency does not always result
from rule infraction. For example, violation of the division of labor, as when
colleagues in different departments give unauthorized aid to one another,
may even make the organization more efficient, at least in the short run.
However, despite the debate in the organizational literature over the effects
of some of the bureaucratic norms on efficiency, there is general agreement
that application of the norm of competence is essential for maximum
efficiency.
In a literal and formal sense the superiors of an incompetent employee are
the ones who have violated the norm of competence. However, bureaucratic
oppositions directed against incompetence usually focus on the incompetent
officials, not on those responsible for their appointment. Cases in which
oppositions are aimed at those who made hiring and promotion decisions are
usually grounded in charges of discrimination; that is, someone has not been
hired or promoted because of prejudice against an ascriptive characteristic
such as sex, age, race, or religion. The proliferation of national voluntary
groups to counteract discrimination (for example, for blacks, women, and
gays) has provided support to bureaucratic oppositions against discrimination.
Such oppositions are usually fought on the grounds of injustice, although
incompetence and, perhaps, dishonor may also be reasons.
The structural ground for an opposition against incompetence is that the
role incumbent is not discharging assigned duties. Subordinates who must
follow inappropriate orders are usually aware that their own performance is
impaired. Thus, opposition to incompetence is often bound up with concern
for career advancement, the desire to do meaningful and high-quality work,
commitment to the norms of just rewards and equal opportunity, and concern
for the deleterious effects of inappropriate or self-defeating action. The
crew on Captain Arnheiter's Naval vessel judged their superior to be
incapable of giving orders and mutinied. Mutiny is a special case of
bureaucratic opposition because there is no higher authority to whom to
appeal, it requires direct action, and, most importantly, it involves a
usurpation of authority. 3ust as in the fictional "Caine Mutiny," the
"Arnheiter Affair" led to a court-m artial of the mutineers. In the latter case
the court did not agree with the mutineers' assessment of their superior's
competence.
Many issues are involved in understanding bureaucratic incompetence. Is
it based on intellectual incapacity to perform role requirements or is it
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rooted in psychological factors? Are incompetent officials appointed because
the norms have not been applied correctly or does incompetence only become
manifest after the official has taken the position? Is there, perhaps,
something about the structure of bureaucracies themselves or about positions
of authority that fosters incompetence? Another set of issues relates to the
perception of incompetence. Superiors often seem to suffer from what Josiah
Royce called "viciously acquired naivete" about the excellence of their
appointees or immediate subordinates. Is it merely that superiors do not want
to admit to incorrect hiring and promotion procedures or to mistakes in
applying good procedures? Or are subordinates more likely to perceive
incompetent administration because they are directly involved in its effects?
Although some people are fired or, more rarely, demoted, does a criterion
such as "their attitude" play a greater part in their removal than does
incompetence? In summary, if bureaucracies attem pt to pursue goals
efficiently, why are so many incompetents found in modern organizations?
One way of responding to the issues involved in bureaucratic incom
petence is to investigate why incompetents are not removed. Most
bureaucracies make little provision for dismissing employees and, as Weber
noted, "Normally, the position of the official is held for life, at least in public
bureaucracies; and this is increasingly the case for all similar structures." (13)
In a discussion of public bureaucracies Blanche Blank remarks,
If getting good people in has its frustrations, getting poor ones out is
even worse. Dismissals in the New York City civil service run to less
than 1.5 per cent a year. The required proceedings are highly formal,
almost like a trial - and generally suggestive that it is the supervisor
rather than the employee who is being tried. ... Considering, therefore,
the risk of the unsettling effects on various segments of personnel, the
tremendous consumption of agency tim e, the heavy cost and the
ordinary human reluctance to do unpleasant things, it is remarkable
that any dismissals are achieved under present conditions. (14)
Lawrence Peter (15) explains endemic incompetence in organizations by
arguing that people are rewarded for doing their jobs well by promotion to
other jobs which usually have more status, higher income, and greater power.
Competent performance of a new task will eventuate in still another
promotion. However, when an employee no longer performs adequately the
promotion process will end. Over time, then, positions tend to be filled by
incompetents. For example, excellent teachers may become bad principals,
superb craftsm en may become grouchy and ineffective foremen, and hot-shot
salespeople may become unproductive sales managers. Peter traces the
problem of incompetence to the evaluation of candidates for a position on the
basis of past performance at tasks that are not related to the functions of the
new job. Hence, bureaucracies create incompetents.
Despite its great popularity among employees of large organizations, who
assume that it applies to their bosses and not to themselves, "Peter's
Principle" is a bit too glib to be accepted at face value. Why do many
observations seem to support the "principle"? One possibility is that the new
job differs in essential respects from the old one. One may perform a task
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well not only because one has been trained adequately for it but because it
affords intrinsic value, regardless of its financial, status, and/or power
rewards. People promoted to administrative positions are often judged to be
incompetent. They have been removed from performing activities that they
may have enjoyed and for which they were well suited, and they have been
given the task of controlling others. Unless one enjoys exercising power over
others or is satisfied fully by extrinsic financial and status gains, promotion
into administration may be, at best, a mixed blessing. Perceived incompe
tence may stem not only from a deficiency in control skills and other
administrative talents, but from resentment at being deprived of satisfying
work. Administration is the "art" of getting others to do a task efficiently.
Managers may miss the direct satisfaction of doing something concrete, be it
making a sale, teaching a course, or handling a welfare client's problem.
Since Marx's writings appeared, those concerned with worker alienation have
considered control over one's work and its conditions to be the most
important occupational value. They have failed to note, probably for
ideological reasons, that form of alienation related to lack of direct control
which is inherent in administrative roles.
In more general term s, of course, any or all aspects of a bureaucrat's job
may be alienating. In the syndrome of alienation the person cannot identify
with his or her work, therefore, the work loses its subjective meaning. The
worker becomes less devoted and less efficient, and often tries to avoid
making decisions. Marx's notion of alienation, although it was meant to apply
to blue-collar work, is just as applicable, if not more so, to the jobs of whitecollar bureaucrats:
What do we mean by the alienation of labor? First, that the work he
performs is extraneous to the worker, that is, it is not personal to him,
is not part of his nature; therefore he does not fulfill himself in work,
but actually denies himself; feels miserable rather than content,
cannot freely develop his physical and mental powers, but instead
becomes physically exhausted and mentally debased. Only while not
working can the worker be himself; for while at work he experiences
himself as a stranger. (16)
People who experience themselves as "other-than-themselves" are not only
capable of inefficiency but of outright cruelty. Controls such as guilt and
ideals of humaneness function in the autonomous person, not in those who are
strangers to themselves.
From Here to Eternity (17) can be interpreted as the novelist James
3ones*s attem pt to illustrate the tyranny and abuse leveled at subordinates by
a compulsive and merciless individual who is alienated from his meaningless
job. Less vicious, but perhaps more insidious, is the behavior of Bob Slocum,
the anti-hero of Joseph Heller's Something Happened. (18) Employed as a
middle-level adm inistrator in a large and nameless business organization,
Slocum is the epitome of the alienated bureaucrat. His treatm ent of his
subordinates, colleagues, and family is often cruel and arbitrary. From is
interior monologue we learn that he is as confused by his Kafkaesque actions
as are those around him. (19)
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The incompetence that results from resentment and alienation may have
consequences beyond the inadequate performance of specialized tasks. It
may also be the underlying reason for acts that form the basis of other
grounds for bureaucratic opposition, such as injustice and dishonor. In the
managerial ideology administration is the highest form of work and is judged
to be universally desirable. Challenging this pervasive assumption reveals the
possibility that the administrative myth is a subtle form of ressentiment and
that hierarchical organization may have built-in psychological strains that
engender inefficiency. (20).
In addition to the structural determinants of incompetence there are many
psychological and social-psychological explanations for it. Some analysts of
society have argued that the exercise of power itself has deleterious effects
on those who employ it. When political scientists assess opposition to
authoritarian regimes they often quote Lord Acton's dictum that "Power
tends to corrupt: absolute power corrupts absolutely." (21) More to the
point, perhaps, is a statem ent made by a black sheep of the American
Revolution, Sam Adams: "Power is intoxicating. There have been few men
who, when possessed of unrestrained power, have not made a very bad use of
it." (22) Administrators do not, as a rule^have absolute or unrestrained power.
However, due to the difficulty of removing officials as noted above and other
considerations to be discussed later, the supposed checks on managerial
power, such as the observations of superiors and the performance of
subordinates, are ineffective restraints.
A psychiatrist, Dr. H. Waldo Bird, identifies a set of personality charac
teristics which he claims are responsible both for propelling his male subjects
to the top of organizations and for their incompetence and subsequent failure.
In the successful men he observed, including those "whose corrupt behavior,
sexual misadventures, incompetence or breakdowns have made news headlines*
recently, ... (the) drive for authority, control, and domination assumes over
whelming proportions as does the sex drive ...." (23) Other observers identify
what may be called "male menopause" or "mid-life crisis" as a cause of in
competence. A journalistic account of such a crisis cites the example of "a
¿ ': year"old production manager (who) began dumping all his office responsi
bilities on subordinates, some of them untrained to handle them, and filling
his own day with unimportant work." (24) The so-called male menopause is
not, according to the proponents of this explanation, a physiological
phenomenon, but the result of highly career-conscious people recognizing that
they are not going to "make it to the top" or that the position they had
struggled for and finally achieved is not rewarding after all.
In attem pting to account for incompetence one should not overlook the
effects of alcoholism and the various types of mental illness which are
widespread in the public at large. The Catholic Church and some unions and
corporations have acknowledged the frequent incidence of alcoholism and
have begun clinics for those who voluntarily undergo treatm ent or who are
persuaded to do so. The medical profession classifies alcoholism and mental
disorders as illnesses, attem pting to remove the stigma of personal
responsibility from them. However, many individuals are reluctant to admit,
either to others or to themselves, that they suffer from such afflictions,
borne bureaucratic oppositions are, of course, struggles against administrators
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who are mentally ill or alcoholics. Even if the oppositionist is sympathetic to
the superior’s plight such benevolent emotions must be overcome by an
attitude of ruthless compassion which focuses upon objectionable actions. A
male nurse who participated in a bureaucratic opposition to remove the
Director of Nursing Services at a suburban community hospital at which he
was employed reported,
Most significant was the inflexibility of the Director, partially based
on false information given her, and her own personal problems which
clouded her judgment. She was rumored to drink heavily to the point
that she was home ’ill’ many times and when at work acted ’peculiar’
and used mouth deodorants excessively. (25)
Inflexibility, such as that exemplified by the Director of Nursing Services,
constitutes the basis of a number of related theories of organizational in
competence. Victor Thompson coined the term "bureaupathology” to identify
the various manifestations of inflexibility, which run the gamut from personal
problems to what Thorstein Veblen called ’’trained incapacity” (over
specialization). (26) Overspecialized bureaucrats cannot adapt to changes
within the organization or the society at large and, thus, evince incompe
tence. For example, the introduction of computer technology or the rise of
the black liberation movement probably caused many administrators to
become incompetent because they were not flexible enough to cope with and
adapt to new demands and requirements.
Robert K. Merton has investigated the structural factors that lead to the
formation of the inflexible ’’bureaucratic personality.” Merton asserts that
conformity to the rules, the reliability of behavior, is essential to an efficient
bureaucracy. Such conformity can best be achieved ”if the ideal patterns are
buttressed by strong sentiments which entail devotion to one's duties, a keen
sense of the limitations of one's authority and competence, and methodical
performance of routine activities.” (27) Often such sentiments are
overstressed in order to insure compliance and there occurs a "transference
of the sentiments from the aims of the organizaiton onto the particular
details of behavior required by the rules. Adherence to the rules, originally
conceived as a means, becomes transformed into an end-in-itself." (28) Thus,
Merton suggests that inflexible, and therefore potentially incompetent
people, are trained to be so by the bureaucracy itself. Others have suggested
that the inflexible bureaucrat manifests a particular personality type which
was nurtured and developed in early childhood (for example, the "analretentive" personality). The presence of such people in organizations would
be attributed to self-selection.
That rigid adherence to rules is often incompetent behavior which affects
the organization adversely shows that the rules do not always promote
efficiency and that incompetence can result from following them. This
judgment is illustrated by the well-known protest tactic of "work-by-rule."
Traffic controllers at airports have effectively stopped all plane traffic by
this procedure and it is sometimes one of the tactics of bureaucratic
opposition.
The inflexibility of a superior becomes a barrier to efficiency when there
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is a breach between the formal rules of an organization and the informal,
everyday procedures that often grow up in efforts to adapt the rules to
concrete situations. (29) An FBI agent considered the excessive phone calls
and the "insipid and insistent suggestions" of his headquarters supervisor to be
an attem pt at "trying to look competent rather than be competent." (30)
When the agent was disciplined for failing to write up a report on a tip
provided by an informant who was known for his unreliability, his colleagues
supported him in a bureaucratic opposition. They demonstrated to the higher
echelon that the supervisor's over-rigid adherence to details constituted
interference with the agency's mission and that the agent had been unfairly
punished.
Inflexible adherence to rules may be due neither to personality nor to
bureaucratic training, but may result from a feeling of "having" to prove to
others that one is competent. Such overcompensation is especially prevalent
among those whose ascriptive characteristics differ from the qualities of the
"normal" role incumbent (for example, women, non-whites, and the very
young).
The first female supervisor at a nationwide shipping company, N. was put
in charge of a highly effective loading dock. According to one of her
subordinates, high morale had resulted in a system of mutual aid which was at
variance with the rules. N. recognized the efficiency of this informal system
and felt at ease with it until she attended a meeting with other supervisors
and managers. One can only speculate about what went on at the meeting,
but when N. returned she "began to raise hell. She said that we (the workers)
didn't run the area and she did." (31) Exercising her authority, she permitted
no talking on the job, transferred workers to different positions arbitrarily,
and prohibited the mutual assistance activities. The group's efficiency
dropped precipitously and then decreased still further as the workers
retaliated in a greve du zele. N. eventually quit. Because N. was a female in
a previously all-male position, she was judged by special standards; her peers
and superiors were concerned with her style, not with her achievement. A
male, especially a white middle-aged male, would probably not have been
singled out as being too easy. Due to the pressures on women to overstress
the masculine stereotype of management it is a wonder that many more are
not strict and "bitchy."
Rigid rule enforcement becomes incompetence in several ways. In
addition to the possibility that the rules themselves generate inefficiency,
subordinates may, like Dostoevsky's underground man, resist being "piano
keys" or being treated as machines which are turned on at a specific hour,
programmed to perform certain motions, and then turned off at another
specific time. Informal systems may grow up as a response to the
mechanization of the individual and may indicate an assertion of individual
will. The desire to exert one's will for its own sake (Dostoevsky's "freedom to
be free") sabotages many administrative plans to increase efficiency by
changing the rules. The hope that "rational" changes will increase compliance
is frequently dashed by the creation of ever-new informal networks.
Administrators tend to rationalize their failures by accusing their employees
of laziness or irresponsibility, because their perspective does not allow them
to acknowledge mere willfulness. A common example of such administrative
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tunnel vision involves time regulations. Employees may take 40 minutes for
lunch when the rules allow them only half an hour. The "enlightened”
manager, who does not want to punish but who does want to maintain control,
revises the rules to read "40 minutes for lunch." Shortly afterwards the
employees begin to take 45 or 50 minutes for their mid-day meal. Rigid rule
enforcement, then, is often perceived as an attack on one's dignity, a denial
of one's volition. A common response to the perceived denial of dignity is to
assert one's will, which within organizations usually can only be done by rule
violation. If the rules are so engineered that they produce efficiency when
they are obeyed, the assertion of will as a reaction to rigid enforcement leads
to a reduction of organizational efficiency.
In addition to the various structural, psychological, and social-psychologi
cal explanations of incompetence, there is another determinant which might
be termed rational or purposive. In this case people do not perform their role
requirements competently because they find that the requirements are not in
their own best interest. Most instances of incompetence grounded in rational
self-interest are classified under corruption, but one may imagine examples in
which people are purposefully inefficient so that they can hold on to jobs that
would disappear if they were done effectively. For example, corruption,
whether it is interpreted as injustice or incompetence or both by those who
oppose it, has consequences for the character of opposition. In publicly
exposing the considerable cost overruns of the C5A cargo jet project, Ernie
Fitzgerald stressed the resultant inefficiency rather than the possible kick
backs, post-retirem ent job offers, etc., that led officials of the Defense
Department to award and oversee contracts so ineffectively. A study of the
former Air Force engineer's case suggests that, whatever the motive for
Fitzgerald's "whistle-blowing" bureaucratic opposition, he believed that an
appeal to the ground of incompetence rather than to that of injustice would
be more prudent. (32)
In addition to incompetence, a second possible effect of norm violation is
the denial of respect or of honor to other persons, whether subordinate
employees or members of the organization's clientele. As a ground for op
position, disrespect is specifically the subjection of persons to demands that
are beyond their role requirements. These requirements are defined by the
organization's rules, although they tend to be less explicit for clients than for
employees. For example, a chairperson may require that faculty attend
departmental meetings, meet their assigned classes, and turn in grades on
time. These demands are within the chairperson's rights, because they match
the explicit duties of each faculty member. However, a chairperson who uses
departmental funds to purchase equipment for private use, indulgently forces
secretaries to witness abusive temper tantrums, or insists that faculty host
departmental social events at their own expense abuses authority and violates
the rules. Such actions as displays of temper and extra demands on
employees are not only instances of injustice, but of dishonor. They require
subordinates to act in ways that are undefined by, if not irrelevant to, their
role descriptions.
A Chicago legal secretary was fired because she refused, even after
receiving a written directive, to make coffee for the lawyers for whom she
worked. With the aid of other secretaries in the office, who came to work in
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waitress’ uniforms to protest her dismissal, and the news media, a successful
bureaucratic opposition of two week’s duration resulted in her reinstatem ent.
Since the expectation that secretaries make coffee for their superiors is
general in organizations one might inquire why there have not been many
more of such oppositions. Only recently have secretaries begun to define
their role as excluding the ’’traditional" functions of women, a change
associated with the Women’s Liberation Movement. Under the new definition,
only strictly secretarial tasks, such as taking dictation and typing, are
perceived to be legitim ate demands, while the performance of "wifely" or
"motherly" functions is interpreted as degrading. That the performance of
duties extrinsic to the secretarial role is not yet widely perceived to be
dishonorable, and may even be regarded as an honor, is related to the lack of
self-respect of many women. Without self-respect the experience of
dishonorable treatm ent is impossible.
One source of dishonor, then, is the merging of ascriptive characteristics
and the behavioral expectations based on them with occupational role expec
tations. The more that a single ascriptive group dominates an occupation or
clientele, the more likely it is that there will be dishonorable treatm ent. The
cultural ground of violation of the bureaucratic norm of treatm ent "without
regard for person" is often supplemented, or supplanted, by idiosyncratic
prejudice. An assistant to a bank branch manager in the Southeast was
infuriated by her superior's disrespect for her. He called her one of the
’’girls," frequently asked her to bring him coffee, and made cracks about
"libbers." Believing that virtue would triumph, that her superiors would
acknowledge her excellence and punish the incompetence of her immediate
boss, she refused to object to the degrading treatm ent. (33)
Social movement organizations, such as the National Organization for
Women, the Grey Panthers, the NAACP, and gay rights groups, attem pt to
combat dishonor and disrespect. One of their basic tactics is consciousness
raising, which is intended to give their constituents a sense of pride in
themselves. Such pride, however, has the effect of making people more
aware of and vulnerable to the experience of dishonor. These movement
organizations have lobbied for laws and enforcement mechanisms to end
dishonorable treatm ent, but for political reasons they have often phrased
their objectives exclusively in term s of justice. The results of their efforts,
such as the creation of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, have
aided some bureaucratic oppositions. The rights movements also attem pt to
educate the public, which includes organizational authorities, about the
invalidity and inhumane consequences of the stereotyping which is the basis
of much disrespective treatm ent.
Violation of rules specifying the rights of employees or clients can be
opposed on the grounds of both injustice and disrespect. However, the
motivational ground for members of a bureaucratic opposition is usually
dishonor. When the clients are dishonored, bureaucratic oppositions in their
favor usually occur when they are in a relatively weak position with regard to
the organization and have few resources to mount a defense on their own
behalf. Action in behalf of clients is also more likely where the employees
are professionals or semi-professionals whose occupational ideology stresses
service to others. An example of concern for clients' rights (and of the
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preconditions for a bureaucratic opposition) is the following letter to an
"action" column of a daily newspaper:
We've seen the movie "One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest": now what do
we do about it? Both of us have been working in a private mental
hospital ward in Chicago and have seen gross abuses in the use of
electroshock here, and we want to know what we can do about it.
Patients or their guardians are supposed to sign consent forms, but the
formality is abused. Others sign for them or they simply are told to
sign. We ... see no benefits and only pain from this often vindictive
treatm ent. (34)
This letter also illustrates another feature of the grounds for bureaucratic
opposition. The focus of the opposition may be on the rule violations
themselves, whether formal (injustice) or substantive (incompetence or
dishonor). However, the concern may also be with the violation of universal
moral principles: the human consequences of rule violations. Victimization
or empathy with it are frequent grounds for participating in a bureaucratic
opposition. The indignity of dishonor, the frustration resulting from being
subordinate to an incompetent, and the unwilling involvement in cruelty are
all denials of a person's autonomy and provide much of the moral stimulus for
risk taking. However, it is necessary to reiterate that there are usually
multiple grounds for any bureaucratic opposition.
The preceding discussion has been an attem pt to analyze a fundamental
ground for bureaucratic opposition: organizational abuse resulting from norm
violations. The following section will examine the second basic ground for
opposition: abuses reflecting differences in values and in the interpretation
of the policies intended to achieve goals. The major concern of the analysis
of norm violation was to define the relevant norms and to illustrate briefly
some of the consequences of their infraction. The issue of why the rules of
bureaucracy are broken has not been considered extensively, because the
focus has been on principles, not proclivities.
An adequate analysis of the reasons for norm infraction would require a
typology distinguishing organizational from personal causes of rule violation.
Among the organizational influences would be sets of contradictory
expectations (for example, the strain between tenure and competency in
academic institutions) which have been studied by organizational researchers.
With regard to personal influences on rule infraction, there are three major
classes. The first is the classical Greek understanding that norm violation is
the result of some diminished intellectual capacity. The second is the
Christian category of sin. The seven cardinal sins - avarice, lust, envy,
wrath, pride, sloth, and gluttony - account for much of the behavior that we
wish to understand. Finally, disobedience may be principled and purposive, an
act of protest or opposition against the organization on moral grounds.
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ABUSES GROUNDED IN DISPUTES OVER POLICIES
The majority of bureaucratic oppositions appear to be grounded in one or
more violations of the norms that constitute the bureaucratic ideal. The
abuses classed under the heading of norm infraction include such conditions as
injustice, incompetence, and dishonor, each of which presupposes that all
participants in the situation share a normative consensus but, for one reason
or another, one or more individuals misbehave or deviate. In the society at
large analogous behavior would be labeled criminal, immoral, or abnormal,
and would be controlled by such methods as incarceration, psychotherapy, or
ostracism. Those who have the authority to punish rule violators often fail to
do so, both in the organization and society. A later chapter of this study will
examine some of the reasons for the failure of administrators to mete out
negative sanctions, but for the present it is sufficient to note that many
bureaucratic oppositions stem from such inaction.
There are other grounds than norm infraction on which bureaucratic
oppositions are based. These grounds can be grouped together under the
heading of disputes over organizational policy and focus on abusive rules
rather than abusive persons. Of course, the distinction between rules and
persons is relative, because particular individuals are often so closely as
sociated with a policy that an opposition may aim at their removal in
conjunction with policy changes. In addition, oppositionists may believe that
some rule violations are rooted in policies that are vague, inapplicable
inappropriate, or otherwise problematic.
Policies may be judged to be objectionable because they contradict
general bureaucratic norms or because they are inconsistent with the
particular goals that differentiate the organization from others. In such
cases the standards for criticism are embedded within the organization's self
definition. However, policies may also be opposed because they are held to
violate general moral standards, such as those of a religious tradition, the
general culture, or some transcendent position. As in the case of norm
violations, policies may be disputed because they harm subordinate employees
in some way or because they harm the organization's relevant public.
Table 2.1 Grounds of Bureaucratic Opposition, Organizational Abuses
Rule Violations
Policy Disputes
Bureaucratic Norms
Norms
Internal injustice (toward subordinates) Inefficient Moral
Unfair
Dishonor (of subordinates)
policies
policies
Incompetency
External Injustice (toward relevant
Ineffective
Immoral
publics and individuals)
policies
policies
Dishonor (toward relevant
publics and individuals)
Ineffective action
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The formal structure of opposition, noted by Georg Simmel among others,
requires that there be some points of agreement among the conflicting
parties in addition to the issues on which they disagree. When the opposition
to an organization is grounded in policy disputes, the areas of agreement
among the contenders are usually quite broad. In a sense, the opposition
group is hoisting the organization by its own petard; the grievance is
organizational hypocrisy. The oppositionists claim that the organization is
not living up to its own standards or that its policies and their implementation
are not adequate to achieve its stated goals. Martin Luther’s objections to
the selling of indulgences by the Catholic Church was, initially, nothing more
than a bureaucratic opposition grounded in a dispute over policy. Luther's
dissenting arguments were based on the New Testam ent, a book to which the
Church claimed to adhere. According to Luther, the practice of selling
indulgences was contrary to the Church's major purpose, the salvation of
souls.
Disputes over policy may focus on internal issues of efficiency or external
considerations of effectiveness. Efficiency, here, refers to the use of
appropriate and economical means to achieve the organization's goals.
Inefficiency is often more apparent to those who implement policies than to
those who have the authority to make them or change them. This irony is a
continual source of strain in organizations. Some organizations acknowledge
the tension and encourage subordinates to suggest ways of increasing
efficiency, even to the point of awarding cash bonuses for cost-reducing
innovations. An Indiana-based pharmaceutical firm, for example, provides
empolyees with one-third of the money saved each year by implementing
their suggestions. In most cases, the administration and the subordinates
should benefit from attem pts to make policies more efficient. Thus, it is
reasonable to assume that when bureaucratic oppositions coalesce around
policy disputes something more than efficiency is at stake.
Behind some policy disputes concerning efficiency is opposition to an
incompetent administrator, one who is inflexibly committed to tradition, a
personal ideology, or a literal interpretation of the rules. Such disputes may
also mask resistance to dishonor as the following example illustrates. In
response to pilferage from its warehouse a large retail chain instituted a
security policy in which drivers were ordered to unload their trucks and
reload them while the invoice was checked against the goods. Although
employees did not criticize the need for a security check they felt that this
particular policy unduly harrassed them, forced them to do an excessive
amount of work, and left them less time for the day’s deliveries. Only the
last complaint related to efficiency; the others were concerned primarily
with dishonor. After complaining to the foreman without success, the
workers attem pted to have their union intercede for them. The steward, who
was aware of the problem, indicated that the union approved of the company's
policy. One driver interpreted the union's inaction in the following terms:
"Deep down, the union felt that with their refusal to help, the employees
would forget the whole m atter and let the company do what they want." (35)
The resulting bureaucratic opposition, which was initiated by those involved
in the thefts, escalated into a work stoppage. After a week of protest the
opposition was successful and the policy was changed to require only that the
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goods be checked against the invoice while they were being loaded onto the
truck for the first time.
In contrast to inefficient policies, ineffective policies are those which in
some way are deemed inconsistent with the organization’s goals, for example,
by subverting them or being irrelevant to them. A great many of the
bureaucratic oppositions that have received public attention are grounded in
ineffective policies - they have been attem pts to redirect the organization
towards its ’’proper" goal. "Sore Throat," a bureaucratic opposition composed
of one or more employees of the American Medical Association, has exposed
various policies that it considers inconsistent with the goals of the
Association. For example, it publicized a policy which permits drug company
representatives to sit on the scientific policymaking body of the Association
because that policy contradicts the AMA's public claim to independence from
the profitable pharmaceutical industry. (36) Other Sore Throat disclosures
were aimed at demonstrating to the Internal Revenue Service that the AMA
should be taxed on advertising revenues from its publications. Documents
indicated AMA political contributions were aimed at preventing tax-reform
legislation that would impose levies on advertising revenue. Sore Throat's
objective was not merely to expose the financial interests and political
lobbying of the AMA but to restore moral purpose to the Association: "Once
in a financial shamble with its executives discredited, Sore Throat believes
the AMA could 'be restored to its original constitutional objectives: To
promote the science and art of medicine and the betterm ent of Dublic
health'." (37)
H
Oppositions grounded in resistance to ineffective policies confront the
problem of identifying just what the organization's goals are. Organization
theorists are notoriously divided over the proper way to determine goals, and
even over the issue of whether they can be determined at all. Functionalists,
such as Talcott Parsons and Peter Blau, identify goals on the basis of prior
theoretical categories. If this approach is rejected in favor of an empirical
analysis, the problem of finding a starting point arises. James D. Thompson
argues that goals vary over time. Herbert Simon states that the goals "must
be inferred from observation of the organization's decision-making pro
cesses," (38) and thus recognizes that there may be several, possibly
conflicting, goals. Charles Warriner explicitly rejects determination based on
official statem ents of purpose: they are "fictions produced by an organi
zation to account for, explain, or rationalize its existence to particular
audiences rather than ... valid and reliable indicators of purpose." (39) Yet
for many people, including the members of bureaucratic oppositions, it is just
such official statem ents that are believed to indicate the organization's goals.
And it is to the goals mentioned in such pronouncements that they want to
hold the organization accountable.
While some policies are in clear contradiction to the official goals of the
organization, others are in a much more ambiguous relation. Is it a goal or a
subgoal of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to obtain information about
the intim ate lives of public figures, such as Martin Luther King, Jr.? Was this
policy of the FBI merely a reflection of J. Edgar Hoover's idiosyncracies or
was it directly related to the organization's official and assigned mission?
Such uncertainty and ambiguity have caused some bureaucratic oppositions to
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become mired in debates about the "true” goals of the organization and the
fitness of policies to these goals.
A second and more serious problem confronted by oppositions to
ineffective policies is the presence of two clearly distinct, and at times
contradictory, sets of goals in all organizations. The first set contains the
commonly understood aims of the organization, the products or services that
it is supposed to provide. The second set comprises those goals related to the
sheer continuation of the organization itself. Friedrich Baerwald refers to
the first set of goals as the "object orientation” of a group and to the second
as its "project orientation.” (40) This distinction is similar to others, such as
Edward Gross' differentiation of "output goals” from "support goals.” (41)
The object and project orientations of an organization are not necessarily
contradictory, but in practice they often clash. For example, there have been
allegations that the FBI had policies to foster rather than limit criminal
activities. The aim of such policies, which are contradictory to the Bureau's
object orientation, was to obtain additional Congressional funding (project
orientation). As an example of this policy, a "paid snitch for the FBI,"
confessing to Otis Pike and his Congressional Committee on Intelligence,
related "how the FBI paid him to lead a bunch of idealist ding-a-lings on a
draft board raid: 'I was not only encouraging the group to raid the Camden
draft board, I was initiating all the plans to do so'." (42)
Another case of conflict between object and project orientations concerns
the conditions in a Chicago psychiatric hospital that led to a bureaucratic
opposition. The opposition charged that the administration was primarily
interested in maintaining the number of patients and in keeping the costs of
their care to a minimum. The oppositionists, who saw the patients on a dayto-day basis and were members of the various "helping" professions, sought
policies which would increase the quality of care. Prevailing policies were
judged to be ineffective because the dissenters were committed to the
facility's object orientation. (43)
In nonprofit organizations, financial interests form part of the project
orientation. Businesses, however, present a special problem because there is
disagreement about whether profits or the production of quality goods is the
organization's primary object. Some social philosophers, such as Thornstein
Veblen, have distinguished between "business" and "industry," identifying the
first with the quest for profits and the second with quality production. They
have adapted, then, the distinction between object and project orientations to
the special case of capitalist economic organizations. Whatever the other
problems with this distinction may be, it is useful for understanding bureau
cratic oppositions in economic organizations. For example, when the Good
Humor Corporation produced ice cream with dangerously high bacterial
counts it did so in order to increase profits. It would have been costlier and
less profitable to produce good ice cream, which their own advertising calls
"the next best thing to love." Good Humor's pursuit of profit at the expense
of quality and public health provoked a "whistle-blowing" opposition which
was reported in the press. (44)
Project orientation, which refers to the perpetuation of the organization,
often becomes confused with the continued domination of the organization's
elite. Labor unions, despite their nominal democracy, are particularly subject
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to the replacement of the union's interests as a whole by the oligarchy's
advantage. Jock Yablonski's fate (he and his family were murdered) is
testimony to the violence that often attends efforts to change formally
democratic but effectively authoritarian organizations. It does not follow,
simply because the "machinery" of democracy is present, that those in power
will allow it to be used. Roberto Michels' work is basic to understanding the
reasons for oligarchic structures in formally democratic regimes, though his
pessimism obscured recognition of such possibilities as oppositional move
ments.
Dissident groups within the Teamsters Union provide an example of opposi
tion to an authoritarian union. One such group, PROD, with two thousand
members, reaches perhaps the upper limit in size for a bureaucratic
opposition group. PROD is primarily opposed to ineffective policies, although
it has also attacked corruption and rule violation. Its basic grievance is
oligarchic domination enforced through policies which provide "its top brass
with a fleet of luxurious jet aircraft," give them incomes of over $120,000 per
year, and treat them to unlimited travel accounts and French chefs. (45) A
second grievance, which also illustrates a concern for object orientation, is
the charge that the union has not tried to achieve contracts which contain
adequate safety clauses. The assumption of the opposition, which is
consistent with the cultural ideal of a labor union and the union's own charter,
is that the goal of union includes on-the-job protection of its members.’
Bureaucratic oppositions in many other unions, such as the United Mine
Workers, the National Maritime Union, and the International Ladies Garment
Workers Union, have also been initiated on the grounds of ineffectiveness and
corruption. (46)
Policies that are considered to be abusive because they are ineffective are
sometimes indistinguishable from those which are judged unfair. Fairness is a
moral standard which applies to relations within the organization, but which
does not necessarily coincide with bureaucratic norms. Fairness does
coincide with those bureaucratic norms which prescribe equal treatm ent
"without regard to persons" and hiring and promotion on the basis only of
competence. Hence, oppositions against policies which explicitly discrimi
nate against one group of employees, such as women or minority group
members, focus on both moral and formal abuses. Discriminatory policies are
often in effect for long periods before they are judged to be unfair.
Perception of their unfairness is often spurred by social changes external to
the organization, such as the effects of the various liberation movements.
The message of such movements is that traditional differences in treatm ent
have been based upon erroneous and immoral assumptions about the character
and capabilities of the members of certain groups. Bureaucratic oppositions
grounded in the struggle for fairness have relatively good chances for success.
Not only do they often have at their disposal the resources of national groups
and access to legal remedies, but their moral purpose stimulates zeal and
solidarity which are often absent in responses to norm infractions. Further,
the administrators are often less implacable, more ready to yield, because
discriminatory policies may contradict their own moral standards and those of
the society at large.
When discriminatory policies are aimed at relevant publics or client
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groups rather than at the employees of an organization, the abuse is
interpreted as a breach of the organization's function and is usually judged to
be more reprehensible than "unfair" internal treatm ent. The greater public
outrage at the unfair treatm ent of clients is probably due to identification
with the victims (one might have been or might in the future be a client), the
cultural separation between "public" and "private" activity, and the notion
that people are free to change jobs but often cannot avoid the encroachment
of an organization upon their lives.
Other charges of unfairness and of abuses grounded in policies which harm
those outside the organization stem from commitment to absolute moral
principles rather than from issues of effectiveness or efficiency. Perhaps the
most relevant moral principle here is the prescription to treat people as endsin-themselves, never as means only, which was formulated by Immanuel Kant
as the "categorical imperative." (47) The categorical imperative is
inconsistent with bureaucratic rationality, which considers employees as
means to enable effective and efficient goal attainm ent: they are mere role
incumbents. Often when the goal of the organization is "service," clients are
regarded as means to profits or as excuses for further government funding.
Customers of production organizations are similarly viewed as means to
profits, as is evidenced by much advertising.
An extreme case of the treatm ent of people as means to an organizational
end is provided by various governmental bureaucracies, such as intelligence
agencies, for which the goal is a reified public good. For example, "shortly
before King was to be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, the FBI sent him and
his wife an anonymous letter, along with a tape from one of the 'bugs'
(recordings made with the approval of Attorney General Robert Kennedy of
King’s conversations), which King took to be a suggestion that he commit
suicide or face public disgrace." (48) Other FBI vendettas against persons
from all sectors of the political spectrum have come to light, indicating gross
violation of the categorical imperative. (49) Summing up the proceedings at a
Senate hearing on this agency, columnist Ellis Cose writes:
... the feeling by the FBI (was) that once someone had been labeled as
subversive (usually Communist) or was thought to have close as
sociations with subversives, any means of destroying that individual
was justified. (50)
Disclosures of "wrong doing" by intelligence agencies before congressional
committees and the Rockefeller Commission, and statem ents to the press by
"disgruntled" employees intent upon reformist bureaucratic opposition indi
cate that abuses were not "isolated incidents of zealous agents exceeding
authority in the field, however frequently such may occur. Rather, the
abuses were ongoing, bureaucratic programs, often continuing over de
cades ...." (51) The nature of intelligence organizations, including their cult of
secrecy, insistence on loyalty, and occasional use of violence, make
bureaucratic oppositions aimed against their "immoral" policies difficult to
undertake. The best known oppositions against such policies were undertaken
by former CIA agents Victor Marchetti and Philip Agee, who "blew the
whistle" from a relatively safe distance. Such oppositions are borderline
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cases which merge into public opposition to bureaucracy from the outside.
Agee s struggle is also atypical because it had a revolutionary intent: he
"feels that the abolition of the CIA is the only viable solution." (52) That
Marchetti and Agee resigned their positions and literally risked their lives
indicates that the motivational ground for their opposition was immoral
policies and not merely infractions of bureaucratic norms. Although
intelligence agencies are often publicly opposed for their illegal actions,
moral outrage seems to impel and sustain the struggle.
There are several possible explanations for the occurrence of immoral
policies. Sometimes there has been a change in society's moral standards that
has not been accompanied by alteration in policy. For example, intelligence
agencies conceived and instituted in wartime conditions carry their policies
forward into peacetime activity. A second explanation affixes cause and
blame on individuals who abuse their authority. Much of the blame for the
exposed wrongdoing of governmental agencies in the 1970s, for example, has
been placed, with strong conservative implications, on "sick" or "wicked" men
such as Hoover and Richard Nixon. More structural explanations for immoral
policies center on the dynamics of what was called "project orientation"
above. The desire to perpetuate the organization and its elite often results in
policies that sacrifice persons to the bureaucratic equivalent of raison d' etat.
Project orientation is intensified when the organization 7s locked in
competition with other bureaucracies or groups. Business policies such as
"planned obsolescence" and President Nixon's use of the FBI and the IRS to
harrass his "enemies" exemplify this dynamic.
The myth of bureaucracy - that it is purely an administrative entity
devoid of politics - does not allow for the identification of any of the abuses
discussed in this chapter. That such abuses exist and that people have
struggled to eliminate them is evidence against the validity of managerial
ideology. Political activity is ubiquitous and is not confined to the state,
despite the protestations of some social scientists. Political processes have
similarities across disparate contexts, thus the work of those who have
examined oppositions in the state is useful for the analysis of similar
phenomena within organizations. However, for reasons stated at the
beginning of this chapter, political scientists have not attended sufficiently to
the grounds for such oppositions, concentrating instead on the overt activities
involved in conflict. For a study of bureaucratic oppositions, investigation of
their grounds is essential because different grounds lead to different
strategies and outcomes. This chapter presented a typology of the grounds
for opposition, showing their structural and motivational aspects and
revealing their origin in the perception of abuse. Abuses were classified in
term s of violations of bureaucratic norms, inefficient and ineffective
policies, and immoral policies.
Grounds are the "good reasons" or bases for action. Generally, before any
concerted action can occur, or the plans for it even be formulated, people
must have reason to depart from routine. Awareness of the grounds for
opposition is often the result of a social process and is usually the first stage
in constituting an opposition group. Such awareness is not only important
from the viewpoint of self-knowledge but also because it is a tactic in group
formation and in later struggles. Having detailed the grounds for opposition,
the next step is to investigate the processes and problems of initiating
bureaucratic oppositions.
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The Conditions of
Bureaucratic Opposition

... if someone took it upon himself to alter the disposition of
things around him he ran the risk of losing his footing and falling to
destruction.
Franz Kafka, The Trial
It is a fallacy born of optimism to believe a thing necessarily will be done
simply because it should be done. As President Carter has said, "The world
isn't fair." Thus, we may reasonably assume that changes are not made in
bureaucracies just because there are abuses of moral and/or bureaucratic
norms. The grounds for oppositions are all the reasons why subordinates may
and sometimes do challenge the administrative order, but they are counter
balanced by the conditions of organizational life, most of which are directed
to the results of uninterrupted functioning. The phenomenon of bureaucratic
opposition may usefully be conceived of as a process in which the forces for
change continually struggle against those promoting stability. Even when an
overt opposition emerges, it remains subject to dissolution by the very
dynamics of hierarchical systems as they influence both personality and the
relations that bind informal groups together. It is essential for a
comprehensive understanding of bureaucratic opposition, then, to grasp why
people find it difficult to attem pt to make changes which would bring
practice into line with standards, and also to understand which conditions are
most favorable to the emergence of resistance.
The conditions promoting stability have been discussed by social theorists
primarily under the heading of "the problem of order": How is a stable and
functioning society possible for individuals whose interests may conflict?
Hobbes' response to this question is that rational human beings subordinate all
particular interests to their supreme self-interest in survival, and, thus, will
obey an effective sovereign regardless of the content of the commands.
Rational individuals, according to Hobbes, prefer to be controlled because
their alternative is to live in a state of nature where, in a condition of the
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war of "every man against every man," there is "continual fear and danger of
violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and
short." (1) Three centuries after Hobbes the problem of order continues to be
a central concern of social thought. Talcott Parsons, in "Hobbes and the
Problem of Order," claims that Hobbes "saw the problem with a clarity which
has never been surpassed." (2) Parsons, however, does not ground order
primarily in force and fear but in value consensus, which is developed during
the individual's socialization and is reinforced by various institutions.
Hobbes, the utilitarian, and Parsons, who acknowledges normative control,
together provide the twin bases of most theories of order: interest and duty.
A dissenting tradition, which is generally opposed to authority, supplements
mainstream speculation with other/ conditions promoting stability. In the
early modern period, for example, Etienne de La Bo6tie was concerned with
the problem of order. Unlike Hobbes, however, he did not ask why people
obey but why they do not disobey. La Boetie assumed that the ruler's power
is partly dependent on the acquiescence of the ruled, on their consent. He
conceded that fear, submission "under constraint and force," functions to
insure initial compliance. But he noted that after the institution of a state
most people "obey without regret and perform willingly what their predeces
sors had done just because they had to." (3) La Boetie was concerned with
understanding why people obey a tyrant willingly when they are in no
immediate danger, and he added to the grounds of Interest and duty those of
habit, propaganda, and cooptation. The grounds provided by both the
mainstream and dissenting traditions in modern social thought are sufficient
as points of departure for understanding the relative imbalance between the
ubiquity of organizational abuses and the less common response of bureau
cratic opposition.
The case data on bureaucratic opposition, which is used in other parts of
this work, is not well adapted to the present issue. Bureaucratic oppositions
are essentially activities in which people have surmounted the forces
operating for stability and have overcome fear, duty to the organization's
leadership, habit, propaganda, and/or cooptation. Such data do not provide
much information about organizations in which abuse is widespread but overt
struggle does not arise.
William James considered habit to be the "flywheel of civilization."
Certainly, no habit is so universal as the habit of obedience. Habit, of course,
does not explain much, but merely describes the overwhelming tendency of
people to act in accordance with the expectations of others and not to violate
the social, moral, or legal norms. Disobedience, which is often called
deviance by the defenders of authority, is the exception rather than the rule.
Obedience to organizations, then, is just an instance of a more general habit
which must be broken before opposition to authority can arise. (4) Human
habits are learned; they are not, sociobiology notwithstanding, genetically
controlled. We are taught obedience from the very first moments of our
existence and the lesson is retaught and reinforced by all of the institutions
of society. Religious notions of original sin and eternal punishment, political
appeals to patriotism and the extraction of oaths, grading systems in
education, evaluation procedures in business, and the threat of ostracism are
only some of the ways in which obedience is taught.
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Now these are the Laws of the Jungle, and many and mighty
are they;
But the head and the hoof of the Law and the haunch and
the hump is - Obey! (5)
Experimental studies by Milgram, although questionable in regard to
validity, provide evidence about how well the law of obedience is learned.
His research indicates that people are so willing to obey authority that they
will inflict pain on others simply because they have been told to do so. (6)
Political philosopher Christian Bay concludes that "most of us have been
trained, as generations of our ancestors have been before us, to obey almost
all laws almost by instinct, and certainly by habit if not by conviction." (7)
The lessons of obedience that are learned in the process of socialization
direct people not to question any authority. The success of the rhetorical
strategy of arguing from authority rather than giving reasons to support
claims and commands indicates the pervasiveness of habits of obedience.
Organizations reap the benefits of the work that other social institutions have
done. The adult associates "ought" with the commands of any authority,
much as Pavlov’s dogs associated the bell with food. Unquestioning reverence
for authority figures is learned early in life. Certain authority roles (for
example, the parental) have been crucial to our existence and we have
transferred fear, veneration, and the sense of dependence from them to
authority in general. The vital authorities of our early years, such as parents
and physicians, have had the literal power of life and death over us and it was
in the interest of our peace of mind to regard them as benevolent, to believe
that they had our good at heart. We also tend to generalize these judgments
to all authority figures. The fear of attacking authorities is also based on the
difficulties of withstanding the consequence of the absence of authority:
freedom. When people are not guided by authority they become responsible
for their choices and, as many existentialists have noted, responsibility often
causes anguish.
Habits of obedience may also be related to the establishment of a sense of
loyalty to a formal group. After the manner of Erich Segal's idea of love,
loyalty means "never having to say you're sorry." Slogans such as "my country
right or wrong" and "America - love it or leave it" are examples of attem pts
to fabricate loyalty. Advice to employees is redolent with such sentiments:
a newspaper column reads, "Boss Bugs You? Start job-hunting." The
development of a sense of obligation to a hierarchy tends to color one's
evaluation of it. Cognitive dissonance theory predicts that if a person has a
positive attitude toward X (for example, the firm) and X indicates that Y (for
example, a policy) is good, then the person will tend to have a positive
attitude toward Y. Certainly, some people can withstand cognitive
dissonance to a greater degree than others, but the general tendency, at least
among Americans, is towards consistency, particularly when the defining
object is as salient as one's employer. The high saliency of one's job makes it
difficult to stand back and judge it, to achieve role distance, because if the
job is found wanting it would be consistent to judge oneself unfavorably too.
It is not surprising, then, that those who are very subservient to authority also
tend to have a low tolerance for dissonance.
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Conformity is closely related to the habit of obedience. When individuals
accept the dictates of their circumstances they have no autonomous standard
against which those circumstances can be judged. Acquiescence makes
criticism impossible and opposition, at least in its initial stages, depends upon
criticism. However, once a bureaucratic opposition is underway it may be
strengthened by conformity, particularly by the other-directedness described
by Riesman et al. in The Lonely Crowd. (8) The "herd mentality" makes
stampedes possible so long as there is leadership, which it cannot engender by
itself.
La Boetie's second ground for passive obedience is propaganda. He refers
to events such as the Roman circuses in which "the ancient dictators so
successfully lulled their subjects under the yoke, that the stupefied peoples,
fascinated by their pastimes and vain pleasures flashed before their eyes,
learned subservience as naively, but not so creditably, as little children learn
to read by looking at bright picture books." (9) Contemporary imperial and
organizational societies have their functional equivalents of the circuses in
televised football, country club golf, lavish expense accounts, and company
supplied prostitutes. (10) Propaganda also includes ideological indoctrination.
La Boetie writes of the authorities: "They never undertake an unjust policy,
even one of some importance, without prefacing it with some pretty speech
concerning public welfare and common good." (11) Company newsletters
notoriously quote the chairman of the board in this manner, and the training
in authority holds, witness the statem ent of Charles Wilson, a former
President of General Motors who became Secretary of Defense, "What's good
for General Motors is good for the country." Propaganda also inspires
reverence and admiration by the fabrication of mystery. La Boetie noted
that "the kings of the Assyrians and even after them those of the Medes
showed themselves in public as seldom as possible in order to set up a doubt in
the minds of the rabble as to whether they were not in some ways more than
man..." (12) The washrooms and dining facilities of bureaucratic organi
zations, strictly segregated by hierarchical rank, appear to be modern
counterparts of social mystery. Behind all such practices lurks the Aesopian
assumption that "familiarity breeds contempt." (13) Joined to mystery are
hypocritical appeals to democracy or community (pseudo-gemeinschaft). It is
difficult to oppose authority figures when there is a widespread feeling that
"the boss is such a nice guy it would not be the right thing to hurt him."
The third ground for passive obedience noted by La Boetie is cooptation,
in which the hierarchy creates a pyramid of privilege by dispensing material
benefits to a small group which develops its own loyal followers by parcelling
out a share of its grants, and so on. This strategy, which may be termed
"feudalization," generates a hierarchy that mirrors but does not entirely
embrace the organization. Feudalization, of course, is in strict violation of
the administrative ideal of achievement, and is a last resort because it
impinges upon the autonomy of the leadership. It is often difficult to
distinguish between reluctance to engage in struggles based on bought loyalty
and reluctance based on fear of losing one's position, because where
feudalization occurs stable expectations are built up. In organizations,
privilege is generally relative to possible privation - the carrot may be more
evident, but the stick is more fundamental. The centrality of occupation to
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self-concept, the general scarcity of employment opportunities, and the
negative sanctions that an administration can mete out (for example,
geographical transfers, assignments to odious or meaningless tasks, or simply
strict enforcement of rules that would make work uncomfortable or
intolerable) all make the comparison between opposition to a tyrant and
opposition to an organization plausible.
Another more inclusive account of the barriers to opposition is provided
by utilitarianism or, as it is called in contemporary social science, exchange
theory. (14) In exchange theory what the early modern thinkers called fear
and desire is translated into pecuniary term s as cost and benefit. Benefits
such as liberty and justice are measured against the costs of opposition, and
the decision whether or not to struggle is guided by the cost-benefit ratio (in
Homans' terms) or by calculations of net profit or loss. This bourgeois theory
(the adjective is used in a descriptive and not in a pejorative sense) is adapted
to the culture in which it appears and seems to explain why many people do
not oppose organizations in which abuses are widespread. Exchange theory,
however, may be more a way in which people justify their opposition or their
failure to oppose than a motivator for conduct. In a capitalist society costbenefit language is publicly acceptable, even when it is difficult or impossible
to assign numerical or even ordinal values to the various outcomes.
The costs that enter into the "rational calculus" are varied. In trying to
assess the differential success of his recruiting drive, one of the leaders of a
bureaucratic opposition in a large law office writes about a secretary: "Even
if she felt that the rule was wrong, the fact that she endured it for so long
made her want to pass on that rule to others." (15) The cost here was self
esteem; the woman did not want to admit to herself or others that she had
suffered for nothing. The leader of the opposition continues: "The two
associates who joined our opposition were both unusual in the sense that any
hopes for quick partnership opportunities were destroyed." (16) Why did they
bear this cost? "They both told me that it wasn't a hard decision. It was a
responsible act of freedom." (17) Finally, the eight secretaries who joined did
not intend to continue at the firm of more than a few years. "Five were
putting their husbands through school, two were working for a down payment
on a house and one was working to put herself through college." (18)
The degree of commitment to long-term employment in an organization is
important in determining who is most likely to join an opposition, as the
example of a bureaucratic opposition in a municipal agency illustrates. All of
the members "did not look upon expressing their derogatory view of (the
abusive supervisor) as synonymous with cutting their own throats. The mean
age for the five was 25 and not one of them had any intention of making a
career out of their present employment. ... None would be fazed if after
stating their minds, they were asked to permanently leave." (19) The threat of
the loss of employment, of course, usually works to dampen opposition. In
trying to alter sexually-biased practices in an accounting departm ent, the
oppositionists were unable "to recruit the other two females in the office to
join forces with us. Their excuse was that with the realities of the recession,
we too had better have second thoughts about trying to act like crusaders."
(20) An intelligence agency oppositionist analyzed the risks in this manner:
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"The fear of such banishment from the warmth and security o f 'us’ into the
coldness and uncertainty of ’them ,’ the fear of losing the favors of the powers
that be, all tend to force ’good’ behavior, that is, follow ing the ’company line.’
It's that or transfer to a far-away o ffic e , a Bureau-type Siberia, or the
banishment to the Sheol outside the Bureau." (21)
A potential factor m itigating the cost of opposition for those who fear
loss o f employment or salary increases is some sort of job security. Thus, one
would expect, ceteris paribus, that those with civil service protection, union
membership, fam ilial employment, or possession of a scarce and needed skill
would be more likely to participate in bureaucratic oppositions. An attempt
was made to test this hypothesis by questioning employees of unionized and
nonunionized airlines.
The results of the research indicated that union
membership does not seem to a ffe c t participation in a bureaucratic
opposition.
Furthermore, a majority of respondents fe lt that union
membership would have no influence on such a ctivity. The data, based on
responses to questions concerning awareness of abusive policies, suggest that
unionized workers tend to assume that it is the union's responsibility, not
theirs, to see that things are "done right." (22)
Once a bureaucratic opposition is underway, costs can also be assessed on
nonparticipants.
An active member of a bureaucratic opposition waged
against an airline's new anti-hijacking regulations stated that the seniority
and recognized expertise which she and several others possessed influenced
those who w ere unwilling to participate to "go along" if one of the leaders
was present: " If anyone disagreed with us, they would not admit it because
they fe lt the group pressure." (23) In this case people participated, were
swept into action, because they found it too costly to remain inactive.
Even if each person could a ffix relative values to the various costs and
benefits of opposition, such calculations would be meaningful only for the
moment and might be altered drastically with changing circumstances. When
a leader of a bureaucratic opposition in a grounds department was asked
about how he was able to handle his concern about losing his job if he
participated in an effo rt to change a demeaning policy, he responded: "I was
very concerned about keeping my job. I needed it greatly. But I became so
enraged at the policy that I simply forgot about my fear." (24) Can his
statement be analyzed in exchange theoretical terms to read that the benefit
o f changing the policy outweighed the cost of possible dismissal?
A
preferable interpretation is that, for a period of tim e, he became a non
economic actor, that he acted without calculation.
A m odification of the utilitarian exchange theories, which is specifically
concerned with whether or not people w ill participate in political action,
appears in Mancur Olsen's The Logic of C o llective A ction . Olsen argues that
rational and self-interested people will not help to achieve common interests
except under special conditions, because they w ill enjoy the benefits whether
or not they make sacrifices to bring them about.
In order, then, to
understand why so many people do participate in co llective action it is
necessary to assume that human beings are not always instrumentally rational
and self-interested, and/or that opposition groups exert various pressures or
o ffe r incentives to join them. One may interpret the works of revolutionary
theorists such as Mao Tse-Tung and Fidel Castro in a bourgeois fashion,
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arguing that they o ffered moral incentives to adjust the balance sheet. Such
moral incentives include, as student of rebellions James Downton notes,
comradeship, pride, and purpose. (25)
In his analysis o f various types of
groups challenging the polity or the general society, William Gamson comes
to a similar conclusion: commitment to a cause allows one to transcend the
calculations of cost-benefit analysis. (26)
Narrow-gauge self-interest within the lim its defined by a social structure,
then, is only one m otivation for action. It is ’’consciousness that does not
transcend its rootedness in an econom ically com petitive mode o f produc
tion." (27) Max Weber was w ell aware o f other varieties o f m otivated action:
"Less ’rational’ actions are typed by Weber in terms of the pursuit of ’absolute
ends,' as flow ing from affectu al sentiments, or as 'traditional,' (28) Although
Weber tends to associate d ifferen t types of action with differen t kinds o f
c o llective associations, it is unwarranted to conclude that only one mode of
action is present in each type o f social structure.
Although traditional
conduct seems unlikely to m otivate oppositions to bureaucratic authority in
industrialized societies, action m otivated by the pursuit of absolute ends and
action impelled by affectu al sentiments can and do, together or separately,
actuate bureaucratic oppositions.
A ttem pts to use utilitarian theories to understand why people do not take
part in grounded oppositions is further com plicated by the complex relations
between knowledge and action. The utilitarian theories assume knowledge of
abuse and a considered decision about whether to act. H owever, at least
some people are "blind to" or fail to see any abuse, and therefore fa il to act.
Many theories o f falsified or distorted knowledge and conception have tried
to account for such blindness. Those concerned with why people do not
believe or know what seems to be so obvious to others have coined terms such
as happy consciousness, bad faith, false consciousness, repression, m ystifi
cation, and viciously acquired naivete to describe this phenomenon. Theories
o f non-knowledge claim that people misinterpret situations either through
unconscious distortion or through inattention.
Thus, with reference to
bureaucratic opposition, one reason why people do not act to correct abuses is
that they are unaware of them. While certain structurally grounded abuses
may be w ell hidden in some organizations, the vast m ajority o f abuses are not
concealed from employees.
Weber indicates that "bureaucratic admini
stration always tends to be an administration of ’secret sessions’: insofar as it
can, it hides its knowledge and action from criticism ." (29) However, Weber is
referring to the attem pt to keep secrets from the public, not from insiders.
The lack o f recognition o f abuses, then, is most often the result o f some
process of non-knowledge.
It is not surprising that recognition of organizational abuse is not the same
for all o f those in similar positions.
The psychological and social
characteristics of those who say the "emperor has no clothes" are apt to be
d ifferen t than the characteristics of those who are oblivious to the nudity.
For example, oppositionists are likely to be recent arrivals to the organi
zation. Young Turks have not been habituated to convention, do not yet have
strong loyalties, are potential or actual com petitors with older employees,
are uncertain about their future, often have standards that they bring with
them from another organization, and fe e l the discom fort of alienation from
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ongoing informal groups. The experience of the stranger, who is unhindered
by the everyday mentality of the natives and "sees" more than they do, is
common to new arrivals.
Distance from the everyday is also more
pronounced in professionals who uphold standards which are explicitly
independent of, and often in conflict with, conventional bureaucratic norms.
This clash o f standards is one o f the bases o f the tension between
administrators and their professional subordinates that has been extensively
studied by sociologists. (30) Professionals are expected, in Thoreau’s terms, to
"march to the beat of a different drummer." For example, social workers
who strongly identified with their profession were found to be more likely to
deviate from administrative procedures than their less comm itted colleagues.
(31) The "professionalized" social workers justified rule violations in terms of
more e ffe c tiv e service to their clients. In contrast, w elfare workers with
weak professional orientation had a greater tendency to follow organization's
rules and procedures more strictly.
When people judge that the organization is violating moral and not only
bureaucratic standards, they are placed into a condition of role conflict. In
such cases the role of employee, which in a bureaucracy prescribes obedience
to the commands o f superiors, clashes with the more generalized dictates of
citizenship, religious faith, or what Weber called ethics of ultimate ends.
However, although Weber's idea o f ethical autonomy makes role conflict
intelligible, his own discussion avoids the issue by resolving it in favor of
obedience to hierarchical command:
An o ffic ia l who, according to his own view, receives an order that is
wrong can - and should - raise protests. However, if the superordinated o ffic e persists in its instructions, then it is not only his duty but his
Honor to carry them out in such a manner as if they were in agreement
with his own convictions, and thereby show that his sense of duty to
o ffic e outweighs his own willfulness. (32)
For Weber, the politician is of a differen t
bureaucrat. He w rites:

species or spirit <than the

... it is immensely moving when a mature man - no matter whether
young or old in years - is aware of a responsibility for the
consequences of his conduct and really feels such responsibility with
heart and soul. He then acts by follow ing an ethic o f responsibility and
somewhere he reaches the point where he says: 'Here I stand; I can do
no other.' (33)
One way o f resolving role conflicts is to com partm entalize one's roles. "In
modern societies, marked by a high degree of space and time specialization
and separation of human activities, it is possible for someone to be one person
at certain places and times and another person at other places and
tim es." (34) By employing this schizoid ta ctic one fa ils to see the immoral
actions for what they are (moral standards are reserved for roles which are
not enacted in the bureaucracy). In his advice to clinical psychologists,
Ernest Keen acknowledges the phenomenon of com partm entalization.
He
warns
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To become aware of his own experience of self-as-subject may
enlighten latent values. This may put him into agonizing con flict
between his personal values and his bureaucratic values, and the
therapist must be willing to accept responsibility for his role in
bringing that con flict to a head. (35)

Even in cases in which abuses are recognized, there are barriers to
participation in bureaucratic oppositions that do not re fle c t the operation of
the ’’rational calculus.”
For example, Western sex-role norms inhibit
opposition by divorcing means from m otive. Men are expected to be active
and aggressive, but they are also supposed to be "toughminded,” to be
insensitive to personal feelings and m orality, and to direct their attention to
the ’’bottom line." Women, in contrast, are supposed to be "tenderminded"
(atten tive to feelin g and m orality), but they are also expected to be passive
and quiescent. Thus, the male role permits the means to opposition but not
the m otive, and the fem ale role permits the m otive but not the means.
Particular individuals, of course, do not always act consistently with either
their own normative standards or social role expectations.
Aside from the barriers to opposition imposed by deep-rooted roles is an
often unreasoned cynicism with regard to the importance and probable
success of one's efforts, and a resulting ignorance of the appropriate means of
making changes. In a study of Am erican soldiers done during World War II
about one-half of the sample questioned indicated that during their career in
the army they had fe lt the desire to bring a complaint to the attention of the
authorities. Four-fifths of these people failed to bring any complaints and
cited as reasons for their decisions:
1. d ifficu lty in gaining access to the Inspector General (the o ffic e r who
performed the role of trouble-shooter);
2. the judgment that it was fu tile even to try to do anything;
3. fear of reprisals. (36)
Whether or not cynicism is justified depends upon the circumstances of the
particular case, but that it engenders ignorance of the e ffe c tiv e means of
opposition is unquestionable. (37) When courses of action are not institutiona
lized and when examples of them are not w ell known, they w ill not, ceteris
paribus, be frequently pursued.
In representative democracies the party
system provides a form o f institutionalized opposition, while revolutionary
strategists have many blueprints and historical examples. Oppositional action
within organizations has neither ongoing institutions to express it nor a
historical tradition to support it - there is not even a term in the language for
such action.
Bureaucratic opposition, of course, is not the only way in which a person
can respond to disagreement with organizational policies or practices.
Disagreement with organizational authority creates con flict and conflict can
be resolved in many ways. Kurt Singer, in a decades-old a rticle, made a
persuasive case that there are four basic solutions, to conflict based on the
two dimensions o f cognition and volition. (38)
The first or cognitive
dimension poses the alternatives of acknowledgment or repudiation of the
conflict. The second or volitional dimension poses the alternatives o f a ctive
or passive response to the cognition. Repudiation of co n flict coupled with
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passivity means isolation from the field of a ctivity. In an organization such
isolation would involve either psychological withdrawal from one's job
(lowering its saliency in one's life ) or actually quitting. Passive acknowledg
ment of con flict means admitting defeat before any struggle is initiated,
renouncing one's objectives: it is follow ing the advice of "suffer and be still."
This resolution is widespread and may account for high rates of absenteeism,
lackadaisical work habits, and feelings of alienation and hostility.
Such
symptoms, including expressive acts of sabotage, are the result o f partial
resignation, the incom plete resolution of the con flict situation. A secretary
writes, "And everyw here we rebelled in a thousand small ways - taking extra
tim e in the ladies' room, m isfiling important letters, 'forgetting' to correct
typos." (39)
Repudiation of con flict coupled with an activist disposition leads to
behavior that attempts to m odify the conflict situation, to integrate in some
way the opposing positions: it is the strategy of compromise that draws so
much praise from mainstream administrative theorists, though its particular
expressions may be mildly subversive.
There are several ways in which
em ployees may attem pt to compromise a con flict situation. If a policy or
superior prescribes violations of bureaucratic or moral norms the em ployee
may obey sporadically, agreeing to the order but doing the "right" thing when
the boss is not looking. A similar strategy is for the em ployee to try to
compensate for the undesirable consequences in some way. For example, a
secretary whose boss ordered her to give him monies from petty cash to use
for his personal expenses replaced the funds from her own salary. Similarly,
when a w elfa re department's policy changed and no longer allowed certain
expenditures for home furnishings, a case worker would w rite up a report in
which monies that were actually to be spent for furnishings would be charged
to some allowable category. Another variant of compromise is the effo rt of a
subordinate to "patch things up" with a client who has been abused by a
superior. Bordering on more acute acknowledgment of con flict are forms of
unproclaimed resistance. For example, when there is a directive to crack
down on tim e spent for lunch, workers may begin to take only an hour instead
o f their usual hour and fifte e n minutes for the o ffic ia l 45 minute break. On
the whole, the development of informal rules arises from the compromise
ta ctic o f con flict resolution. (40)
Many rulings, o f course, cannot be
compromised and the efforts o f employees towards compromise are frequent
ly feeb le attempts to assuage guilt.
The last resolution of con flict, in which incom patibility is actively
acknowledged, is termed by Singer "resolute contention": When a person
"does not want the clash of antagonistic forces to be eschewed, attenuated or
denied, he takes his stand and decides to fight the co n flict out...." (41) It is
within this category of resolute contention that bureaucratic oppositions fall.
They require both full recognition of incompatible rules and a decision to
fight to establish the situation that "should" obtain.
Individuals do not randomly select one of Singer's four conflict resolution
strategies. The choice among the alternatives is influenced by a number of
factors, some of which are personality, the actions taken by others, and prior
experience with and expectations o f the organization's probable responses.
Political scientists have been concerned with determining how those who
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participate in political a ctivities d iffer from those who do not enter the fray.
They distinguish among levels o f participation (whether or not the person
perform s a leadership role) and among types of groups (traditional, democrat
ic, or extrem ist). Lester Milbrath, for example, studied research on behavior
directed towards a ffec tin g the "decisional outcomes of governm ent." He
concluded that those enacting such behavior tend to have above average
education and socioeconomic position, a sense of political e ffic a c y , a sense of
political duty, self-confidence, and above average knowledge and sophisti
cation. In addition, participants are more likely to be male, sociable and
outgoing, and not cynical. (42)
The extent to which participation in the political system is similar to
involvem ent in a bureaucratic opposition is difficu lt to assess. Impressionis
tic conclusions based on the case data collected for this study indicate that
those who are most a ctive in bureaucratic opposition groups have charac
teristics similar to Milbrath’s intensive participants. In addition, bureaucratic
oppositionists tend to be concerned with the ethical dimensions o f existence.
The sociological and political science literatu re on "extrem ist" group
members does not seem to be applicable to bureaucratic oppositions.
The preceding discussion has been concerned with the conditions inhibiting
opposition as they are expressed in the individual. There are also strictly
social conditions that block opposition which are, perhaps, re fle c tiv e o f
individual motives when they are woven into group traditions.
Within
organizations, informal groups and their orientation to the form al authority
structure are factors with considerable influence on the probability o f
struggle. In general, informal work groups are functionally adapted to the
organization and provide their members with ways of coping within the
boundaries of the administrative order. They are usually conservative forces
because they make the workplace more personal and less distant, anonymous,
and threatening. Their ideologies preach "liv e and let live," and although they
may disparage the organization and its leaders they o ffe r no proposals for
change. There are, however, "deviant" informal groups which are positive
conditions for opposition. In such groups there is a tradition or a culture of
a ctive opposition to authority. When this rate type of informal group exists it
may have developed from past experiences with bureaucratic oppositions in
which the possibilities for success were demonstrated. Despite the possibility
o f oppositional traditions, however, the vast m ajority o f informal work groups
negatively a ffe c t the potential for opposition. Their co llective attitude is
one of indifference or open hostility to any change. It is only when the policy
which may provide the ground for an opposition is newly instituted, and
particularly when it disrupts the informal group’s adaptation to the
organization, that such a group is likely to become oppositional. An example
o f a disruptive policy is a no-talking rule which in terferes with the group's
sociability function.
The structure o f informal groups and their traditions are important
because bureaucratic oppositions are best pursued when several employees
participate. There have, o f course, been both successful and unsuccessful
one-person oppositions and they w ill be discussed in some detail in the
follow ing chapter. H owever, it is easier for an oppositionist not to go it alone
for both ta ctica l and emotional reasons. More participants generally means
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more resources such as ideas, knowledge, and contacts within and outside the
hierarchy. For example, an opposition group of nurses fe lt strengthened by
the presence of a nurse who was romantically linked with a medical staff
member, even though he was already married. (43)
Also, because the
adm inistrative myth claims that all policy is rational, any opposition is
almost autom atically suspected of irrationality.
Lone oppositionists are
often tagged as "mental cases," deviants, or troublemakers, and are not taken
seriously. It is more difficu lt to make charges of mental imbalance when two
or more people publicly acknowledge the same abuse.
Generally, bu
reaucratic oppositions that are one-man shows are so only because no allies
could be found. There is almost always a search for allies, if only to fo rtify
the resolve and corroborate the judgment of the lone oppositionist. Also, the
search for allies may be motivated by a desire to avoid pariah status.
Large-scale social opposition groups, term ed "challenge groups" by
Gamson, tend to be increasingly e ffe c tiv e with greater membership. Such is
not the case for bureaucratic oppositions which, except in special cases of
oppositions to unions or other form ally dem ocratic structures, seem to depend
upon fa c e -to -fa c e interaction.
Where representative institutions exist
attempts can be made to organize electoral support, but where they do not
exist there is usually a necessity for tight solidarity. Between 12 and 15
members seems to be an upper lim it for oppositions, and many o f the groups
contain only four or fiv e people. Of course, the pool from which opposition
group members can be drawn also a ffects the size o f the group, as does the
level o f authority against which the opposition is raised.
The development and maintenance of the opposition group, and not only
its actual strategies, require great effo rt. Since groups do not form abruptly
and spontaneously like mushrooms after a rain, it is necessary to mobilize and
unite those who may be w illing to act.
M obilization depends upon the
existence o f quasi-groups which may be transformed into self-conscious
collectivities. The process of transformation has been described by Morris
Ginsberg who stated that a quasi-group is a c o llectivity which has "no
recognizable structure, but whose members have certain interests or modes
o f behavior in common which may at any tim e lead them to form themselves
into definite groups." (44) There are many quasi-groups in organizations,
some of which crosscut one another. The most obvious are form ed by people
who are in the same organizational position, such as dock loaders, nurses,
social workers, accounting clerks, or, more generally, the subordinates of a
certain o ffic ia l. Crosscutting groups may be based on ethnicity, sex, age,
religion, or political a ffilia tion (more generally, upon any nonoccupational
interest), and whether or not they are activated depends a great deal on
external social circumstances.
In addition to quasi-groups and, probably more important, are the informal
work groups discussed above. Despite their generally conservative function
within organizations, it is possible for informal groups sometimes to be
transformed into oppositions, which is probably why they have both fascinated
and scared apologists for the administrative ideal since the Depression. (45)
The leader of the dock worker's opposition described earlier analyzed the
development of his opposition group from an informal work group: "The
workers in our area had gotten to be a close-knit group, because of all the
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talking and joking we had done. It’s possible that is why talking and joking
aren't allow ed.” (46)
The recruitment into bureaucratic oppositions is usually gradual because it
involves risks and the testing of loyalties on all sides. Likely prospects for
participation are those who indulge in the griping and black humor that is the
first response to abuse. Although such a ctivities are useful for spreading
discontent and for delegitim ating authorities, they do not themselves
constitute opposition. Depending upon the circumstances, group form ation
may result from the exasperation with a long train o f abuses or may be
directly related to a single precipitating event. D ifferen t members of the
group may have based their decision to struggle on differen t grounds (in
response to differen t abuses). Initiation into the group is informal. ” Hey, you
know, we ought to do something about that” is often sufficient inducement to
participate for those who are already m otivated.
Formal groups have
initiation procedures which tend to be elaborate and replete with ritual, and
which function to inform everyone that the recruit is unmistakably a member.
For example, m ilitary induction ceremonies are blatant and include shaving
the heads o f recruits, tagging them with metal identification plates, and
outfittin g them distinctively, all o f which is reminiscent of ca ttle branding.
Initiations into fraternal and religious groups also are filled with instances of
ceremonial investment. Such practices function to reinforce the newcom er’s
commitment to the group and to make resignation difficu lt.
Informal groups, which generally lack initiation ceremonies, are continu
ally threatened by casual participation and "dropping out” by members. There
is no need for members to explain publicly why they have not participated
fully, they have no gifts to return, and there are no legal proceedings for
detachment.
To bolster solidarity, noninstitutionalized pressures must be
m obilized. For example, frequent fa c e -to -fa c e interaction among members,
especially when it includes conversation about the organization's abuses,
serves to maintain and enhance com m itm ent.
When others within the
organization are aware of the group's existence the solidarity o f its members
is often enhanced and is sometimes intensified when members are stigm atized
and ostracized by nonmembers. (47) In reciprocal fashion, those who are
potential converts to the group but who have refused to join are usually
view ed negatively by the group's members. A t times the hostility o f the
group against outsiders becomes more important to it than the original goal
o f change. And when the opposition is term inated, whether or not it has been
successful, these hostilities tend to endure.
Comm itment to the group need not be based only on affirm ation of its
goal, but may also be based on personal loyalties.
Personal loyalty is a
general characteristic o f primary groups, which are characterized by
gem einschaft (relations are personal and diffuse rather than specific to a
certain role). Where oppositions are based on gesellschaft (self-in terested
exchange), there is often some unwritten bargain in which individual members
re ceive something o f value as an inducement to maintain their participation.
Such rewards vary from the opportunity to exert power to "gettin g a piece of
the action" (for example, being next in line for promotion to the position
whose current incumbent is under attack by the oppositionists). When people
become disenchanted with the issue that engendered opposition, despairing of
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victo ry or simply becoming annoyed with all the tim e oppositional a ctivity
takes away from other pursuits, their active commitment is supported by
solidarity. In their analysis of the German Army's performance during World
War II, Shils and 3anowitz claimed that the higher echelons miscalculated the
source of the soldier's commitment to keep fighting under adverse conditions.
It was assumed by the m ilitary command that patriotism and a faith in the
nobility o f Hitler's mission was sufficient to sustain comm itm ent. Shils and
Janowitz indicate that, on the contrary, loyalty was accorded mainly to the
soldier's small unit, to the individuals who comprised this primary group. (48)
The form ation of groups that do not have high status in their social
environment, to which people find it risky to belong and which do not have
legitim acy, is hindered by the difficu lties in developing trust among potential
members. Group formation is made even more d ifficu lt by the atmosphere o f
com petition engendered by organizations, in which
people vie with one
another for advancement and privileges.
C om petitive relations and the
alienation that accompanies them create undercurrents of mistrust and
suspicion which are difficu lt to overcom e.
A leader of a secretarial
opposition comments, "This hatred o f other women, which was really selfhatred, made it easy for the Editor-in-Chief to divide and conquer." (49)
When people may face being fired or fired upon if their active opposition
is publicly known, developing trust poses problems as acute as reaching the
decision to fight to make changes in the organization. Once there is trust,
however, high risk serves to foster commitment because each one feels an
obligation not to let the others down. The positive relation between risk and
com m itm ent, noted by Downton in his study of rebel groups, (50) may also be
explained by cognitive dissonance theory as a result of our tendency to feel
positive e ffe c t for that which we must suffer to achieve. (51) In part, this
explanation covers the patriotism o f war veterans, the loyalty o f hazed
fratern ity brothers, and the love o f a mother for her infant.
Many
bureaucratic oppositions, however, are not very risky. Pledges o f "united we
stand, divided we fa ll" and frank admissions of the risks involved in struggle
are o ften su fficient to create a trust which extends as far as the
organizational roles, but which does not involve the whole person. Once such
trust is established among members o f an opposition group there is rarely any
further mention o f the risks.
Even where trust has been created there is still a problem o f maintaining
com m itm ent. Gamson indicates that
bureaucratic organization helps a group with the problem of pattern
maintenance.
By creating a structure o f the roles with defined
expectations in the place of diffuse commitments, a challenging group
can better assure that certain necessary tasks w ill be routinely
perform ed. (52)
Bureaucratic opposition groups, however, rarely become form al organizations
them selves because they are usually small, fa ce-to -fa ce groups whose
members believe (not always correctly) that their struggle w ill last for only a
short tim e. Sometimes the inform ality of oppositions promotes their success,
because the administrative authorities often prefer a w ell-organized adver-
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sary to loose congeries of disgruntled individuals. Organized oppositions, as
Simmel recognized, are more predictable, can be more easily coopted, and
can more readily arrange compromises than informal groups:
... against a diffuse multitude o f enemies, one gains more often
particular victories, but has great d ifficu lty in achieving decisive
actions which defin itely fix the mutual relationship o f the forces. (53)
Basic to the organization of a group is its degree of centralization and the
nature o f its leadership. Most ongoing groups have specific procedures for
selecting leaders. For example, elections are used in democracies, accession
in monarchies, and preemption in revolutionary governments. Small groups
that are form ed independently of the directives of authorities often use the
method o f assumption in which the one assumed by all to be the best qualified
becomes the leader. To the extent to which bureaucratic opposition groups
are centralized and can be said to have leaders, assumption is the dominant
method o f leadership selection. However, the infrequency o f oppositional
a c tivity makes it d ifficu lt to judge leadership ability. Unlike the hunting
groups of the Bushmen, in which the most skilled hunter is the leader who
deploys men to differen t areas and tasks, bureaucratic opposition groups
cannot base selection of a leader on instrumentally rational criteria. Perhaps
this is one reason why bureaucratic oppositions often have no clearly defined
administration and why those that do have leaders have no form al procedures
for acknowledging them. G eneralizing from the data, leaders o f opposition
groups have two basic characteristics: they are highly articulate and they are
the most strongly or among the most strongly m otivated to achieve the
group's goal. Taking liberties with Weber's categories, the authority of these
leaders is based on charisma. Their personal influence alone determines the
extent to which they w ili be heeded. They have no reservoir of fo rce with
which to compel obedience. Like all u nofficial leaders they must consult far
more than command. Leaders of bureaucratic oppositions serve as advisers
coordinators, and planners, provided that others are w illing to listen to them’.
Such noncoercive administration is frequent among small groups and even
characterizes whole communities such as the Northern Algonquians, the
Kalahari Bushmen, and some Eskimo. These communities are characterized
by primary interaction, low population density, and rela tively simple social
organization.
Leaderless bureaucratic opposition groups d iffer very little from those
with leaders. In the form er, advice is more readily given by and taken from
those who have special-area com petence, and, thus, most of the members of
the group are at some tim e in positions o f leadership. (54)
Lack o f
centralization is not only due to the small size and expected brief duration of
the opposition, but to the relative status o f and risks taken by the members.
Most often all the members of the opposition group are at the same leve l o f
the organizational hierarchy and, th erefore, confront similar risks. When
subordinates and their imm ediate superiors unite, the la tter usually become
the leaders. For example, in academ ic bureaucratic oppositions those who
have tenure tend to take the lead and to expose themselves to the authorities
o f the university more than do the untenured facu lty who fa ce the risk that
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their contracts will not be renewed.
When bureaucratic oppositions are expected to last for an extended period
o f time (m ore than a few weeks) and/or when large numbers of people are
involved in them, organizational com plexity develops.
Specific roles are
created and filled , including leadership positions. Examples o f highly complex
opposition groups are found most frequently in labor unions. Not only are
unions legally required to have a dem ocratic form , but they were initiated as
a kind of bureaucratic opposition and maintain a mythology of struggle and
organization.
Also, oppositions against union authority often require the
coordination of large numbers of people. The wildcat strikes by mine workers
in Appalachia, which lasted for several months during the summer of 1977 and
which w ere directed primarily against the United Mine Workers, exem plify a
highly complex opposition group in action.
The fa ct that workers were
scattered among numerous sites throughout the regior^eif required centralized
planning and coordination. The event that precipitated the opposition was a
change in medical benefits, which had been free in the past but which were
then put on a fe e basis. Comments made by the miners, how ever, indicated
that the precipitant was only the straw that broke the cam el’s back: the
oppositionists accused the union of being generally indifferent to the needs of
the workers.
The wildcat strike included about one-half o f the UMW's
175,000 working members and it appeared that the organization o f the
opposition was based in some o f the UMW district o ffic e s . (55) The most
militant district, //17 in Charleston, West Virginia, was treated by the UMW
hierarchy as a kind o f ’’bargaining agent" for all of the strikers, although it
had not been authorized to speak for the other districts. Oppositions against
unions, such as this wildcat strike, are on the borderline between bureaucratic
oppositions and traditional political processes because they may involve
actions against a federated body by some of its legally constituted parts.
Another complex bureaucratic opposition group is the Professional
Drivers' Council (PROD , Inc.) which has been in con flict with its union, the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, since 1971.
Membership figures
vary, but in 1977 PROD claimed 10,000 members, o f whom 4,000 had paid the
$20 yearly dues. PROD has charged that the top o ffic ia ls of the Teamsters
have been financially irresponsible, have failed to push for legislation and
contract agreements which would reduce safety hazards, and have made a
mockery o f union democracy. Unlike the UMW w ildcatters, whose opposition
arose within the union’s form al structure, PROD was inspired by Ralph
Nader’s public interest group, from which it became independent after a year
o f tutelage. The diversity and com plexity of PRO D ’s activities preclude a
simple structure for the group. It has won court cases which the Teamsters
grievance com m ittees had refused to fight and it has lobbied the Departments
o f Transportation, Justice, and Labor, and the Internal Revenue Service.
PROD also publishes books and a "hard-hitting" bi-monthly newspaper which
recounts the actions of its members and Teamster retaliations. (56) Finally,
the organization has been a literal prod, holding meetings throughout the
United States in which teamsters are informed about how to clean up their
local unions.
Despite the publicity that they get, large and complex bureaucratic
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threats (Student Nonviolent Coordinating C om m ittee and the Black Panthers),
N A A rm
j atl0f?aI Association fo r the Advancement o f Colored People,
N A A C P ), and moral persuasion and example (Martin Luther King, Jr. and the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference).
t , The form ation and coordination o f individuals into opposition groups are
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.l nterplay betweer> the ever-present grounds for struggle and
the organizational conditions which inhibit dissent. That the countervailing
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form ation does not occur and an individual decides to go it alone. Energies
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" 8i ^ ,opposition 8rouP t0 attem pt to change policies or ruleolating personnel only form the prelude to bureaucratic opposition itself.
The actual struggle must proceed according to a strategy or course of action
through which the oppositionists attem pt to achieve their goal of instituting
esired changes. Such strategies and the tactics derived from them form the
subject m atter of the follow in g section.
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Every public action which is not customary, either is wrong or,
if it is right, is a dangerous precedent. It follows that nothing
should ever be done for the first time.
- F.M.
Cornford,
Microcosmographia Académ ica, vil

Bureaucratic opposition is a political phenomenon that appears in an
adm inistrative entity, which is defined so as to exclude politics. According to
the myth o f administration, each employee has a prescribed role, the
perform ance of which is instrumental to the achievement of the organi
zation's purposes. Under ideal circumstances there is no conflict between the
perform ance of a role and the efficien t achievement of o ffic ia l organization
al goals. Each em ployee is assumed to be competent, m otivated to perform
the prescribed function, and able to contribute to the overall purpose. When
any o f these assumptions are not met, and they are never met com pletely,
there is a possibility for opposition to business as usual. As Locke pointed out
in the Second Treatise, there are always abundant excuses for revolt in any
political situation, there are always grounds for opposition.
The ideal
organization is no less a utopia than the ideal state.
As noted previously, bureaucracies resemble authoritarian states because
they do not provide for legitim ate and institutionalized opposition. Oppo
sition parties and interest groups in democracies need not legitim ate
themselves because they are acknowledged to be integral components of the
ongoing system. Bureaucratic oppositions are, by definition, outside of and
subversive to the system in which they appear and must legitim ate
themselves. The grounding of oppositions, described in the second chapter,
can be conceived o f as a process of seeking for justification under conditions
in which, according to o ffic ia l definition, justification is ruled out. The task
o f bureaucratic opposition is to create itself as a legitim a te phenomenon.
The grounds for bureaucratic opposition are sought in deviations from or
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infractions o f the norms o f the organization itself or the norms o f the wider
society. Although the members of an opposition may have multiple and even
con flictin g m otives for their participation, they must usually espouse the
cause o f making the organization live up to its own standards or the standards
o f the wider social environment. Only if an opposition is carried out secretly
can its members avoid the problem of justifying their dissent. H owever, the
grounding o f an opposition m erely gives it an ideology; it does not make a
place for it within the system and certainly does not insure its success. As
noted in the third chapter, oppositionists must make a self-conscious
comm itm ent to challenge business as usual. They must organize, or at least
take individual risks.
Bureaucracies are, in one respect, hierarchies of
authority. Opposition within them is a threat to the exercise of authority and
w ill nearly always be perceived by o ffic ia ls as a signal that control is giving
way to chaos. As in all authoritarian situations, the first concern o f o fficia ls
is that obedience be maintained. In general, oppositionists must walk softly
and carry as big a stick as possible. Y e t just because their a ctivity is not
leg itim a te they cannot lower their voices, and just because they lack
authority they have little clout.
Bureaucratic oppositions, then, will
predictably m eet the resistance o f the o ffic ia l hierarchy. Higher o fficia ls,
who become or are made aware of dissent, w ill be concerned not m erely with
the validity of the grounds, but with the maintenance o f obedience,
submission, and the semblance o f order. The oppositionists, however, are
often unaware o f or, to use R oyce's expression, "viciously naive" about the
resistance they w ill m eet and the reprisals that they may su ffer. O ften they
believe that the "fa cts" w ill speak for themselves, that if only the o fficia ls
are made cognizant of abuses the abuses w ill be corrected. Without such
innocence or naivete there would be few er oppositions undertaken. O ften the
belief that the "facts speak for them selves" is the vital lie that fuels
opposition, at least in its initial stages. The oppositionists not only use the
norms o f the organization or the society to justify their case, but they often
believe that the higher administrators are com m itted to these norms, even to
the exclusion o f maintaining the appearance o f control and wisdom. Such
b elie f is almost never warranted.
As Serpico found, the authorities
themselves may be corrupt. However, even if they are generally honest, they
w ill fe e l threatened by breaches in the chain o f command.
The initial
innocence of many oppositionists is, of course, instrumental to their taking
action. They are concerned with rectifyin g a perceived abuse, so concerned
that they put on blinders and fa il to take the role o f the authorities. It is
frequently their innocence or naivete that allows them to overcom e
bureaucratic inertia and to transcend the paradox o f their powerlessness.
Although they are engaged in a political a ctivity , a combat, they often do not
interpret the organization as a political system, and thus are as much as or
more victim s o f the adm inistrative myth than their superiors.
Just because oppositions are not legitim a te phenomena within bureaucra
cies they are relatively unstructured a ctivities.
There is no culturallyprescribed role for the oppositionist, no ready-made routine for successful
dissent.
Highly organized social acts, such as those undertaken by
bureaucracies, may be described as linear, sequential, and ordered because
they are patterned by a preordained plan. O f course, bureaucracies are not
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as orderly as their handbooks have it, or else, for one thing, oppositions would
not occur. However, business as usual in a bureaucracy often approximates
the o ffic ia l plan. The Platonic illusion that form structures content cannot
be maintained in any sense for bureaucratic oppositions. Their grounds are
not given to them by a charter, but must be sought and created, often in the
very process of con flict. Even when the grounds are clear, the oppositionists
must devise ways o f effe c tin g their goals, must innovate strategies.
The use of the term ’’strategy" implies a situation of combat. The word is
derived from the Greek and originally meant the "art of the general." Its use
in the present discussion implies a judgment that the nature of political
a ctivity is com bative.
In the Western tradition, the idea that politics is
essentially con flict is paralleled by the idea that it is or should be a rational
discussion aimed at determining the common good. The political scientist
Maurice Duverger writes:
Ever since men have been reflectin g on politics they have oscillated
between two dram atically opposed interpretations. According to one,
politics is con flict, a struggle in which power allows those who possess
it to ensure their hold on society and to profit by it. According to the
other view , politics is an e ffo rt to bring about the rule of order and
justice in which power guarantees the general interest and the common
good against the pressures of private interests. (1)
The two definitions of politics tend to become confused with one another in
bureaucratic oppositions. The oppositionists often believe initially that they
can e ffe c t the changes that they seek m erely by appealing rationally to a
supposed normative consensus. In later stages, if such stages occur, they
frequently shift to the view that politics is a power struggle or at least to the
idea that power is a key factor in winning the debate over just what
constitutes the common good. In the present discussion, the use of the term
strategy is meant to stress the judgment that even when the oppositionists do
not believe that they are engaged in combat, the element of con flict, of the
m ilitary campaign and the adversary relation, is always present. The mere
act of "speaking the truth to power" is a combative act because the o ffic ia l
who receives the message and is responsible for the organization’s proper
function is im plicitly being accused of dereliction of duty. He or she should
have spotted the incompetent or unjust em ployee, or should not have
tolerated the in e ffe c tiv e or immoral policy. Oppositionists, of course, are
often unaware that they are mounting such an attack, so involved are they
with their cause.
The idea that politics is a rational discussion about the public good implies
that the participants in the discussion are equals whose arguments are judged
by their intrinsic merits. In the words of Jurgen Habermas, rational politics
implies an "ideal speech situation," in which each member is concerned to
determine truth and goodness, not to maintain a chain of command or to gain
power and privilege. The Machiavellian definition of politics as the act of
gaining and maintaining power is more appropriate to the study of
bureaucratic opposition than the Platonic idea of rational discourse because
the oppositionists are not equal participants in the political process and they
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confront authorities who are concerned primarily with maintaining order.
k i j uS 1° iud8ment made in the present discussion about what politics
should be, but only about what politics in bureaucracies have been.
The dynamics of a bureaucratic opposition can, in its most general form,
be view ed as developing goals, designing strategies for implementing the
goals, and enacting strategically appropriate tactical maneuvers. "One can
say that tactics is fighting and strategy is planning where and how to fight,
with the 'how' construed so as to exclude the details." (2) The goals o f a
bureaucratic opposition are related to the grounds of the opposition but are
not always determined by them.
A t one extrem e the actual goal o f an
opposition may be the perpetuation of an illegal a ctivity , such as pilferage,
while the public ground is the supposed incom petence o f a supervisor. A t the
other extrem e the actual goal may follow directly from the ground, as when
the oppositionists attem pt to rem ove a rule that causes in efficien t or
in e ffe c tiv e functioning.
Most oppositions fa ll between the two extrem es.
First, the members o f the opposition may have w idely differen t goals, some
o f which follow from ungrounded m otives and others o f which are based on
commitment to the public grounds. Second, there may be a range o f specific
goals com patible with the general ground and the oppositionists may disagree
among themselves about which o f these specific goals is the best or the most
prudent to pursue.
For example, when a promotional policy bars the
advancement of women and/or minority-group members, a new policy might
allow for "token," "m erit," or "a ffirm a tive action" promotions of those
against whom discrimination is directed.
There are many determinants o f goal selection.
For example, how
radically the goal departs from the organization's current modus operandi is
often a function of the perceived resources of the opposition group, such as
its morale, connections, and bargaining skills. Further, the goals may be
influenced by prevailing policies in comparable organizations and may change
in the course o f the opposition as actions disclose new information, close o ff
options, and open up new alternatives.
Finally, the choice o f goals may
become subordinate to the opposition’s strategy through considerations of
prudence or the presence o f ungrounded m otives, such as revenge or the
e ffo r t to maintain solidarity or avoid dismissal.
Oppositions often adapt
satisficin g" strategies in which they ask for more than they need or expect
so that they can bargain down to their actual goal, which its e lf only becomes
clarified in the bargaining process. The indeterm inacy o f goal selection is
related to the unstructured and unprogrammed nature o f bureaucratic
opposition. C larity about goals is, for the most part, a luxury o f those who
are confident that they have the means to achieve those goals and can count
on a consensus about their desirability.
Most generally, the goals of a bureaucratic opposition are either to stop
norm violations by having the violator dismissed or reform ed, and/or to
change a policy in whole or in part. The goals of changing the personnel and
o f changing the structure are not mutually exclusive. Other things being
equal, if there is a choice about which o f these two goals to select, then
altering personnel will be preferred. The organization is not structurally
damaged by personnel changes, so by concentrating on the removal or reform
o f incumbents the oppositionists can better maintain their loyalty to the

STRATEGIES AND TACTICS

61

organization itself. Attem pts to alter policy are more costly. Serpico first
went a fter the removal of several corrupt cops, but then realized that
corruption was an unwritten policy of the New York C ity Police Department.
He altered his goal to changing the structure of the Department, to
elim inating in e ffe c tiv e , and immoral policy, and met with strong resistance
and reprisals. The W atergate investigators also sought "to determined which
of the President's men were responsible. The paradoxical conclusion was 'all
the President's men'." (3)
Once a goal is set, even provisionally, the general plans for achieving it
need to be developed and put into e ffe c t. These general plans or strategies
fa ll into two major classes, based on whether they primarily involve giving
information about perceived abuses to authorities, outside agencies, or news
media, or involve taking direct action against the abuses, such as harassment,
filin g suit, or disrupting the routine of work. The informing strategy is an
attem pt to exercise power indirectly by pursuading someone else, usually
someone with administrative or legal authority, to re c tify the perceived
abuse. D irect action, of course, involves the commitment to participate in
the power struggle oneself.
However, most forms o f direct action also
require the final action to be taken by those in authority.
For many reasons the informing strategy is the most prevalent used in
bureaucratic oppositions. Perhaps the most important reason for this is that
it does not appear to be political, it does not seem to commit one to a
con flict. The informer often makes the naive assumption discussed above,
that if those in positions of responsibility knew that something was amiss they
would be grateful for the knowledge and promptly go about setting things
right. Informing, then, reminds one of children tattling to their parents about
their sibling's misdeeds. The informer can, at least for a while, keep up the
pretense that the administrative ideal is honored by the authorities, that
there is a normative consensus. As Alvin Gouldner noted, human beings tend
to associate goodness with power. (4)
A second reason for the popularity of informing is that it appears to be
less costly than direct action, because it relies upon others who have
authority to do the "dirty work" of e ffe c tin g change. Informing appears to
leave the decision in the hands of the authority, and, thus, it does not seem to
be rebellious. Informers break with business as usual only by violating the
chain o f command, not by challenging the principle of command itself. They
are often not aware, at least consciously, that the authorities tend to
associate the chain o f command with the principle o f command.
The
informing strategy also seems to be less costly than direct action, because
typical instances of direct action, such as work stoppages, may be grounds for
dismissal from the organization, while complaints generally are not. Again,
the oppositionists are frequently aware that authorities, who are embarrass
ed, discredited, or compromised by revelations of misconduct, can find
excuses for bringing reprisals against dissenters. Informing, then, is as much
a political strategy as any other and, of course, many oppositionists
understand this from the outset.
. . .
u
Just as the goals of actual oppositions are often multiple and may change
over tim e, strategies are various and mutable. If informing fails, one may
continue to inform to higher levels within the organization or to other
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agencies with authority, or engage in some form of direct action.
Disagreement within the opposition group, or m erely lack o f coordination
among its members, may generate the trial o f differen t strategies or tactics
simultaneously. In contrast to more structured conflicts such as wars, going
in more than one direction at the same tim e may benefit the opposition
because the dissenters are not engaged in a zero-sum game. In particular,
informing, despite its risks, does not necessarily consume much in the way of
resources.
The choice of strategy, however, is not necessarily based on
calculations of instrumental rationality. Participants in oppositions usually
lack knowledge o f the full range o f their alternatives and of the consequences
o f follow ing the options o f which they are aware. The use of an ’’econom ic”
metaphor in this discussion m erely serves to indicate that choices are not
made randomly and that there is more or less a logic at work which takes
costs into account and seeks to minimize risks. If econom ic rationality w ere
a major concern o f oppositionists, however, there would be few bureaucratic
oppositions.

INFO RM ING

There would seem to be nothing easier to do than to provide information
about an abuse.
However, when the informing strategy is undertaken a
number o f unforeseen problems may arise.
It is not sufficient for the
oppositionist to stand in the lobby and vocally announce the abuse or to pass
out circulars to those who happen by.
The proper recipients for the
inform ation must be found and they must be w illing to listen.
As hierarchies o f authority, organizations attem pt to restrict and to
control communication as w ell as to secure the performance of other tasks.
Orders are handed down from the top through a chain o f command and any
inform ation passed in the opposite direction is not supposed to break that
chain. Employees are expected to report only to their imm ediate superiors.
Oppositions, however, are frequently directed against just those supervisors
to whom the dissidents ordinarily report. Im mediate subordinates are more
likely to become aware o f the rule violations o f their superior than are
o ffic ia ls at the superior’s own leve l or at higher levels. In order to inform
then, the hierarchy must often be breached.
An opposition group which attem pted to inform on a supervisor's
discriminatory action against the fem ale accountants in his o ffic e went one
level higher in the chain o f command. However, the supervisor's superior
refused to talk to us because we had fa iled to follow corporate procedures.
He pointed out to us that our first point o f contact was Mr. V " the
discrim inatory supervisor. (5)
R igid adherence to the hierarchy, which makes informing within the
organization impossible, is not the only barrier to communicating about
abuses. Some counselors in a drug abuse clinic found out that the vice
directors o f the agency had been "skimming money from federal funds for
their own personal use. ... The scheme was camouflaged nicely, by talented
book-juggling' by the culprits. Funds, supposedly used fo r drug purchases,
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improving 'job-readiness,1 and counseling tools were confiscated by the vice
directors." (6) A statement detailing the malfeasance was drawn up by the
counselors and given to the director, but no action was taken.
The
oppositionists soon learned that the director was also dishonest:
Th erefore, we had to make an appointment which fin ally got through,
to enlighten the Executive-D irector to the present conditions. This
was fa irly d ifficu lt to do, because o f his 'isolated position' he kept
himself in. Finally, after three weeks of trying to get through we got
that appointment, by one day barging in his o ffic e and announcing we
needed to talk to him. (7)
In this case, the information was appreciated and action was taken.
Informing over the heads of one's immediate superiors can also backfire
when they are told about it.
A weapons analyst in the U.S. A ir Force,
physicist Kenneth S. Cook, broke the chain of command in the course of his
bureaucratic opposition. His immediate commanding o ffic e r informed him
that he had a copy of his "confidential" letter to the higher brass.
What follow ed was a Kafkaesque nightmare.
Cook's top-secret
security clearance was summarily removed without explanation.
Then, before a m ilitary medical panel ... he was found mentally and
physically incapable of performing further service ... within the
governm ent. (8)
Similarly, a fter his superior held up a report about air charter abuses for
more than fiv e weeks, a Federal Aviation Administration em ployee, P.I.
Ryther, went over the o fficia l's head to the deputy administrator. When he
did not take the report seriously, Ryther tried to contact the administrator of
the agency.
He did not respond and passed the word that he would not
comment on the report. Shortly afterwards Ryther was forced to resign when
he was "called on the carpet at a special meeting of his superiors for ignoring
proper channels." (9)
Working one's way up the organizational chart, even if gaining access is
not a problem, does not always make sense. The o ffic ia l chart may not
coincide with the way that power is really distributed. The more that the
oppositionists are fam iliar with the "shadow table" (the actual hierarchy of
influence), the better they can target their activities. A t one university it is
w ell known that one o f the several vice-presidents controls or can control all
areas o f the administration. Several bureaucratic oppositions which began
with inform ing strategies went directly to him, by-passing chart-relevant
deans.
.
Information may be ignored, used against those proffering it, or used to
further the goals o f the bureaucratic opposition. Monarchs were known to kill
bearers o f ill tidings and, while not nearly as severe, administrators rarely
w elcom e the bad news that oppositionists bring.
O fficia ls more or less
co rrectly fe e l that imprpprieties are their responsibility, because they have
form al authority over the situation. O ften they w ere responsible for the
hiring, promotion, or good ratings of the rule violator. Anthony Jay, author
o f The Corporation Man, writes:
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... the hardest and most thankless task is to tell the higher managers in
the corporation that your im m ediate boss is no good. In the first
place, they appointed him, so you are im plicitly critic izin g their
judgment. In the second place, maintenance o f corporate authority
demands that they take his word against yours. In the third place, no
one much wants to employ the sort o f person who is liable to go behind
his back to a superior and v ilify him, even (or especially) if the person
is tellin g the truth. In the fourth place, your m otives are bound to be
suspected. (10)

Illustrating Jay's point is an opposition which took action against a
supervisor o f a research s ta ff who "treated the sta ff in a belligerent and
undignified manner." (11) A complaint was lodged with the o ffic e manager,
who was the next highest authority in the department. It turned out that the
manager "placed greater credence on the reputation o f the supervisor than on
the complaints o f the sta ff." (12) His only action was to tell the supervisor
which em ployees had complained. "In an e ffo r t to discourage and prevent
future contacts, he scrutinized the work o f those em ployees who visited the
O ffic e Manager. When mistakes w ere found, no m atter how significant, the
em ployees w ere told that they w ere fired ." (13)
Many oppositionists have considered using the informing strategy but have
fe lt that it was too dangerous to undertake because o f the potential for
retaliation. A police homicide d etective maintains that "speaking out against
immoral or perceived unethical conduct o f superiors can be a dangerous
practice.... When a member becomes known as a 'trouble maker,' a telephone
call w ill precede him to every new assignment warning of his character
deficien cies." (14) An FBI agent acknowledges that "agents who w rote letters
o f protest during Hoover's tim e could expect, at least, to be transferred to an
undesirable o ffic e ." (15)
Various reasons, including the fea r o f transfer to distant schools, impelled
a bureaucratic opposition group o f elem entary school teachers to pass
information through a third party. The teachers opposed their principal's
illegal orders to have them coach students for standardized examinations and,
also, upgrade their scores.
Instead of reporting to the city's board o f
education directly, they inform ed the school's P.T .A . and helped the parents
draft letters accusing the principal and calling for his resignation. These
letters, which w ere sent to the members o f the board o f education and the
superintendent o f schools, did not reveal the identities of the teachers. The
opposition group achieved its goal through an informing strategy involving
minimal riask. (16)
The tactical issues o f how to inform are multidimensional.
Is the
information to be p roffered in person or by m ail? In either case, is it to be
transmitted by each o f the individuals in the opposition separately or is it to
be delivered co llectively ? A vailable examples show the use o f many tactics
and it is d ifficu lt to generalize about which are the most e ffe c tiv e . Physical
accessibility, a sense o f one's communications skills, the degree that the
authority intim idates, and the nature o f the inform ation are possible
influences on which ta ctic w ill be employed.
One o f the major problems that informants have is gaining credibility.
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The numerous derogatory epithets hurled at informers, such as snitch,
squealer, fink, and rat, dampen the urge to give information. John Dean,
described as "the pariah of Washington, the detested 'bottom -dwelling slug,'
the 'well-poisoner,' Nixon's despised 'Heartbreak Kid,"' (17) recalled his de
cision to tell what he knew about the W atergate break-in: "Now I fe lt the
razor edge between the squealer and the perjurer. I had never fe lt more
squalid." (18) The negative view o f the informer also allows the recipient of
the information to be suspicious of it and, thus, to be reluctant to act on it.
The automatic labeling of an informer as a "troublemaker" shifts the burden
from the accused to the accuser, while imputing personal (non-grounded)
m otives to the oppositionist classifies the information as mere propaganda,
nothing to be taken seriously.
Oppositions mounted by only one person are most easily discredited. A
group, as long as it is not perceived to be a mob, is believed to be more
ob jective. C redibility is increased not only by having several people inform,
but by the "consistency credits" of the oppositionists and their organizational
status.
The longer that people have been with the organization as
"cooperative team members," the more seriously w ill the charges be
considered. Thus, numbers, consistency credits, and level of status are all
resources o f the oppositional group.
When some nurses mounted a bureaucratic opposition against an incompe
tent nursing director, their information was ignored. However, the hospital
administrator regarded the same statements with considerably more gravity
when some physicians joined the opposition. (19)
T h e e ffe c t o f the
composition of the opposition group on its success indicates that an informing
strategy is not independent of considerations of power.
C redibility is also influenced by the evidence used to support the charges.
The pervasive legalistic m entality, probably stronger in public than in private
bureaucracies, gives "hard" evidence, such as memoranda, disinterested
observers, bookkeeping records, or tape recordings, more weight than
unsupported recall or hearsay. Some abuses are easier than others to document
with evidence convincing to the legalistic mind. Because the bureaucratic
opposition depends for its success on the administration acting on its
inform ation to elim inate the abuse, the evidence, ceteris paribus, must be
com pelling enough to overcom e inertia. It is very d ifficu lt to obtain such
convincing evidence, for example, to demonstrate the incompetence o f
administrators.
There is usually no physical object to examine, and if
declines in output or morale are cited they can be attributed to factors other
than the manager.
Circumstantial evidence and the testimony o f subordinates are often
insufficient to impel action, especially if the administrators fear legal suits
or reactions from the Civil Service Commission or unions.
Thus, one
informing ta ctic, as was indicated above, is to inform on an easily
demonstrable abuse rather than on the abuse on which the oppositionist's
comm itm ent is grounded. For example, the failure o f a straight informing
ta ctic on an incompetent supervisor led the frustrated opposition group to
take advantage o f a situation which would normally have been ignored. "In an
em otional outburst the Supervisor insulted a fem ale sta ff member with the
use of sexist and racist slurs." A t this stage of the opposition the group was
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aware that "there was (only) one provision in the company policy for the
removal o f an em ployee at the supervisory level - the use o f profanity and
abusive language to subordinates. (The group) united behind the insulted
em ployee and encouraged her to register a 'form al grievance' with the o ffic e
manager, who had ignored the oppositionists' previous complaints. (20) A
member of the group recalled the e ffic a c y o f altering the public ground:
"The S ta ff was now basing its opposition movement on a clear-cut issue of
company policy .... " (21) and anticipated the supervisor's removal.
The
evidence for the new ground was easy to gather and was credible to the
administration.
Informing on sexual harrassment is particularly d ifficu lt because in serious
cases there probably w ill not be witnesses and there is still a widespread
b elief that women are seducers "asking fo r" advances made by males. One
woman who was harassed stated: "As in rape cases, the woman is often held
responsible for encouraging animal urges in her male co-workers. Almost
always, the woman loses." (22) A young girl working as a housecleaner for an
older man told her residential counselor that "she wouldn't go back because he
grabbed her breast and tried to kiss her." The counselor reports that "my pain
and anger intensified when one o f our male counselors said, 'She's probably
just fantasizing.'" (23) Although there are now many statutes against sexual
harassment, the problem still remains one o f establishing proof. A lawyer
advised women to use a method "that is p erfectly legal - that is, to
unobtrusively w ire one’s self for sound by carrying a hidden ta p e ’ re
corder." (24)
Although the lawyer's advice is perhaps farfetch ed in most cases of
harassment, tape recordings have been successfully used to provide indisput
able evidence against corrupt police. The lone oppositionist, D etective Ellis,
’’was ou tfitted with a tape recorder which he wore beneath his clothing." (25)
Ellis feigned interest in joining the a ctivities o f taking money from
prostitutes, pimps, and drug dealers, and in keeping some o f the money
confiscated in drug arrests.
In many cases, evidence o f abuse is obtainable in incriminating memo
randa and other documents. A t times these are easily accessible, especially
when the violators are unaware o f the im propriety of their actions or do not
believe that they would be prosecuted for such offenses. H owever, when they
are cognizant o f their culpability, they w ill carefu lly protect access to
potentially damaging m aterial.
The prospects o f obtaining documentary
evidence are increased by bringing individuals who have access to it into the
opposition. Such evidence is also more easily secured if the informants can
act anonymously and conceal their intentions.
An example o f anonymous informing was the e ffo r t o f one or more
em ployees o f the American M edical Association to change some of the
organization's illegal and unethical practices by transm itting "dozens of
confidential letters, memoranda, and other documents from A M A files ... "
(26) to the press. The informant's anonymity allowed continued access to the
embarrassing m aterial.
Humorously clubbed "Sore Throat" by the higher
o ffic ia ls o f the A M A , the oppositionist has caused them to hire a private
security firm to plug the leaks. Several s ta ff members have been given lie
detector tests. (27) Had Sore Throat's intentions and identity been known,
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the m aterial would surely have not been available to him.
Informing strategy requires convincing evidence and the tactics used to
obtain it may include stealth. The directors of a hospital were not impressed
by the argument that a doctor made accusing a fellow surgeon litera lly of
killing a number of patients. They took no action against Dr. X. Dr. Harris,
the accuser, then obtained more credible evidence than his previous
testimony about a pattern to the deaths that were linked with Dr. X. He " ...
obtained a master key from a nurse and, alone in the hospital's dressing room,
opened locker number 4, assigned to Dr. X. The locker 'was a mess with
items strewn about,' Harris testified. 'The thing that struck me w ere these
em pty vials of tubocurarine (a trade name for purified curare) and this loaded
syringe. That was enough for me. I closed the locker and shuddered.'" (28)
"Astounded by the discovery," that is, armed with more solid evidence, the
directors finally took action.
Informing strategy in oppositions directed against policies is, ceteris
paribus, more d ifficu lt than in those aimed at rule violators, if only because
o f lim ited accessibility to needed evidence. In an article about managerial
strategies, Paul Goodman and Donald Van Houten contend that "lim ited
access to financial and production data plays an ... important role in
maintaining the corporate status quo." (29) They conclude, pessimistically,
that those "who wish to challenge managerial decisions on rational grounds
may thus have inadequate data from which to plead their case." (30)
In order to boost the prospects of the success of an informing strategy,
the oppositionist or opposition group may marshal a number of tactics.
Among the possible tactics is the use of rhetoric in the disclosure. Rhetorical
skill, the power to persuade, is unevenly distributed and may or may not be
used self-consciously by the opposition. Particularly when there is resistance
against a policy, the dissenters must present arguments and not merely
factual evidence. The policy may be shown to be "irrational" because it leads
to a loss o f efficien cy in reaching the organization's goal or because it
actually subverts the attainment o f this goal. Discriminatory policies are
fought by dramatic "demonstration" that members of a group are competent
to perform relevant tasks. If the policy contradicts some moral norm the
argument may involve what rhetoricians call appeals to authority, invoking
the Church, for example. Arguments may be geared to arouse emotions, such
as sympathy or prejudice.
Appeals to the awesome power of the herd
("Everyone else is doing it") are often useful. Finally, one may appeal to fear,
which is more than mere rhetoric.
It is the threat o f calling on other
resources and, as such, borders on direct action.
There is a paucity of data with regard to the rhetoric used by bureaucratic
oppositionists.
The comparable challenge groups, social movements and
revolutionary cadres, use rhetoric too, but theirs is made public as ideo ogy.
When a bureaucratic opposition uses rhetorical arguments the appeals are
often created without self-conscious awareness and are hidden from public
view . It would be interesting to compare the rhetorical devices used within
organizations to those used on a wider public. One might expect the appeal
to reason to be more frequent in bureaucratic oppositions than elsewhere
because of the specialized content of the issues and the lim ited number of
people involved.
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In the use of persuasion, arguments are judged to be strong only within a
specified context. The art requires sensitivity to the situation and to the
personalities involved.
One may play on the honor o f the firm or the
sympathies of the administrator; appeals may be couched in the "patois" of
the organization. One o f the more e ffe c t iv e o f the several tactics used by
members of a bureaucratic opposition in a law o ffic e , who tried to change a
trivial but annoying policy, was to w rite a memo to one of the partners. In it
was explained "the illeg a lity o f withholding funds involuntarily"; that is, the
memo was couched in the legalese common to their work. (31)
Another ta ctic used by those without authority to accompany an informing
strategy is what may best be described as harassment. This ta ctic involves
rep etitive informing, either by the same person or others. It persuades not by
reason but by continual annoyance. When the harassing ta ctic is e ffe c tiv e ,
the administrator, in exasperation, corrects the grounded abuse because his or
her inertia has been made too painful. Children, another group o f people with
no authority and few sources of power, quickly learn this ta ctic to obtain
privileges and goods initially denied to them. Parents are known, much to the
delight o f manufacturers and advertisers, to cave in to repeated wails o f "Buy
me, buy m e."
The housewife, traditionally pictured in a situation not
dissimilar to the child’s, supposedly resorts to the same ta ctic - in this case
called nagging - to get what she wants.
A special kind o f informing with the organization is contacting the board
o f directors or board o f trustees. Appealing to this body differs in several
ways from m erely going up the organizational chart to a higher-level
execu tive. Most obviously, the o ffic e is occupied by several persons, not a
single incumbent. More significant is the ambiguous position o f the board
members who are both insiders and outsiders.
They have the highest
authority within the organization, appointing those who are charged with the
administration of day-to-day a ffairs within the broad policy guidelines
outlined by the board.
But they occupy their o ffic e , both physically and
functionally, very rarely; they are not fu ll-tim e em ployees o f the
organization, but are more like absentee owners.
They pursue other
occupations, if they are employed.
Because o f their status as partial
outsiders, the act o f informing is perceived by them to be a somewhat
disloyal.
However, the board is the first logical recipient of complaints
against the higher administrative o ffic e r o f any organization.
Typically,
bureaucratic oppositions whose goal is to oust incumbent presidents go to the
board.
°
Several accounts o f bureaucratic oppositions against college presidents
have been w ritten up in the news media.
Nora Ephron has extensively
described two o f them in remarkable detail. (32)
In an Esquire article
ironically entitled "The Bennington A ffa ir ," the bureaucratic opposition to
rem ove Bennington C ollege President Gail Parker is analyzed. The climax o f
the case was the faculty's reporting to the trustees that they had no
confidence in her ability as President. Grounding their opposition on Parker's
incom petence, the facu lty recounted incidents o f "poor judgment, tactless
ness, lack o f follow-through." (33) They also mentioned Parker's well-known
a ffa ir with an outspoken facu lty member. Ephron hints broadly that many
facu lty members w ere not com m itted to the opposition's grounds.
Their
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motives varied. One professor, who was a major impetus to and coordinator
o f the opposition, had been acting president the year before Parker was
appointed and was thought to have been disappointed that he was not chosen
for the permanent position.
Parker antagonized the faculty in various ways and had few consistency
credits le ft. For example, at the customary fall presidential address she read
a long section from The Groves of Academ e, a novel by Mary McCarthy.
The section concerned a faculty m eeting at McCarthy’s Jocelyn
C ollege, where the same people got up and said the same things year
a fter year, and nothing happened. To this day Gail Parker cannot
understand why the faculty found the reading condescending and
offen sive; she thought the section was terribly funny - and it is, of
course, which is not the point. The Bennington
faculty
resembled
Jocelyn’s almost too perfectly.” (34)
It was not surprising that when Parker went against tradition to announce
sweeping new policy changes without the approval or even consultation of the
facu lty, the bureaucratic opposition began in earnest.
Not only did this
precipitating act dishonor them, but the new guidelines were a direct threat.
Parker's report called for a reduction in both the number of faculty positions
and the percentage o f tenured slots. (35) In the Bennington tradition, the
president is viewed as a leader rather than an administrator.
Thus, the
charge o f incompetency which led to the vote of no-confidence by the faculty
was taken seriously by the Board o f Trustees. Parker and her husband, the
vice-president, w ere forced to resign.
A t Boston University a bureaucratic opposition to oust its president met
with no success at all. John Silber is an abrasive and uncompromising person,
and was known to be so by the search com m ittee that selected him as
president. They thought, at the time of selection, that he was just who the
university needed. The incidents that created the nucleus opposition group of
deans involved Silber’s handling o f the budget. ’’The deans had turned their
budgets in months before, when the budgets were due, and Silber had sent the
budgets back to be revised. They turned them in again and Silber had sent
them back again” without comment. (36) They resented having to cut back
continually, especially when Silber had allocated large chunks of money to
support pet projects. Some of the deans discussed strategy. One said that he
might resign and was told by another that it was ”a fu tile gesture ... because
no one would care if the deans resigned.” (37) Within a week two-thirds of
the deans agreed to call for Silber’s resignation. A fte r word of this was
’’leaked” to the press ’’the faculty joined the deans, and at a full Faculty
Senate they voted 377 for resignation, 117 against, with 12 abstentions.” (38)
The grounds of the bureaucratic opposition to the president concerned his
’’financial malfeasance.” Among other things, he was charged with obtaining
in terest-free loans, having the university build a private tennis court, and
paying for his Beacon Street apartment-hideaway. It is doubtful that these
incidents would have raised many eyebrows had they been comm itted by some
other president, one who was not as outspoken and abrasive as Silber. The
administrators and facu lty composing the opposition mainly wanted Silber
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removed from o ffic e because he had continually dishonored them, but they
did not consider this ground to be strong enough. The Board's response to the
ini or mat ion about Silber's malfeasance was to have a member confront the
president privately, over drinks. Silber d e ftly "explained away" each charge
to the satisfaction o f his somewhat inebriated prosecutor. He then mounted a
campaign to have statements supporting him sent to the trustees by major
politicians and educators. When he form ally faced the full Board, many o f
the trustees arrived thinking that he "was just wonderful." (39) Silber
toughed out" the confrontation and "defended himself brilliantly." (40)
Several years have passed since the opposition was mounted and John Silber
whose salary is over $80,000 per year, is still President of Boston University.
Why one bureaucratic opposition based on informing to the board o f trustees
tailed while another succeeded cannot be determined with exactitude. One
may surmise that the contrasting political clim ates o f the two schools, as
well as the personality differen ces o f the presidents and board members,
helped cause the divergent outcomes.
The informing strategy is generally the first to be chosen because it
appears to demand less commitment than direct action and is relatively less
costly. The options within the broad informing strategy include alternative
recipients o f the information and differen t ways or tactics of presenting it.
Ifkthu flrSt tfy at informinS is not successful by the opposition's standards,
which may alter, the dissenters may switch to direct action or inform
elsewhere. If they choose the latter alternative, they have three directions in
which they can move: up (to a higher level on the organizational chart),
laterally (to some supportive association such as a trade union), or outside (to
a controlling agency or the press).
Many o f the same considerations relevant to informing to one's superiors
are applicable to lateral informing. Employees are involved with one or more
groups to which they can supposedly turn for redress o f grievances. These
groups, such as unions, the C ivil Service Commission, or professional
associations, are more or less independent o f the organizational hierarchy and
can contribute various resources to bureaucratic oppositionists. Such groups
may also have some authority over the organization in which the em ployees
work, through laws or contractual agreements. In a sense, they can shortcircuit bureaucratic oppositions.
When one o f their members reports an
infraction, their representatives go to management to have it corrected.
Because they have some independent authority, their relations are best
described as negotiations rather than as bureaucratic oppositions as defined in
the present discussion. H owever, gettin g a union to take one’s grievance
seriously and act on it often amounts to making a bureaucratic opposition
within the union. Making the organization change its policy is beyond the
scope o f the union's business-as-usual and involves working the political
machinery o f the union.
It is not uncommon for union o ffic ia ls
echelon o f the organization being opposed
worker in a large city attem pted to make
municipality-owned system. He first spoke

to assume the view of the upper
by the employees. (41) A transit
some minor policy changes in the
with the union president:
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He listened atten tively to my plans but refused to take an a ctive role
because he was dedicating most of his time to seeking reelection. He
tried to pacify me by ... indicating that the organization was too fin ely
tuned to permit changes in one part. (42)
In another case, workers at a warehouse loading dock objected to a new
policy o f tightened security measures. They first complained to the foreman,
informing him that the new policy placed an undue physical burden on them
and was also insulting.
Not getting any results from the foreman, the workers decided to go to
their union steward, who by that time was w ell aware of the situation,
(The union said) .. that they thought the security measures were good,
and they fe lt no need to change them because the employees wanted
it! (43)
In both o f these examples, the failure o f informing strategies to lateral
groups led to an escalation to direct action against the employing organi
zation.
The d ifficu lty with using unions to correct perceived organizational abuses
is that their major purpose lies elsewhere. The membership, particularly in
the United States, is interested in decent wage contracts and fringe benefits,
such as medical insurance and paid vacations. Resolving grievances that are
not clear-cut and explicit in the contract is generally beyond the union’s selfimposed scope, and policy disputes are beyond its purview altogether. The
union’s power ultim ately rests on the strike, thus, informing it of an abuse
which it resolves borders on direct action. However, as far as the employee
is concerned, an appeal to the union is an informing strategy. Ralph Nader
and his associates conclude that
In theory the union may, through the co llective bargaining process,
demand both substantive rights to protest work that threatens the
public and procedural devices for a fa ir hearing when those rights are
asserted. In practice this potential has been neglected. (44)
Unlike bureaucratic organizations, unions have, at least on paper, the
political machinery with which those without form al authority may make
input. Electoral practices and other dem ocratic mechanisms, however, are
often window dressing concealing entrenched oligarchy. The classic study of
union dem ocracy done by Lipset et al. worked from the premise that such
dem ocracy was the exception, not the rule. They attem pted to explain how it
is possible for a dem ocratic union to occur rather than why it does not.
Oppositions within unions rarely use informing tactics alone because it is
usually the top echelon that is being fought; informing within the union is
useless. Also, because of the political structure, dissidence is expected to be
worked out through majority opinion as expressed in union elections.
Dem ocracy is more of a sham in some unions than in others. A Teamsters
member made a proposal at a union convention to slash President F itz 
simmons’ salary. He was beaten by several sergeants-at-arms; ’’the beating
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le ft his fa ce swollen and purple." Another member charged that "tactics such
as adjourning Team sters’ meetings when dissidents try to speak or holding
meetings at hours when many union em ployees cannot attend are common...."
(4.5) In e ffe c t , unions which are strongly authoritarian, despite dem ocratic
cam ouflage, are significant for the present study because they are similar to
bureaucratic organizations.
Other lateral groups have less power than unions. Employed professionals
can inform to their professional association which often can or w ill do no
more, a fter investigating the charges, than to censure the organization. The
association's newsletter will then describe the injustice and put its members
on notice to "try" to avoid securing a job at that institution.
Among
university professors, the tight job market o f the 1970s lessened social
opprobrium as an e ffe c tiv e enforcer o f the Am erican Association o f
U niversity Professors' list o f censured colleges and universities.
The
association's power is mainly the ability to make swipes at an institution's
reputation among professionals.
Ernie Fitzgerald, involved in a complex bureaucratic opposition against
the cost overruns in the D efense Departm ent, sought help from his
professional engineering association when he was dismissed from his job. He
asked that the association "investigate the professional and ethical questions
involved ...(But) the Am erican Institute o f Industrial Engineers suddenly
decided it was not a 'professional' society; it was a 'technical' organization.
Thus it absolved its e lf of dealing with ethical questions." (46) The overruns
were charged by Lockheed in its work on the C5A cargo plane. Fitzgerald
contends that the effectiven ess of the AIIE and similar groups is "undermined
by their practice o f allowing 'sustaining' or 'corporate' members.
Large
m ilitary contractors are contributing members o f his own society. ... "(47)
A second type o f lateral group is directly incorporated into the
bureaucracy. Organizations such as the United States Arm ed Services have
built-in units to redress grievances of those without authority. The Inspector
General's O ffic e has been in existence since 1813, and similar agencies are
iound in the armies o f many nations. It is form ally independent of any other
channels o f command. A campus R eserve O ffice rs Training Corps (R O TC )
instructor enthusiastically told me that while the suggestions which em erge
from the Inspector General’s investigations are called recommendations, they
are ordinarily received as commands. My general skepticism was nourished
by cases of bureaucratic oppositions within the army whose members did not
deem it worthwhile to use this O ffic e .
In a United States A rtille ry installation in Germany a group o f young
college-educated enlistees found their sergeant to be inordinately abusive.
His excessive drilling, overly rigid inspections, unfair distribution o f passes,
and misuse o f recreational funds w ere intolerable to them. There was no
concerted action until "for some minor infraction the sergeant pulled the
passes of the entire unit for the whole weekend. While having lunch in the
mess hall later that day the unit booed the sergeant as he passed by the
window. It was this spontaneous action that precipitated the form ation o f the
opposition group." (48)
A t a m eeting that evening they discussed various
courses o f action and specifically rejected the use of the Inspector General,
believing it to be in e ffe c tiv e . They decided upon an informing strategy. The
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u nofficial leader proposed that they w rite up a list of their grievances and
give it to the commanding o ffic e r. Eighteen of the 20 men in the unit signed
it. The leader requested the signatures, indicating that he fe lt that there was
"sa fety in numbers." However, they failed to present the list because the
sergeant’s permission was needed to do so. Rather than change to direct
action or attem pt to inform to the Inspector General or to some agency
ouside o f the army, they used some ingenuity to get to the Commanding
O ffic e r (C.O.).
The leader gained access on the pretext o f "personal
problems" and delivered the list.
The C.O. was shocked by the list and
despite the sergeant’s threats ("I’ll get you for this") most of the injustices
were eventually eliminated. (49)
William M. Evan, in an analysis of the Arm y’s Inspector General
Departm ent, gives substance to suspicions about the ability of the I.G. to
reduce the need for bureaucratic oppositions. He begins by suggesting that
"the I.G. complaint procedure may seem to involve an organizational anomaly
in granting all army personnel a legal right to lodge complaints directly with
I.G. o fficers, for it thus sanctions the circumventing o f the chain of
command." (50)
Evan indicates that the chain of command is rarely
circumvented in practice, and he supplies various structural reasons to
account for the observation. O f greatest importance is the fa ct that the I.G.
personnel are recruited from line officers who, after a brief stint, return to
the line. Thus, the o ffic e r serving in the I.G. has been socialized "to see the
value o f the chain of command."
Upon transfer to the I.G. he learns of the opposing principle of direct
and horizontal communication. Since he is destined soon to return to
his duties as a line o ffic e r, he is not likely to repudiate the principle of
the chain o f command, much less become comm itted to the function of
the I.G. complaint system. (51)
Also, the o ffic e r ’s transfer to the I.G. is usually viewed as down-grading.
Evan concludes that investigators would "prefer that army personnel take up
complaints with their immediate superiors ... , and (have) a tendency to view
them as being largely unjustified." (52) And although a soldier has the right
to lodge a complaint with the I.G., line officers "may be inclined to view such
action by subordinates as virtually disloyal conduct." (53)
Substantiating Evan’s analysis is the narrow call a S taff Sergeant in the
A ir Force had in using the Inspector General's o ffic e . Sergeant Hayden filed
a complaint against a superior o ffic e r, charging him with conduct unbecoming
an o ffic e r .
An o ffic e r o f the Inspector General conducted a two-week
inquiry and not only confirmed the charges but found further detrimental
information against the accused major: " ... petty th eft, drinking on duty, and
calling the A ir Force Secretary a meddling fool and an idiot." (54) The
Inspector General asked Hayden to drop the charges and when Hayden refused
he was ordered to the mental health clinic for evaluation. There, too, he was
asked to drop charges. His refusal led to his transfer into the psychiatric
fa c ility at another base, Lackland. Fortunately for Hayden, the doctors at
Lackland discharged him with a "clean bill o f health" a fter two weeks of
examinations.
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Further corroboration o f the I.G.'s in effectiveness is the em ergence o f
unofficial complaint systems. Rather than "suffer in silence,” go through the
LG. o ffic e , or participate in a bureaucratic opposition, army personnel may
bring grievances to the chaplain or to the Mental Hygiene Consultation
Service, both o f which act unofficially on complaints. (55) Whichever of
these three groups are used, the issues involved in informing, particularly
achieving credibility and having the abuse perceived as a serious one that
should be elim inated, still obtain.
Internally created groups, such as the Inspector General's O ffic e and
company unions, are only as e ffe c t iv e as their top echelon allows them to be.
Corporate malfeasance, on the whole, and rule violation by those in ultimate
authority are abuses outside the o ffic ia l jurisdictions of ombundsman-style
o ffic e s . The types of abuses which they are prepared to take seriously and
the scope o f the recommendations they are prepared to make are influenced
by the clim ate of each particular bureaucracy. Whether such o ffices are used
or by-passed by em ployees is a function o f their perceived effectiven ess.
Because they allow their em ployees to "blow o ff steam” as they inform, they
may function more as "pressure escape valves" than as mechanisms to correct
abuses. As such they are rather functional to maintaining the status quo and,
thus, it is understandable that bureaucracies have created them.
Ombundsman o ffic e s within bureaucracies correspond closely to those
created by various levels of government to give their citizen s redress of
grievances against o ffic ia l agencies. More specifically, they resemble the
execu tive ombundsman found in many Am erican cities and counties more than
the classical ombundsman developed in Scandinavia. The latter is an o ffic e r
o f Parliam ent who investigates citizens' complaints about unfair treatm ent by
governm ental departments and who recommends a remedy if a complaint is
deemed just. The o ffic e was begun in Sweden and Finland and was adopted by
Denmark in 1955. Since then Norway and New Zealand, among others, have,
adopted it. (56)
The execu tive ombundsman differs from his classical cousin in that the
form er is dependent upon the chief execu tive and serves at his
pleasure, while a classical ombundsman, once appointed, serves for a
fixed term at least form ally independent o f the appointing agency. (57)
The lack o f independence of the execu tive ombundsman tends to in terfere
with the task o f redressing grievances, whether the execu tive is a mayor or a
corporation president. (58) It is interesting to note that those governments
which have institutionalized the classical ombundsman may be term ed the
most progressive; they are the best exemplars of the w elfa re state. They
represent, also, Max Weber's fears of a rationalized world - the Crystal
Palace where politics has been replaced by administration. The ombundsman
provides a small measure o f politics in a system that considers politics to be
an anachronism. Because the ombundsman o ffic e s are ultim ately controlled
by the administration within bureaucracies, policies and rule violations that
are in the administration's interests cannot be opposed by them. Thus, the
o ffic e s serve a rather lim ited function in correcting abuses.
A second alternative to informing to one's superiors within the organi
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zation, which may supplement or substitute for appeal to a lateral
organization, is informing to a governmental agency or to the general public
through the news media. "Whistle blowing" may be undertaken after other
informing or direct-action strategies have failed or it may be the first resort
o f oppositionists. When an organization is systemically corrupt it is neither
prudent nor e ffe c tiv e to inform within it.
The rationale for whistle blowing is that the interests of the public are
generally harmed by organizational abuses that are illegal, that violate
widespread moral norms, or that breed in efficien cy. Both public and private
sector organizations are, in some sense, responsible to the public.
The
consumer, the taxpayer, the citizen, and the patient, among others, are all
recipients of the e ffe c ts of organizations and can be appealed to by the
whistle blower.
Most often, of course, public outrage at organizational
abuses is not very great. (59) Regulatory agencies, which are often staffed by
personnel on loan from the organizations that they monitor, also cannot be
relied upon to act against reported abuses. Nonetheless, if the oppositionists
cannot trust the higher levels o f their own organization, they may have
nowhere else to go but to the public, or its o ffic ia l representatives in the
execu tive or legislative branches of government, or to independent regulatory
authorities.
Although going outside the organization to the public seems to be merely
a logical progression in the attempt to make changes in an organization by
those without the authority to do so, it is not perceived to be continuous with
other strategies.
Dissent is interpreted as disorganization and making
internal dissent public is viewed as a direct attack on an organization, a
treasonous act. Even those outside the organization may deem the whistle
blower a traitor: "M artin Luther seems to be about the only figure of note to
make much headway with public opinion after doing an inside job on a corrupt
organization." (60)
Organizations can be usefully conceived of as miniatures of society.
They have a hierarchy of status and of roles, a system of myths and
values, and a catalogue of expected behaviors. ... (They) meet many of
the most basic needs of their members and expect in return loyalty and
conform ity. (61)
Americans who protested against the Vietnam war w ere told directly by
bumper stickers and indirectly by police actions, "A m erica - Love it or Leave
it." Those who have fe lt the response to whistle blowing are fam iliar with
this kind o f sentiment: "the principle is 'your organization, love it or leave
it.'" (62) The self-im age of organizations as self-contained polities leads
administrators to view governmental agencies as foreign powers. Organi
zations are usually w illing to submit voluntarily to governmental authority
only when it suits their interests to do so. Otherwise they must be coerced in
some way. Bureaucratic oppositionists who call upon the power of Congress,
for example, are seen in the same light as the Spanish Republicans viewed
Franco's use of German fighter planes or, better yet, as anti-Communists
view Soviet support of revolutionary groups in Western democracies or nonMarxist dictatorships.
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In the past decade there has been a spate o f whistle blowing activities.
Several books have been w ritten on the phenomenon itself and conferences
have been organized around the theme. (63) It is the form o f bureaucratic
opposition that is most widely known because gaining public awareness is its
central strategy. Whistle blowing, especially when it is the first tactic used
in an opposition, is more likely to be done by one person rather than by a
group.
Perhaps this is partially explained by the extrem e risk, including
opprobrium, o f such action.
Going beyond narrow self-interest may be
possible in crowds, but opposition groups tend to discuss alternatives
"ration ally,Mincluding the possible reprisals that might be taken against them.
Heroic stances are easier to take when others are not around to remind one of
the consequences of an action.
Even its supporters recognize that whistle blowing is a strategy that
supports a basically conservative position.
Informing in general is not
designed to change but rather to restore.
The information proffered
demonstrates that what "is" is not what was "supposed to be." It is designed
to provoke outrage - the organization is shown to be exceeding the bounds of
authority and/or decency. The bounds, secured by social values, are upheld by
the whistle blower, or at least they are espoused in public, whatever other
m otives may be involved.
A classic example o f the whistle blower's temperament is found in
Christopher Pyle's opposition against the United States Army's practice o f
civilian surveillance. In two articles, one published in January and a fo llow up in July 1970 in The Washington Monthly, Pyle described in some detail the
surveillance apparatus used by the Arm y and its development after 1967. He
also argued vigorously that the Army's activities w ere unconstitutional. The
grounds of this opposition w ere provisions of the United States Constitution,
while the strategy was to make it public that the U.S. Arm y was violating the
fundamental law. The effectiven ess of an informing strategy rests upon the
commitment of those who have the authority to uphold a standard to enforce
it. If the authorities are neither indignant nor enraged about transgressions
they will not be moved to take action m erely because of the oppositionist's
information. Pyle's disclosure did not fa ll on deaf ears. It was picked up by
the Am erican C ivil Liberties Union and the press.
Senator Sam Ervin,
Chairman of the Constitutional Rights Subcommittee, was particularly
disturbed and instituted hearings on the case in February 1971. The Senate's
power over the Arm y is related not so much to substantive legislation as to
the disbursement of m ilitary funding. The armed services are concerned for
their budgets. A few weeks after the start of Ervin's hearings the Assistant
S ecretary of Defense revealed Defense Department regulations that prohibit
ed m ilitary involvement in civilian a ffairs, promised that these regulations
would be follow ed, and indicated that much o f the irregularly collected
inform ation had been destroyed. (64)
The problems that face all bureaucratic oppositionists who attem pt an
informing strategy, deciding upon and gaining access to those who should
re ceive the information, and presenting credible evidence to them, are also
confronted by the whistle blower. One o f the major decisions involves the
choice among the alternatives of going to the "authorities," contacting a
re fere e group, or bringing the case to the attention o f the general public. (65)
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The bases for the selection of one or more of these possibilities are rather
complex. Potential whistle blowers may not be aware of all o f the agencies
that might have an interest in their information. And even if all o f the
possible recipients of the revelations are known, the oppositionists might
believe that most o f them would not be sympathetic, that they have been
’’captured" by the organization they regulate.
With regard to personal security, particularly to future employment,
blowing the whistle to a governmental agency is usually less costly than
presenting the information to the general public.
Not only is more
confidential informing viewed as a less treasonous act, but there are often
built-in protections for the oppositionist. For example, it is a violation of
federal law to retaliate against someone who testifies before a congressional
com m ittee.
Whether or not potential whistle blowers are aware o f the
d ifferen t risks involved in differen t strategies is not easy to assess. The
option selected is usually related to the ground of the opposition. If the abuse
is a clear-cut violation of an enforced statute and a remedy is obvious,
informing to the appropriate governmental agency is the reasonable alterna
tive.
The selection o f the recipient may also be made in terms of the non
grounded aims of the opposition.
Even if the whistle blowers are all
com m itted to the grounds and sincerely seek to rem ove the abuse, their
commitment may still be accompanied by a desire for vengeance. Durkheim’s
distinction between two types of sanctions for rule violations, retributive and
restorative, is useful here. (66) The first type of sanction corresponds to
criminal statutes and, according to Durkheim, is prevalent in premodern
groups characterized by strong w e-feelings based on the sim ilarity of each
individual to the others. R estorative sanctions, in contrast, predominate in
modern societies which have a complex division of labor. People are aware of
one another as functionaries who may not resemble them, but upon whom
they depend.
The hypothesis here is that those who seek vengeance do not as closely
iden tify themselves with their occupational roles as do those who seek only
the elimination of the abuse. Whistle blowing to the general public is a more
punitive measure than bringing information to a re fere e group or to a
government agency, especially if the information is not made public.
Informing to the public holds the organization up to scorn. Threatening the
organization’s "good w ill," lowering the public's opinion o f it, is painful to
those who identify with that organization. Further, a tarnished public image
may lead to few er customers, lower work effectiven ess, or reduced funding
by a constituent-pressured Congress. A certain amount of vengeance w ill be
accomplished if some arm o f the government calls those who are responsible
for the abuse on the carpet.
However, other things being equal, more
vengeance can be had by going to the general public.
Once the initial choice is made about where to blow the whistle, the
problem of obtaining access and o f gaining credibility still remains. The
approach to a congressional com m ittee or a government regulatory agency is
much like the political insurgent's appeal for international support. And as
Mostafa R ejai indicates, there is typically a counterappeal by the incumbents.
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This taking of countermeasures for international aid is usually easier
for the incumbents, since they are in form al control o f the political
and diplom atic apparatus o f the country and since they are likely to
have a va riety of international contacts. (67)

In like fashion, the heads o f the organizations employing the oppositionists,
because of their o ffic ia l legitim acy, political ties, access to lawyers and
sometimes to large funds, have a greater opportunity to debunk the claims of
the oppositionists before governmental agencies than their adversaries have
to discredit them. The organization's records are often accepted as valid and
even blunt and unsupported denials by o fficers are greeted as e ffe c t iv e
rebuttals to the oppositionists.
Discussing the problems o f labor union
members who have attem pted informing strategies against the myriad abuses
o f union o fficia ls, Burton Hall remarks:
...the rank-and-file union member who appeals to the Secretary (o f
Labor) against the union leaders feels that he is appealing to the ally
o f his enemy to protect him against his enemy....
Y e t the law bars
union members from complaining o f stolen union elections to any court
or agency other than this very friend o f the o fficia ls he is complaining
about. (68)
K
5
Regulatory agencies w ere not set up to handle complaints from the
em ployees o f the organizations that they monitor. Their inspiration, when it
does not emanate from the regulated themselves, comes from other
government agencies, legislative bodies, or consumers. The regulatory bodies
frequently do not carry out their public charges e ffe c tiv e ly . For example,
the Food and Drug Administration was barraged with complaints from both
consumers and physicians about the baneful e ffe c ts of fem inine deodorant
sprays, but no investigation was made o f the charges. Finally, the Federal
Trade Commission, in checking out the truth o f the advertisements for this
product, advised the Food and Drug Administration (F D A ) to investigate.
Unable to subpoena records, the FDA took the word of the manufacturers,
delaying their own research on the issue. (69) Confidence in the effectiven ess
o f such "watchdog’’ agencies is further shaken by the existence of bureaucratic oppositions within them.
One such opposition occurred in the Department of Health, Education, and
W elfare. It illustrates the difficu lties involved in using such agencies to aid
bureaucratic oppositions, because it demonstrates the e ffe c t of politics on
the w ill to en force the law. The O ffic e for C ivil Rights, authorized by T itle
VI of the C ivil Rights A c t of 1964, was responsible for seeing that schools,
universities, hospitals, nursing homes, and w elfa re agencies which received
HEW subsidies did not engage in discriminatory practices. OCR D irector,
Leon Panetta, was rather e ffe c tiv e in accomplishing his duties, much to the
chagrin o f the new Nixon administration. In February 1970 he was dismissed
and his s ta ff understood this action as "simply the climax o f a series of
attacks by the Administration on 'the program'...." (70)
Their bureaucratic
opposition, planned in numerous strategy discussions, was to protest against
the policy to the White House, since the President was the ultimate chief of
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their bureaucracy. Their opposition, grounded in charges of ineffectiveness,
used strategies other than informing, such as several high-level resignations
and a letter signed by almost 2,000 HEW employees.
Another case of a bureaucratic opposition within a government agency
involved the microbiologist J. Anthony Morris. For a decade he had been at
the National Institutes of Health, involved in experiments on the long-term
e ffe c ts of flu vaccine. The response to his internal memo that questioned the
benefits of flu vaccine was the removal of his sta ff, his experimental animals,
and laboratory, and the blockage by his superiors of the publication of his
scien tific articles. (71)
Helped by one of Ralph Nader’s "raiders,” his
statement detailing the irregularities of the NIH flu vaccine program set o ff
investigations by Senator Abraham R ib ic o ff and the General Accounting
O ffic e .
Morris’ whistle blowing to the government resulted in HEW
Secretary Elliot Richardson transferring him to the Food and Drug Admini
stration to continue his flu research. No punitive or remedial action was
taken against or within NIH. In 1976 Morris publicly criticized the swine flu
program.
He had tested the live vaccine in mice and found that it was
potentially carcinogenic. Further, he claimed that it might trigger various
neurological illnesses, including Guillan-Barre Syndrome. Morris turned out
to be correct and the Federal government has agreed to pay ’’reparations” to
those who suffered from vaccine-related disorders. The Commissioner o f the
Food and Drug Administration, however, fired Morris for ’’insubordination.”
Thus, even well-grounded bureaucratic oppositions are not always successful.
Morris upheld the organization’s o ffic ia l functions, to protect health, and
presented inform ation that showed the organization’s policies were detrimen
tal to health. Rather than being rewarded for his efforts, he was punished.
Congressional subcommittee hearings seem to provide would-be whistle
blowers with on ce-in-a-lifetim e opportunities to gain a receptive audience for
their revelations. In the early 1960s Senator Kefauver headed a com m ittee
investigating the drug industry. A medical director at E.R. Squibb and Sons,
Dr. A. Dale Console, testified on the ways in which drug sales were increased
by the exploitation of physicians. (72) Although Dr. Console was apparently
com m itted to a bureaucratic opposition on moral grounds, he gave a
psychological explanation for his action: ” 1 had compromised to the point
where my back was against a wall and I had to choose between resigning
m yself to total capitulation or resigning.... ” (73) ’’The invitation to testify
before the Kefauver C om m ittee o ffered him the platform he sought.” (74)
Similarly, an employee o f the Internal Revenue Service from 1948 to 1971
came forward (the religious metaphor is appropriate) at the Senate
subcommittee hearings on the Internal Revenue Service conducted by Senator
Montoya.
Stanley Prescott described policies which resulted in the
’’abusive treatm ent o f the taxpayer” and the ’’violation of taxpayers' rights.”
(75) Prescott's grounds for opposition w ere the im m orality and the in e ffe c 
tiveness of policy.
He stated that "the overseer at each level must find
among his subordinates at least one 'weak' em ployee and 'help' him into
unemployment or a nervous breakdown." (76)
With seizures and the threat of seizures hanging over taxpayers' heads,
the fear to which IRS employees are subjected is thus passed on to the
taxpayer, which is the whole intention o f the program anyway. (77)
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The Senate W atergate C om m ittee allowed numerous White House
bureaucrats to blow the whistle. It is doubtful that Alexander Butterfield, a
major aide of John Haldeman, would have informed on his bosses had he not
been called upon to testify. It was Butterfield who revealed the existence of
ixon s taping system, which made the President's "stonewalling" technique
in e ffe c tiv e . He did not regret giving the testimony, however. 'I was a loyal
troop, he explains. 'But my mother also raised me to be an honest troop, and
told the truth. No other w ay."' (78) It is d ifficu lt to determine whether
W atergate was an externally provoked opposition or a true bureaucratic
opposition as the phenomenon is defined here. The identity o f Deep Throat
would make it easier to classify the a ffa ir.
Whether or not congressional hearings are held to advance political
careers, as a journalist with conservative leanings claims, (79) they do seem
to encourage whistle blowers. In 1975 Nicholas von H offm an remarked that
these days you can't walk in a door in the Capitol without coming upon
s???e.
^ recounting to a raised row o f legislators some awful business o f
o ffic ia l betrayal and ignominy. The tales they te ll in these hearing rooms of
government murders, burglaries, and pornographic pictures are incontestably
icky.... \o0/
One such ta le-teller was ex-Marine Hardy. As a paid informant for the
!r\ WaS n° t as
embedded in the Bureau's hierarchy as an agent. He
told Otis Pike's congressional com m ittee on intelligence how the FBI paid him
o
ead a raid on a draft board. (81) Although Hardy considered the policies
that he had executed to be immoral, it is not likely that he would have
initiated a bureaucratic opposition had the Pike hearings not occurred. They
provided a whistle-blowing forum where he could give the detailed in for
mation about the abuses without much fea r o f retaliation and could also clear
his troubled conscience: "I only hope and pray that by coming here today, I
can right some o f the wrong that was com m itted." (82) It seems that the
spate o f congressional hearings that started with the W atergate investigations
has abated. Perhaps future election years will generate their reem ergence,
encouraging both political careers among members o f Congress and the
testim ony of whistle blowers.
Another arm o f government, the courts, can be used by those without
authority to correct abuses in their places o f employment. The ground of the
bureaucratic opposition must be some organizational rule violation or policy
that breaks a public law. Unless the information that one has would interest
a district attorney or federal prosecutor, who would then base a case on it,
going to court is a costly and time-consuming undertaking.
The successful use o f a public prosecutor is illustrated by a bureaucratic
opposition mounted by a lone em ployee o f the Good Humor Corporation, the
Pr°ducer* The identity o f the inform er is not known, but he or she
told the Brooklyn D istrict A ttorney's o ffic e that the ice cream was knowingly
marketed with an illegally high bacteria count. Furthermore, the company
was keeping " ... two sets o f quality control records: a false one to- show
state inspectors and an elaborately coded secret set containing true bacteria
counts for the company’s own use. The secret books showed coliform counts
on some batches o f ice cream 200 times as high as the law allow s." (83) The
D istrict A ttorn ey investigated and subpoenaed company records. Although
i!i
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several thousand documents had been destroyed, enough evidence remained
for the oppositionist to sit back as a grand jury handed up a 244-count
indictment. (84)
The press-dubbed "Ice-cream gate" was a successful
bureaucratic opposition in which the legal system acted on information and
allow ed the em ployee to maintain anonymity.
The costliness of informing in court by suing the organization results from
the need to have professional help and adequate evidence.
There are a
number of possible sources of assistance, such as the Am erican Civil Liberties
Union, that have helped bureaucratic oppositionists use the courts to check
organizational abuses. Access to the courts, then, often requires access to
interest groups that can provide resources. Also, there are governmental
agencies that are empowered to press law suits. For example, the O ffic e of
C ivil Rights within the Department of Health, Education, and W elfare can
bring a case before an administrative court if there is evidence o f
discriminatory practices.
But administrative courts, like the Federal
judiciary, have the ability to construe rules more or less strictly. Thus,
despite "w atertigh t" evidence, there is no guarantee o f success.
Use of the courts is made especially d ifficu lt for those who cannot obtain
legal assistance.
Mike LaV elle, a columnist who champions blue-collar
interests, reports:
I have run into a few cases where a union member has asked me if I
knew o f a good labor lawyer and then added, "I can't seem to find one.
As soon as they find out that my beef is against a union they won't
have anything to do with m e."(85)
A further d ifficu lty for those wanting to inform to the courts or to their
union is that "the by-laws of some unions allow them to fine a member or
expel him if a worker files any legal action against the union." (86)
R ela tive to informing against one's organization to the government,
bringing charges to a private referee group is, in general, easier but less
e ffe c t iv e .
Such groups vary widely in their areas o f concern, modes of
action, and sources of support.
Among them are the Anti-D efam ation
League, Consumers Union, Underwriters Laboratories, Sierra Club, and
Common Cause. Some are independent of the groups and organizations that
they monitor (for example, the Consumers Union), while others are supported
by these organizations (for example, the Better Business Bureau). R e fe re e
groups are distinguished here from lateral groups because the latter are
form ed by em ployees while the form er are either created by the organi
zations themselves or by some constituency.
R eferee groups may sometimes take legal action against abuses where
there are codes of good practice, as in the numerous "self-regu lated"
industries. For example, New York Stock Exchange members may "discipline
member firms for defrauding customers or for failin g to maintain adequate
supplies of working capital." (87) H owever, most re fere e groups utilize the
methods o f persuasion, which may vary from rational arguments to threats of
public exposure. They may also serve as conduits to access for oppositionists
to more directly powerful agencies such as courts and legisla tive com m ittees.
When the National Institutes of Health took Dr. Morris' laboratory fa cilities
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away from him a fter he disagreed with their position on flu vaccines, he was
helped to present his case to Congress by the public interest organization,
Common Cause, and by Ralph Nader’s group. (88)
Other re fere e groups, such as the Consumers Union, act by directly
exposing abuses to the public. Whether or not they have their own publishing
ve icle, the press, which accepts their information as highly credible, w ill
help the exposure. These referee groups appear to be e ffe c t iv e in aiding
ureaucratic oppositions against the production of dangerous goods. Although
it is possible to debate the potential danger of a product, it is far easier to
reach consensus that people should not be physically harmed by their
purchases and to "prove" that an item is unsafe, than to demonstrate such
intangibles as dishonor, injustice, or even in efficien cy.
Perhaps because o f the actual or perceived difficu lties in obtaining
e tte c tiv e action by informing to re fere e groups, governmental agencies,
courts, or Congress, many bureaucratic oppositionists bring their information
directly to the general public. Some take this route because the nature of the
abuse is complex or not specifically covered by law, although it is judged to
be an offense to public morality. There are other reasons for going public
such as the oppositionist’s wish to remain anonymous or to damage the
reputation o f the organization.
Many oppositionists who inform to the public do so only a fter failures of
other options.
An example is Karen Silkwood's bureaucratic opposition
against the plutonium plant in which she was employed. The K err-M cG ee
^ a r r o n R iver fa c ility makes plutonium pellets for nuclear power plants.
Ms. Silkwood was highly critical o f the plant's health and safety procedures.
She had gone to her union, the O il, Chem ical, and A tom ic Workers Union,
claiming defin ite instances of company sloppiness." (89) The OCAW had
lit t le influence with management but helped Silkwood to present her case to
the A tom ic Energy Commission. As a result o f the Commission's inaction,
she compiled careful documentation o f safety lapses and contamination and
was on her way to blow the whistle. She had her evidence in a brown manila
t older and a notebook which friends had seen in her hands just before she le ft
lo r her appointment with a reporter from The New York Times. (90) She never
met the reporter and was found dead in her wrecked car. th e re was good
reason to believe that she had been murdered, particularly because the
evidence she had with her was never found. (91)
The A EC finally did com plete its investigations. It found that only a few
.nu™erous allegations referred to possible violations o f the
Commissions standards, but admitted that many others "had substance or
partial substance." (92) The AEC did not put an end to the dangerous
situation, however, and wary environmental groups conclude that the AEC is
an in e ffe c tiv e regulator because it "needed the fuel rods and thus had a clear
interest in keeping Kerr-M cG ee's plant in operation." (93) Karen Silkwood
never had the opportunity to give a statement to the press, but informing to
the media was clearly a logical recourse for her a fter the failu re o f her
inform ing strategy.
Informing to the general public is somewhat differen t from going to
various superiors within the organization, to a lateral group such as a union,
or to some arm o f government. When follow in g the latter courses, those to
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whom one presents the information have the authority to act to elim inate the
abuse or at least have the power to put pressure on those who do have such
authority. The public is several steps removed from the ability to change the
objectionable actions.
Instrumentally, citizens can pressure politicians to
take action through individual contacts, organized lobbies, or the expression
o f opinion, among other means. H owever, im m ediate remedies are usually
ruled out by this informing strategy. Informing the general public is similar
to bringing information to Congress which may become more w idely known
through press coverage, because the consequences may overflow the goals of
the opposition.
Sometimes bureaucratic oppositionists acknowledge the
possible repercussions and use the informing strategy m erely as a ta ctic
within an overall strategy of direct action.
Taking one’s case to the public is more com plicated than playing the town
crier with prefacing shouts o f ’’Hear ye, Hear ye!” Communication in a mass
society is mediated by complex organizations. Thus, inform ing to the publicat-large requires the use of the news media, where the usual set of informing
problems, such as gaining access and establishing credibility, are encountered.
However, because newspapers and television newscasts are business enter
prises, there are additional considerations.
Frequently the media employ
c riteria that are not relevant to ’’the public interest,” such as what will boost
profits or maintain business power in general. Even if the oppositionist's
information is not suppressed, it may be reported in such a way as to raise
doubts about the credibility of its source. Despite obstacles, however, many
bureaucratic oppositions succeed in placing their facts before the public.
There are a few media outlets that are very cooperative in publishing the
information o f bureaucratic oppositionists.
The magazine Washington
Monthly and Jack Anderson's syndicated column have been used by many
whistle blowers to present their cases. Both are modern-day exponents of the
muckraking philosophy.
Its notable representatives, Upton Sinclair, Ida
Tarbell, and Lincoln Steffens, did their work prior to World War I.
In
newspapers and books muckrakers exposed unseemly, corrupt, and dangerous
practices of politicians and corporations. Their work was characterized by an
attitude of ” throw-the-rascals-outism.” (94) As professional journalists, the
muckrakers w ere not employed by those who they exposed. In a sense, a
person who blows the whistle is "the muckraker from within.” (95)
A bureaucratic opposition mounted by s ta ff members against Senator
Thomas Dodd used the columns of Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson to reach
the public. Relying on the rest of the Senate to take action against the
abuses which grounded their opposition would probably have been fruitless.
There w ere two major and interconnected grounds for the opposition: Dodd
had been syphoning o ff hundreds o f thousands of dollars from campaign
contributions for private use, and had accepted funds from those whose
vested interests he supported on the Senate floor. The opposition consisted of
Dodd's administrative assistant, James Boyd, and an o ffic e secretary,
Marjorie Carpenter.
Peters and Branch's description of the bureaucratic
opposition indicates that Boyd, anguished by the corruption, had intended
m erely to "leave quietly and loyally.” (96) A 1964 election campaign report
filed by Dodd for the State of Connecticut was so fradulent that the decision
was made to expose the malfeasance, but only a fter the Senator had
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dishonored his assistant. Boyd recalled: ,fThe campaign diversion in 1964 was
bad but it took Dodd’s m alevolence to make his actions real - not abstract. I
fe lt small and like I was being toyed with for the first tim e since I was in the
Marine Corps.” (97)
Actions that dishonor members of the opposition group are not unusual
catalysts for the em ergence of dissent. Several accounts similar to Boyd's
can be found in the statements of other oppositionists. The rage fe lt at
insults is often sufficient to overcom e the fears of the risks involved or, as in
Boyd's case, the appeal o f a good position. The reaction to dishonor, however,
does not rule out a strong commitment to the grounds of the opposition. Boyd
and Carpenter failed to take action, despite their initial decision, for six
months. They have candidly revealed their thoughts during this period:
We kept wondering 'Who are we to take him on?' And there was always
a fear of looking naive - of summoning up a burst of moralism and then
having everyone laugh and say that's just the way things are done. (98)
But Boyd and Carpenter did fin ally act, giving their information to Jack
Anderson "who encouraged them with his muckraker's fervent argument that
the public had a right to know if there was evidence o f foul deeds behind
Dodd's senatorial pomp.” (99) Tw enty-three columns w ere devoted to their
inform ation over a period of several months.
Pressured by an informed
public, the Senate voted to censure Dodd. H owever, support for the judgment
that d ifficu lties are involved in using the press is provided by the fa ct that
the first two of the columns were suppressed by The Washington Post. Only
edited versions o f the others were printed a fter Drew Pearson exerted
pressure. (100)
Informing to the press is probably easier since Woodward and Bernstein's
capitalization o f W atergate, with the aid of the indispensable Deep Throat.
Investigative journalism has become the rage. Newsmen are w illing to use
"tips” from insiders to expose wrongdoing. Giving data to the press is often a
way of gettin g political o fficia ls to take the complaints which are
simultaneously revealed to them seriously. Such whistle blowing is frequently
a costly escalation of informing and is often tried a fter initial failure with
intraorganizational
personnel.
A typical illustration is the opposition
mounted by two nurses at the Shiprock Indian Health Service Hospital,
located on a Navajo reservation in New M exico. (101) The nurses complained
about filth and poor patient care, protesting for three months through the
hospital's chain o f command.
They then sent a letter describing the
conditions to President Ford, which was also published in a local newspaper.
They w ere admonished and within a month w ere fired for "continued
disruption o f the work fo rce and conduct unbecoming an Indian Health Service
Em ployee." (102) The charge against them was, in essence, "washing dirty
linen in public," a deed sure to displease any administrator.
Frank Serpico's opposition mirrors the nurse's plight, although it was far
more protracted and dangerous. He had gone up the line of command within
the New York C ity Police Department in an e ffo r t to combat the corrupt
practices that abounded. He soon learned that accepting payoffs was not a
rule violation com m itted by a random few , but was an unofficial policy,
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condoned by the highest echelons. He enlisted the aid o f the Internal Security
Division of the Department, but was soon disheartened by their inaction. He
was unable to reach the Mayor, only gettin g as far as one of his aides. (103)
Serpico's friend, David Durk, had earlier suggested going to the press:
Durk had a contact on The New York Times, and they would go to him
and blow everything wide open. ... He reasoned, it was highly unlikely
t ^iat The Times would act simply on the say-so o f two cops at their
level, even though Durk was a d etective.
... Serpico had another
thought. Suppose a superior o ffic e r, a full inspector, a Paul Delise,
accompanied him to The Times and confirmed what he had to say
about corruption in the department and the system which allowed it to
flourish? That, maybe, would make a differen ce. (104)
Serpico was aware that he had a problem o f gaining credibility for his
information with the press. A t first Delise refused to join the opposition,
pleading: "I have a w ife and kids, and I just bought a house and there's a
m ortgage on it, and if I had to leave the department I don't know what other
field I could go into.
..." (105)
But Delise was finally persuaded to
accompany Serpico and Durk to the Times contact. Serpico was correct that
he needed an upper-level police o ffic e r to support his information. The Times
journalist, Burnham, indicated that if "D elise hadn't been there, nothing would
have happened." (106) Burnham's editor gave him the go ahead to w rite up a
three-part series about police misconduct with Serpico's revelations inter
spersed throughout. When the story fin ally appeared in print it set o ff a spate
o f similar ones in the competing daily newspapers, and on radio and television
news programs. The Mayor appointed an independent investigatory Commis
sion headed by a law yer, Whitman Knapp. Several suits were brought against
the Commission by the police. One of them declared that the investigation
might result in "great expense, harassment and inconvenience to police
men." (107)
Serpico gave testimony in both the closed and open phases of the Knapp
Commission's investigation. Unlike other witnesses who concentrated on the
misdeeds of specific persons and who testified because they w ere granted
immunity from prosecution, Serpico repeatedly stressed the policies of the
department that allowed corruption to flourish and, more important, that did
not permit honest police work.
Despite the publicity generated by the
investigation, only a few individuals w ere charged with offenses and they
received minor administrative punishments.
The overall policy which
encouraged corrupt and in e ffe c tiv e activities remained intact.
Serpico's opposition shows some of the problems of the informing strategy
in general.
Because he did not have documentary evidence, as did the
anonymous "Sore Throat" who opposed the American Medical Association,
Serpico needed to supplement his word with the testim ony o f a higher
o ffic ia l. Serpico also could not control the direction that the response to his
revelations took. While he had realized painfully that the entire system was
corrupt, the ensuing investigation concentrated on specific misdeeds.
A two-man bureaucratic opposition against Southwest Bell Telephone
Company was able to get incriminating information into the newspapers
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despite the lack o f "hard evidence." The method used to gain credibility,
however, was costly. One o f the two oppositionists, T.O. G ravitt, a chief
execu tive for the phone company in Texas, com m itted suicide and le ft a
detailed death note. In it he stated that the company was making political
payoffs, doing illegal wiretapping, and using questionable bookkeeping
methods to secure telephone rate increases. (108) According to G ravitt's
widow and James Ashley, the other member o f the opposition who was
general com m ercial manager for Southwest Bell's San Antonio o ffic e , the
suicide was a direct result of the company's attempt to squash the
bureaucratic opposition. "Ashley claims that when Bell learned that he and
G ravitt were planning to expose such practices, the company started
investigating their private lives." (109) G ravitt's fam ily and James Ashley
won a slander suit against Southwestern Bell for three million dollars, but in
light of the events, one may question whether the opposition was successful.

( 110)

Another way of disseminating information to the public about organi
zational abuse is to publish a book. Like the other means of informing, this
ta ctic has difficu lties. The information has to be both substantial enough to
fill at least part o f a book and capable o f arousing public interest. If the
la tter requirement is not met the manuscript w ill probably not be published
by a com m ercial press and, therefore, w ill not be distributed w idely or
review ed in magazines and newspapers. "Vanity" publishing is not usually
e ffe c t iv e for oppositionists, although it is possible for a privately published
work to be picked up by a comm ercial press if it has some success. Other
difficu lties with publishing arise if the organization to be exposed has enough
clout to discourage publishers from printing the damaging information. For
example, several form er agents have tried to publish books exposing the
illegal, in e ffe c tiv e , and immoral policies of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Philip A gee had to have his book, Inside the Company: C IA Diary, published
in London by Penguin Books. A t least three American publishing houses,
Straight Arrow , Simon and Schuster, and Warner Paperback had "been
dissuaded from publishing it by the prospect of interminable legal hassling and
expense." ( I l l )
Having to w rite the book a fter leaving the C IA was also
d ifficu lt for A gee. He w rote it "abroad while bugged and hounded, he claims,
by Company agents." (112) Once the book was in print there was a concerted
e ffo r t to discredit the author. A gee was called a Communist agent, a traitor,
a fo ol, a drunk, and a wom anizer. (113)
Victor M archetti, a form er high-ranking C IA o ffic ia l who has co-authored
a book exposing the Agency, has also been harrassed in his effo rts to make
evidence public.
Portions of this book, C IA and the Cult o f Intelligence,
w ritten with John Marks, a form er State Department o ffic ia l, had been
censored prior to its publication.
The C IA also obtained a permanent
injunction, upheld by the Supreme Court, which prohibits M archetti from
"w riting or saying anything, 'fa ct, fictio n , or otherwise' about intelligence
without prior approval o f the Central Intelligence Agency." (114) The Agency
even tried, though unsuccessfully, to block the publication o f the book by
attem pting to discredit M archetti's character with the publisher. Another
exposure o f the CIA, John Stockwell's book In Search o f Enemies, was
published secretly by W.W. Norton. Only six people within the company knew
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about the project. (115)
It is instructive to compare the bureaucratic oppositions of Victor
Marchetti and Philip A gee. Both chose to publish books as the w ay to inform
the public and they exposed similar types of organizational abuses. Both
resigned from their positions before w riting their respective books. Y e t the
goals of their oppositions differed . M archetti, who had a high rank within the
Agency, hoped that the information he provided would "win public support for
a comprehensive review o f the CIA in the congressional arena." (116) That is,
M archetti wished to curb the abuses, to reform the Agency. In contrast,
Agee's case described the lim it of bureaucratic oppositions: his goal being
the abolition o f the CIA. (117) A gee does not believe that significant reform s
o f the Agency are possible and, so, he aims at the bureaucratic analogy to
revolution in the polity.
Publishing a book about organizational abuses has several drawbacks that
tend to make it a less e ffe c tiv e tactic than other variations on the informing
theme. The author often becomes a celebrity while the book's message is
relegated to a secondary importance. Philip A gee complained: "people seem
more interested in me and my potential trajectory than in what I can say
about the Central Intelligence Agency." (118) Also, while the public expects
the press to check on the facts and to serve as an authenticator of them, the
same expectation does not apply to book publishers. Finally, blowing the
whistle through publishing a book allows the oppositionist to gain financially
and, therefore, casts doubt upon the veracity of the story.
The advantages of exposing abuses through a book incjude the whistle
blower's control over the context in which the information is presented. He
or she can both analyze the causes of the problems identified and o ffe r
proposals for change. The book can also serve as a public confession, since
many bureaucratic oppositionists have participated in the abuses that they
later expose or try to elim inate. For example, Victor M archetti comments on
Philip Agee's expose:
I am a Catholic. I understand what Phil was trying to do in his book.
This was his sincere act of contrition and com plete confession that
every C atholic has to make before he dies so that he at least has a
chance to go to heaven without a mortal sin on his soul. (119)
Most bureaucratic oppositions which inform to the general public are
undertaken by people who are no longer employed in the target organization.
Usually the whistleblowers resign, but if they do not, as soon as their
"treasonous" act is known they are usually fired promptly.
In those
bureaucracies where the employees have some protection, such as those
covered by civil service regulations, paychecks may still arrive, but the
execu tive or professional informer w ill not be allowed to do any meaningful
work. When informing outside of the organization is done by those who w ere
never employed by it, the phenomenon is no longer classified as bureaucratic
opposition, because differen t principles of action and consequences apply.
The outside inform er, for example, cannot be deemed a traitor.
Also,
external oppositions often do not have as much access to confidential
information as do informers from within.
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Bureaucratic oppositions using an informing strategy focus all of their
attention on the grounds of the opposition. Their method is to gain access to
those who are empowered to act to remedy the abuse and to give them the
fa cts." The underlying assumption o f informing is: " If they only knew, boy,
would they be angry!" When this assumption is contradicted, the opposition
ists either believe that the person who heard them is an exception and
proceed to look for a more appreciative ear, or they become disillusioned and
give up, or they explore the possibilities for direct action.
While the informing strategy is often based on the belief that "the facts
speak for them selves," direct action is governed by the premise that the
fa cts" must be supported by power. If the facts do speak for themselves
then the number and status o f opposition-group members should make no
d ifferen ce for success. Ideally, an informing strategy works like the feed back given by a thermostat to a furnace or a gyroscope to a steering
mechanism, maintaining a steady state or an equilibrium. The information
should be su fficient to correct the "error." O f course, the ideal o f the
informing strategy is nearly never actualized. Because of the risks involved
in undertaking a bureaucratic opposition, which are often most severe when
one goes outside the organization, and the general lack o f rewards if the
opposition is successful, whistle blowers tend to be highly com m itted to the
grounds they publicly announce. They are the most idealistic o f opposition
ists, whether in terms o f the public goals o f an institution, the laws of the
state, or the precepts o f a moral system. They are also the firm est believers
in the e ffic a c y o f the "fa cts."
Informing strategy is most applicable to gettin g rid o f incumbents who
have violated important organizational rules, especially if these rules are
backed by wider cultural standards.
Oppositions against organizational
policies that run counter to strongly held norms of the larger society may be
able to inform e ffe c t iv e ly to authorities outside o f the organization or to the
general public. Bureaucratic oppositions grounded in abuses other than these
tw o are less likely to employ inform ing e ffe c t iv e ly and often find direct
action to be more expedient.

D IRECT A C TIO N

The informing strategy presupposes that the recipients o f revelations
about abuses share a form al if not a personal com m itm ent to the norms or
values grounding the opposition. Frequently, however, oppositionists find that
such a consensus does not exist, or they are aware o f dissensus from the
outset.
When the authorities do not subscribe, at least o ffic ia lly , to the
public goals o f the opposition, the dissenters must develop strategies that
ex ert influence or power more directly. The use of persuasion to alter the
value commitments of authorities is a possible option, but it does not seem to
be an e ffe c t iv e one, because higher administrators are not known to be
favorable to having their goals changed by subordinates. Debate over value
commitments is an e ffe c t iv e mechanism o f change only where political
participation is legitim ate, and it is not in bureaucracies. Thus, oppositionists
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who do not inform or who go beyond m erely providing information usually
attem pt either to re ctify the abusive situation by themselves or to get the
authorities to make the desired changes despite their disagreement. In both
o f these cases the oppositionists usually must admit to themselves and to
others that they are engaged in a political conflict.
The distinction between informing tactics and more direct exercises of
power or influence is not sharp and in many concrete cases the two shade o ff
into one another. Each type o f strategy can be used subordinated to the
other in a variety of circumstances, but in the most frequent cases a basic
informing strategy is bolstered by other tactics. Some o f these instances
have already been described.
For example, when the Bennington faculty
informed on the college's president to the board o f trustees "dozens of
impassioned facu lty galleys arrived at the o ffices and homes of the trustees."
(120) The oppositionists assumed, co rrectly or not, that m erely describing the
grounds, citing the president's incompetence, and expressing their lack o f
confidence in her leadership ability was insufficient. To get the board to fire
Parker they fe lt that they had to spell out the detrimental consequences of
her behavior in a dramatic way. Although the facu lty members believed that
they shared a normative community with the trustees, they augmented their
presentation of facts with arguments and with demonstrations of mass
indignation. In this case the power of rhetorical persuasion was used within an
informing strategy to convince authorities that the conditions grounding the
opposition were seriously discrepant with common values.
Another dramatic way o f highlighting the seriousness of an abuse is the
recruitment of those with relatively high status in the organization to inform
with the original opposition group.
This ta ctic is analogous to the
rhetorician's argument from authority.
A group o f nurses attem pted to
rem ove the director of nursing services from o ffic e on the grounds o f
incompetence by allying themselves "w ith a group of militant anti
administration doctors ... " who presented their complaints to the hospital's
board o f directors. (121) This tactic was unsuccessful, but it was easily
converted into a direct-action strategy that will be discussed below.
The presentation of arguments may be accompanied or replaced by various
actions with persuasive aims.
Administrators who do not share an
oppositionist's judgment about a certain policy may reexamine their stand
when the em ployee resigns in protest, particularly if it is done publicly and
supplemented with whistle blowing. Resignation adds greatly to credibility,
in the same way as did the suicide of the telephone execu tive cited above.
A bureaucratic opposition was mounted by three middle-management
engineers who were employed in the nuclear energy division o f General
E lectric Corporation. They did not believe that the radiation-containment
sa fety devices in nuclear plants provided adequate protection.
Their
superiors did not seem to be concerned about the functioning of the system
and denied ever having heard the engineers' complaints. (122) The engineers
decided that because of the safety hazards nuclear reactors should not be
produced. Thus, they opposed the goal of the division in which they w ere
employed on moral grounds. The authority to which they appealed was the
general public, since they assumed that the corporation was not interested in
abolishing one o f its major divisions.
They called a press conference to
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announce their resignations, and to assert that the nuclear power plants now
in operation in the United States ’’are plagued by design defects and operating
problems to an extent that poses a major sa fety dilemma for the nation."
(123)
Their action was directed towards changing the values o f citizens who
might pressure state or national governments to regulate nuclear plants out
o f existence. The e ffe c t of their resignation was assessed by one journalist,
in a front-page story, in the follow ing terms:
It was like a shot heard 'round the nuclear energy world, signalling
what could become a national reappraisal o f the growing dependence
on nuclear power in the United States. (124)
A direct attem pt to exploit the drama of a situation to change a practice
WufS
^ .some legal secretaries in Chicago. They wanted to elim inate
the o ffic e policy that required them to prepare c o ffe e for their bosses. (125)
One o f the secretaries in the o ffic e protested this policy verbally and was
promptly fired. The others then came to the o ffic e dressed in waitress'
uniforms. (126) Their action is reminiscent o f the tactics of the Yippies, who
threw money onto the floor of the New York Stock Exchange where brokers
ran over one another to retrieve the bills. Both events dram atized the values
o f the opposed practices for those involved in them. By holding up a mirror,
distorted to be sure, it was hoped to shame the opponent into abandoning the
practice. It is d ifficu lt to assess the e ffic a c y of the secretarial opposition
because the local news media publicized it. Had the secretaries intended to
use a whistle-blowing ta ctic they could not have chosen better. Access to
television newscasts is made easier when the visual elem ent is emphasized
and even more so when people look slightly ridiculous. The fired secretary
was rehired and the policy was changed.
When the women's movement began denouncing the treatm ent of fem ales
as sex objects, but before anyone had thought to struggle against such
dishonor by legal or administrative means, a secretary told me about a
political ta ctic used in a bureaucratic opposition against a boss who made
lewd remarks about her and her co-worker's bodies. He was particularly
intrigued by breasts, but would observe and comment on other parts of the
body as w ell. The two women began to fee l more and more demeaned, but
were sure that if they complained to him or to any other male they would be
m et with derision. A fte r some months of frustration they hit upon a ta ctic
which proved e ffe c tiv e .
Whenever they looked at their boss they stared
d irectly and continuously at his crotch.
He became flustered almost
im m ediately but it took him some tim e to make the connection between their
stares and his own behavior towards them. Nothing was said but he no longer
closely observed or commented on their bodies. One suspects that his
standard o f appropriate behavior toward women was changed by the
secretarial guerilla theater and not by a change in his appreciation o f their
anatomy.
Some bureaucratic oppositions use informing as a ta ctic to accomplish a
hidden goal. Particularly when the aim is to rem ove a superior from o ffic e ,
or to restrict his or her power, the dissenters may try to build a case by
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presenting evidence of infractions that do not really concern them. Here
informing is neither idealistic nor naive, but instrumental and manipulative.
The dissenters rationally choose the information that w ill be taken most
seriously by the authorities, and select the most sympathetic and e ffe c tiv e
recipients; they exercise political savvy. This ta ctic is feasible in many
oppositions. Subordinates, especially assistants, aides, and secretaries, are
often privy to compromising information which they generally help to keep
hidden because of their loyalty. Abuses which diminish this loyalty allow the
use o f confidential data. As in the case of dram atizing tactics, informing
with ulterior motives requires some acting ability. One must pretend to some
show o f outrage over conditions that are not fe lt to be abusive.
A cting and dissembling are also required when informing its e lf is disguised
under a cover of sociability. It may be e ffe c tiv e and diminish risks m erely to
chat with a superior’s boss on a person-to-person basis; thus, a member of the
bureaucratic opposition group who has social access to an administrator is a
great asset. Showing no sign that one is pleading a case, disparaging remarks,
gossip, and insinuations can be dropped which put the abusive superior in a
bad light. The more that one is aware of the particular values held by the
administrator, the better one can tailor one’s ’’casual” conversation. The
grounds to which the oppositionists are com m itted need never be mentioned.
The aim here is to have the superior viewed less favorably, to redefine the
situation as view ed by the higher administrator. If the tactic is e ffe c tiv e , the
targeted superior w ill no longer be given the benefit of the doubt and
otherwise innocuous behavior may be judged to be grounds for dismissal.
The various means of dram atization and the devious uses of informing are
embroideries of the basic informing strategy. There is a class of tactics,
however, that rely upon verbal expression, but which border on or constitute
direct action. As the courts have recognized, speech may incite or harm as
well as provide information. In bureaucratic oppositions speech ordinarily
becomes direct political action in the form of threats.
The power to threaten a superior with informing others about an abuse is
available to all em ployees who dare to use it. The assumption is that while
the superior does not object to the rule violation or disputed policy, at least
not strongly enough to take remedial action, he or she acknowledges that
higher authorities might be outraged if they w ere apprised of the situation.
In most cases it is probably less risky actually to do the informing than to
threaten to do so. The threat gives the superior tim e to cover tracks, to
prepare a case against the oppositionists, or to try to silence them. Threats
can evoke cooptation offers, counter threats, or even physical attacks. Karen
Silkwood supposedly was murdered when it was found out that she was going
to blow the whistle on her employers. (127)
A special variant of the tactic of threatening is the threat to resign. The
assumption here, whether made explicitly or m erely understood, is that the
organization w ill be adversely a ffec te d by the oppositionist’s departure. The
threat of resignation is meaningful when those issuing it are not readily
replaceable, and it has long been viewed as a test of power in the polity.
Authorities who give in to such threats are perceived as weakening their
control, and according subordinates a veto power over decisions.
The bureaucratic opposition against an incompetent director of nursing
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services at a suburban hospital, which was mentioned above, escalated its
attack to the tactic o f threatening resignation after trying numerous means
o f informing. The group recruited some doctors to give them more authority
when they informed. The hospital administration finally acted and removed
the director when the doctors issued an ultimatum indicating that they would
leave en masse in two weeks if remedial action were not taken. (128) Doctors
are not easily replaced and the resignations would have diminished the
effectiven ess of the hospital greatly.
In an even more successful case the sta ff (nurses, mental health and social
service workers) at a psychiatric hospital opposed the authority structure of
the organization on the grounds o f in e ffe c tiv e policy.
The doctors, who
visited the hospital infrequently, had adm inistrative control over the therapy
program, and thus, over the staff. The opposition arguedthat the staff
... should be free from outside control so it could develop its own
treatm ent philosophy and experiment with differen t approaches. It
seemed rather obvious that the psychiatrists had become rigid in their
approach. They w ere, in e ffe c t , alienating themselves from the unit
workers and from their patients while perpetuating their own roles
without evaluating their efficien cy. (129)
Presentation o f their case to the administration did not m eet with success,
but when the s ta ff threatened a mass resignation, which would have closed
the hospital, the authorities reluctantly gave in and changed the struc
ture. (130)
The threat of resignation, however, sometimes backfires. A number of
co llege book travelers opposed their supervisor's unethical sales methods and
threatened their mass resignation if the practices were not changed. The
sales department made no response to their move. In e ffe c t , their bluff had
been called and, one by one, the salesmen resigned.
The use o f threats as an opposition ta ctic is always risky because a threat
is a direct attack on an adversary, an open acknowledgment o f con flict. If the
blu ff is called and the threat is not carried out, credibility, power, and dignity
tend to be lost altogether. The costs o f threatening are, at one extrem e,
dismissal or actual physical harm, and, at the other, a breach of the trust that
is necessary to conduct day-to-day business without uncertainty and tension.
A t the very least, those who threaten show that they no longer uphold the
myth of obedience to authority. In contrast, nonverbal political tactics allow
the oppositionists to appear to be as loyal as ever - the opposition to a
supervisor, for example, can be kept a secret and yet be e ffe c tiv e .
Abusive supervisors are particularly appropriate targets for being secretly
undermined. A telephone company em ployee, who was a member of a group
that wished to oust a foreman who made disparaging remarks about his
subordinates, indicates why and how such a ta ctic works:
The job o f the forem an is to make sure that the workers are doing
their specific task. But most often, the forem an never knows how the
workers do their job. A ll telephone problems are discovered and solved
through a computer. The forem an has only been trained about basic
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computer ’’know-how.” On the other hand, the workers know how to
’foul up the works’ long enough for just a little trouble. The foreman
gets called ’on the carpet’ every tim e the computer ’’goes down” - stops
for some unknown reason. Note that this is an e ffe c t iv e means of
opposition because the foreman does not know enough about the
computer to know if he has been deliberately set up or not. He just
"looks bad.” (131)
The astute participant-observer assesses this tactic:
... the workers can oppose without gettin g reprimanded in any way. It
has one drawback however; the workers cannot attend the meetings of
the o fficia ls when the foreman is being called in. So the workers never
know if they are having any success. (132)
In order to overcom e their uncertainty and gain quick results, the opposition
ists tried another strategy which resulted in reprisals. What they did not
know was that before they had implemented their second strategy the
administration had decided to transfer the foreman. The opposition had been
successful in making him look incompetent, but its members learned about
their effectiven ess too late. They underestimated their power, the source of
which was their technical expertise.
This ta ctic is also described by Robert Merton with regard to its use
against political appointees or elected o fficia ls who are in charge of public
bureaucracies: " if the bureaucrats believe that their status is not adequately
recognized ... detailed information w ill be withheld from (the o ffic ia l),
leading him to errors for which he is held responsible." (133) Here, too, job
expertise is a source of power for the "lower participants." David Mechanic
form ally states the principle involved:
Other factors remaining constant, to the extent that a low-ranking
participant has important expert knowledge not available to highranking participants, he is likely to have power over them. (134)
Making a superior appear to be incompetent need not rely on expertise.
Sabotage may be e ffe c te d by other means. For example, a secretary may
insert a compromising sentence into a letter dictated by her boss, who usually
signs his correspondence without reading it over. Possibilities for disruption
p roliferate once the decision to begin hostilities is made.
An alternative ta ctic to sabotage, which is also aimed primarily against
superiors who are perceived to be abusive, is harassment. As was noted
earlier, the harassment of employees is often a ground for opposition.
Administrators who are blocked from dismissing disliked em ployees by union
or civil service rules frequently attem pt to make life at the workplace
d ifficu lt for them. A government report on whistle blowing notes:
Informal harassment is a common bureaucratic practice ... often used
against whistle blowers because it is difficu lt to prove and quite often
the em ployee has not done anything technically improper to justify
form al action. (135)
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Oppositionists do not usually have the authority to create difficu lties for
their targets legitim ately, but they may be able to exercise informal power.
In a small municipal agency a bureaucratic opposition used psychological
w arlare against an abusive supervisor. She was what may be termed a "power
reak, ever, eaSer to display her control by com m itting injustices and
ishonoring her subordinates.
A fte r the supervisor had dishonored the
individual with the least tenure and the weakest personality in the o ffic e , all
ot the ^subordinates met to chart their opposition. They believed that the
agen cys director and his administrative assistant were not concerned with
the o ffic e and, thus, that informing would be fruitless. They decided to use
psychological pressure to try to get the supervisor to resign or at least to be
less abusive. They isolated her; "Her attempts to engage in conversation
w ere tota lly ignored." (136) Each morning the employees greeted one another
wi
exaggerated friendliness but did not even speak to the supervisor.
Having no one else in the o ffic e with whom to be sociable, the supervisor was
e ec tiv e ly ostracized. The tactic its e lf probably would have been sufficient
o get results, but success was speeded when the administrative assistant
noticed the situation and inquired about its cause. The sta ff told him about
the problems and shortly afterwards the supervisor was reprimanded and
certain functions were removed from her authority.
Ostracism is not the only means by which subordinates can drive their
superiors to want to leave a position.
Neurotic tendencies can be
exacerbated and reinforced to the point at which the target of the opposition
does becom e em otionally incapacitated. When the ta ctic is successful the
superior either quits or is dismissed, but when it is not the oppositionist's
situation is probably worse than it had been before.
Pushing an abusive superior over the brink has also been litera lly
attem pted and sometimes effe c te d .
There are many cases o f murder or
battery by disgruntled" employees against supervisors. Most often such
incidents are based on perceived dishonor suffered by the subordinate and
occur a fter a reprimand or a dismissal. Battery against the foreman has, in
ta ct, been glo rified in country music. Murderers, o f course, are not allowed
to enjoy the new bureaucratic clim ate that they have created, unless they can
escape detection. A seeming example o f the use o f murder as a ta ctic in a
bureaucratic opposition took place in a perfume fa cto ry in New Jersey A
worker, Robert Mayer, brought suit in a federal court against the company,
alleging sa fety violations. Three months a fter the suit was thrown out o f
court he walked into the fa cto ry "...and, without a word, shot to death the
company president and two plant forem en..." (137) He then killed himself. In
this respect murderers resemble the "alumni" whistle blowers who do not seek
anonymity and who have no intention or hope o f regaining employment in
their form er organization.
Murder and whistle blowing are also similar
because most cases mix grounded opposition with emotional intensity.
Forcing a superior to leave the organization through psychological or
physical pressure is the only use o f power in which bureaucratic oppositionists
need not ultim ately rely on those with authority to put the desired change
into e ffe c t .
There is, however, another possible ta ctic against abusive
superiors which might preserve the anonymity o f the oppositionists. Rather
than try to make superiors appear to be incompetent, as did the telephone
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workers mentioned earlier, the oppositionists might attem pt to goad and
guide them into actually com m itting some abuse or violating a rule that is
considered to be important by the authorities. Ideally such transgressions
would be obvious to the higher levels of administration or the evidence of
them strong enough to be presented anonymously. A variation on the same
theme, if the situation was not ideal, would be to inform on the artificially
induced abuse. In the use of this ta ctic the rule violation would not serve as
the ground to which the oppositionists w ere com m itted; their power of
cunning would be used to provoke and induce a grounded abuse. It is of
interest that in none of the more than one hundred cases o f bureaucratic
oppositions of which I have accounts has this ta ctic been deployed.
Omniscient narrators did not w rite the case descriptions and those who might
use this kind of ta ctic may either be ashamed to own up to their deeds and/or
be afraid that admission might overturn, even at a later date, the successful
opposition.
The various tactics of harassment, psychological pressure, and deception
are most e ffe c tiv e against abusive personnel, but have little applicability in
policy disputes. Policies cannot be changed directly without administrative
action, nor can they be altered indirectly by tactics such as goading in which
the authorities are not aware that there is an organized opposition. It is
possible, however, for subordinates to use ’’the power of lower participants” to
make it plain that the administration's projects will be obstructed.
Many if not most workers have the power that comes from their bending
the rules to achieve greater efficien cy.
Thomas Scheff describes the
power that hospital ward attendants have over physicians. (138) The paper
work concerning medication is extensive and is the o ffic ia l responsibility of
the doctor. The attendants assume some of this work, which allows them
influence over decisions made about the patients. If the attendants opposed
some policy they could refuse to fill out the numerous forms which are not
their responsibility. The tacit threat of such action keeps the physicians from
making policy changes that would displease the attendants.
One of the more popular kinds of direct action, the greve du zele ("work
by rule"), consists of "slowing down the work flow and paralyzing the
functioning o f the organization just by observing, to the letter, all the
required prescriptions ... ’’ (139) This tactic involves an open attack upon the
effectiven ess of the organization and requires the participation of a large
percentage o f the work force.
It trades upon the paradox that rule
infractions are instrumental to the e fficien t functioning of the organization.
(Although many organization theorists have stressed) ... the functional
characteristics of rules within an organization, it should be clear that
full compliance to all the rules at all times w ill probably be
dysfunctional for the organization.
Com plete and apathetic com
pliance may do everything but fa c ilita te achievement of organizational
goals. (140)
Work-by-rule is probably a popular ta ctic because it requires the
oppositionists to obey the rules, not to break or circumvent them. Work
slowdowns, which result from strict adherence to rules, are often psychologi
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ca lly rewarding to the participants as w ell as minimal in their risks. Because
the action impairs the functioning o f the bureaucracy, participants and
others, both inside and outside the organization, become aware o f the
importance o f the work they have been doing.
A bureaucratic opposition in the suburban-area marketing department of a
major telephone company was grounded in dispute over a policy change. A
team of effic ie n c y experts had been brought in and they proceeded to
reevaluate jobs, install a new set of procedures, and increase the norms of
expected output. One of those a ffec te d by the reorganization reported that
Employees became so caught up in paper work, detailed procedures and
seemingly unnecessary reports, many of which w ere repetitious, that
our department began to lose sight of its real purpose, which was the
sales and servicing of our markets. (141)
The opposition seemed to be grounded not only in the in efficien cy and
in effectiven ess o f the new policy, but in the judgment that the department
had been dishonored, that departmental authority had been usurped by the
consultants. The new procedures also resulted in a number of demotions,
transfers, and forced retirements. The informant expressed the mood of the
dissenters: "Our plea was to have the honor of having our own management
team attem pting to get rid o f bunglers rather than these outsiders." (142)
Their co llective action consisted of a work slow down in processing each
order and a refusal to put in the overtim e needed to clear up the situation.
The results w ere that the number of installation orders dropped sharply and
the installers complained. Customers, many of them large businesses, sent in
a rash o f complaints, some directly to the president’s o ffic e . Not only did the
oppositionists recognize the importance o f their jobs, but the ta ctic was
appropriate to the abuse, and therefore psychologically satisfying. They w ere
aggrieved by the imposition o f new rules without consultation - "The
administration only seems interested in our functioning with mechanical
e ffic ie n c y ." (143) Their work-by-rule ta ctic told the upper echelons, "W ell, if
you treat us as machines we w ill behave as machines. Machines will follow
all directions explicitly, have no fle x ib ility or discretion, and w ill not put in
any extra e ffo r t. We w ill show you how in e ffe c tiv e machines are!"
A similar opposition in a legal o ffic e used, among other tactics, a greve du
z e le to oppose a minor personnel policy that was thought to be u n fa ir .---------We decided to do everything by the rules. Tim e cards which a ffe c t
billing tim e w ere fu lly w ritten out with no abbreviations. A ll long
distance calls were refused unless accepted by an attorney.
No
Xeroxing was done without an appointment in the Xerox log. Nothing
was notarized by secretaries until com pletely read. Nobody signed
their bosses' names to documents no m atter how urgent the necessity
o f sending out the document became. In essence everything the o ffic e
manual required was done. But this really fouled up the system because
o f the numerous informal rules which had developed w ere no longer
being follow ed. (144)
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The sense o f poetic justice associated with this ta ctic was obvious and
satisfying to the opposition group members: "If the unfair policy was coming
from the o ffic e manual then we will show you how stupid that manual is by
obeying all o f its rules to the le tte r."
The gratification fe lt by many o f those who initiate a greve du zele is
underlined by the fa ct that this technique is used as an end-ln-itself.
Frequently slaves and others who feel that they cannot successfully make any
changes in their conditions engage in continuous work slowdowns. Others call
them "la zy " or "stupid" but they and their comrades know that they could
work much more rapidly and with greater precision.
"Backstage" they
exaggeratedly mim ic themselves to show that they know that they are
purposely "presenting them selves" as having diminished capacity.
Their
gratification comes from "putting one over" on their masters and the poetic
justice o f "you treat me as less than human and I will behave accordingly."
Work stoppages are similar to greve du zele
because they also require
widespread support. Both tactics presuppose that the administration values
effectiven ess and effic ie n c y enough to make concessions if these goals are
threatened. The power exhibited in a work stoppage is the least specialized
resource of the "low er participant." Mechanic states, "To the extent that a
person is dependent on another,'he is potentially subject to the other person's
power." (145) The strike, then, depends for its e ffic a c y upon the d ifficu lty of
replacing the dissidents. Those with highly specialized skills have greater
leverage than those without them who also often have clauses banning w ildcat
strikes in their employment contracts.
The strike which is initiated and authorized by a union is not a
bureaucratic opposition as defined in this study because it is a type of interorganizational co n flict rather than a movement for change from below. The
w ildcat strike, however, since it is not sanctioned by union authority and may
even be a rebellion against it, falls squarely within the bounds of the present
discussion. Unionized workers are knowledgable about strikes in general, so it
does not take much crea tivity to suggest a w ildcat. The solidarity nurtured
for strikes called by the union also serves wildcatters. The ta ctic requires a
strong sense o f cam araderie that exceeds any loyalty to the union or, of
course, to the em ployer.
Coal miners are w ell known for the use o f w ildcat tactics; their bloody
labor history and the dangerous conditions of their everyday work have helped
to establish very strong bonds among co-workers. Many Appalachian locals of
the United Mine Workers union engaged in unauthorized work stoppages
during the summer of 1977. The workers w ere protesting cutbacks in miners’
health benefits. On June 20, 1977, the miners received a le tte r stating that
they would each have to pay 40 per cent of medical costs up to $500. Until
then they had enjoyed fre e medical care, the legacy o f John L. Lewis'
negotiations. "The next day, scarcely a ton of coal was mined in Eastern
Kentucky." (146) The change in policy came about because o f the depletion of
the medical funds contributed by the owners on the basis of days worked and
tonnage mined. The contributions had dropped in part because of previous
wildcat strikes.
The national union election had been held less than a w eek before the
change in medical policy was announced and, despite denials of any
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foreknow ledge, re-elected United Mine Workers President Arnold M iller was
suspected of com plicity by the rank-and-file. The wildcat strike probably
hurt him more than it a ffe c te d the mine owners:
The longer it lasts, the less leverage Miller w ill have in national
contract talks.
M oreover, his authority in the union is rapidly
eroding... (147)
The workers, who wished to have their medical benefits restored im m ediate
ly, w ere not satisfied with M iller’s explanations that they would have to w ait
for national contract negotiations to open. A fte r the workers refused to go
back to work, the union hierarchy dispatched ’’armed organizers from
Pennsylvania to do battle with unruly picketers.” The w ildcatters broadened
their opposition and mounted a recall movement against M iller. The situation
was not resolved before the national contract was negotiated, as was
evidenced by the great coal strike of 1978 which grew directly out of this
bureaucratic opposition.
Wildcat strikes are direct challenges to the authority o f the union
hierarchy and they are rarely undertaken when the union leadership can
marshal e ffe c t iv e violence to enforce its control. When single members or
small groups oppose a union they cannot strike, but may resign. If they do so
they are often vulnerable to reprisals if they attem pt to keep working in the
same line. For example, an electrical worker attem pted to oppose corruption
in the Communications Workers o f Am erica.
When he realized that the
abuses could not be cleaned up by his effo rts he resigned, not in protest, but
because he did not want to support a corrupt union. He was harassed, beaten,
and fired . (148)
Work slowdowns and stoppages are highly visible protests that sharply
define a co n flict situation. They are opposition tactics that are aimed at
changing adm inistrative policy and, more rarely, personnel by diminishing
organizational effectiven ess and e fficien cy . It is often possible for workers
to oppose a policy without bearing the costs of open confrontation by
circum venting the rules or ignoring them.
Disobedience itself is not
necessarily a ta ctic o f bureaucratic opposition.
To qualify it must be
interpreted as insubordination both by the workers and by the authorities.
Executive orders may not be carried out m erely because o f misunderstanding
or inability to comply rather than because of defiance. (149) Robert Presthus
observes that ” In organizations, people rarely withhold consent. Rather, they
evade, procrastinate, ’misunderstand,’ ’fo rg e t’ ... " (150) Such actions are not
bureaucratic oppositions because there is no attem pt to change the
organizational policy.
Self-conscious and conspicuous disobedience of an organizational rule is an
oppositional ta ctic which directly challenges the principle o f command.
Unmistakable defiance not only may cause in efficien cy but also dishonors the
authorities. (151)
Many administrators tend to believe with Chester I.
Barnard that
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... the e fficien cy of an organization is a ffec te d by the degree to which
individuals assent to orders, denying the authority of an organization
communication is a threat to the interests of all individuals who derive
a net advantage from their connection with the organization ... (152)
Frequently, open disobedience is succeeded by other tactics because
reprisals are taken against some of the participants. These reprisals may be
s w iftly enacted because authorities usually have the legal or administrative
right to retaliate against rule violations without in terference by unions or civil
service commissions. Thus, broad participation is an important factor for the
success of defiance. Reprisals are not easily directed against more than a
very small percentage of the work fo rce without damaging efficien cy.
The host of tactics open to bureaucratic oppositionists, whether within an
informing strategy or direct action, does not assure success. There is no way
of estim ating what percentage of oppositions achieves their goals of
elim inating an abusive administrator or changing a policy. Some movements
are defeated sw iftly, others may escalate from less costly tactics to more
risky ones. Combining two or more tactics may be e ffe c tiv e when done either
simultaneously or in sequence. Some oppositions do not fu lfill their goals but
continue to fight nevertheless. A few try to become permanent by form ally
organizing.
PROD is a group of Teamsters Union members who are opposed to the
corruption of the union hierarchy. The group has existed for a number of
years and has a research director and a newspaper to enable it to inform on
the leadership. (152)
Engaging in other tactics such as court suits and
informing to the government, PROD is a m u ltifaceted and resourceful
opposition group. It can o ffe r some protection against execu tive retaliation
and has finances and manpower that dwarf oppositions within other
bureaucracies.
Such institutionalized dissent as PROD is the lim it of
bureaucratic opposition, because it borders on the creation of a new lateral
organization with a specialized staff and hierarchy of its own. As Max Weber
noted, form al organization means routine.
The essence o f bureaucratic
opposition is to disrupt routine, which is why its tactics are so diverse and
the probabilities of their success so difficu lt to determine.
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MTut, tut, child," said the Duchess. "Everything's got a moral if
only you can find it."
Lewis Carroll, A lice in Wonderland

Bureaucratic oppositions are political phenomena that appear within social
entities which are not supposed to be political systems. According to the
adm inistrative myth, the o fficia ls of a bureaucracy are primarily com m itted
to the e fficien t and e ffe c tiv e achievement of their public mission. They are
responsible, through a board of directors, a board of trustees, or an elected
o ffic ia l, to one or more broader constituencies. Their ultim ate goals are
provided for them by others, and their task is to make sure that these goals
are fu lfilled by developing specific policies and securing adequate implemen
tation of them. If there are any obstacles to e ffe c t iv e goal attainment, the
administrators are supposed to be aware of them and to correct them. In
terms o f the administrative myth there should be no grounds for conflict
within a bureaucracy, because employees are aware that they have no form al
right to dispute the organization's public aims and administrators are
m otivated to achieve those aims e ffic ie n tly and according to the rules. The
ubiquity of bureaucratic oppositions shows that organizations are not self
co rrective and, therefore, are not nonpolitical. They are, instead, seedbeds
o f co n flict in which overt struggle is often muted by repression, just as it is in
the authoritarian state, which also claims to have dispensed with politics.
The grounds for oppositions show that in contemporary organizations some
em ployees do dispute the policies that specify general goals, though not
usually the goals themselves, and that administrators often are not
com m itted to the o ffic ia l aims of the organization, are not dedicated to
e ffic ie n t performance, and are not m otivated to re c tify even abuse that
results from breach o f the organization's own rules. For whatever motives an
opposition may be initiated, it is usually possible to find abundant grounds for
it and, perhaps, to induce such grounds. The conditions for political a ctivity,
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then, are present within the everyday life of bureaucracies, though they may
be concealed by widespread belief in the adm inistrative myth and, more
im portantly, by fear of hierarchical power and habits of obedience that may
originate in belief and fear. If the barriers to opposition are overcom e, the
adm inistrative myth is dispelled, at least tem porarily.
Even the most
innocent informer acknowledges, at least im plicitly, that some abuses have
escaped the attention of the authorities, that supervision is not all that it
should be. In the ideal bureaucracy, "feedback" in the form of suggestions,
praise, and reports o f work output, not demands, is the only legitim ate
communication from the lower to the higher levels.
Oppositions make
demands, even if they are attenuated as tacit expectations that the
authorities w ill act on information presented to them.

OPPOSITION AND A U T H O R IT Y

Once a political process has been unleashed in a bureaucracy the first
concerns of the authorities are to contain it within the organization, reassert
the chain of command, and refurbish the adm inistrative myth. They may also
attem pt to correct the abuses, but they w ill try to do so without admitting
that there are abuses. Thus, they are not likely to reward oppositionists and
tend to punish them even if they believe that the opposition was warranted.
The authorities w ill attem pt to d ep oliticize the situation as quickly as
possible by suppressing con flict. They may do so through taking punitive
measures, through making concessions, or through a combination of the two.
Usually there w ill be some use o f power and the main consequence o f
opposition w ill be reassertion of the hierarchy. Conditions, however, will not
return to the status quo ante, because the political nature of the organization
w ill have been revealed. A ll parties to the con flict w ill learn what a General
Motors execu tive found out:
What is really involved is politics, the conscious sharing of control and
power. History does not o ffe r many examples of oligarchies that have
abdicated with grace and good w ill. (1)
O f course, if the hierarchy fails to reassert itself e ffe c tiv e ly , the organi
zation w ill have become politicized.
The "bureaucratic genius for retaliation " (2) is at its most creative in
devising reprisals against those who mount oppositions.
Among reprisals,
personal attacks can be distinguished from job and career related measures.
Aggression against persons includes various forms o f physical attack and
mental harassment, for which no authority is required. Vindictive admini
strators, who are anxious to maintain their control, often resemble school
yard bullies or sadistic prison guards.
Particularly, as in unions, where
o ffic ia ls do not have authority over a dissident’s working conditions, personal
reprisals are likely to be used frequently.
For example, when several electrica l workers tried and failed to re ctify
corruption in a local union, they "resigned from the union - determined not to
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finance an organization whose leaders refused to account for its funds....
They w ere pelted with bolts and screws, punched, tripped, and burned with
cigarettes.
Only a few friends of the three refused to take part in the
harassment." (3) The whistle blower, who attem pts to go outside o f the
organization to expose abuses, is particularly vulnerable to attack. Karen
Ann Silkwood may have been murdered to keep her from presenting
incriminating documents about the Kerr-M cG ee Corporation to the press. (4)
Co-workers who interact with oppositionists are viewed as disloyal and are
subject to "guilt by association." Thus, there is a tendency to ostracize
dissenters. "The Amish know exactly what they are doing when they ’shun' a
brother; so do the Russians when they make a comrade a 'nonperson’." (5)
A fte r blowing the whistle on the Air Force's cover-up o f cost overruns Ernie
Fitzgerald returned to his o ffic e and found "the beginnings o f a small pile o f
call messages on his secretary's desk - each one a cancelled invitation to a
m eeting, party, or dinner." (6)
Job and career related reprisals are more common measures against
oppositionists than physical and psychological attacks, because they allow
o ffic ia ls to use the organization's powers against isolated individuals or small
groups. Vindictive administrators need not commit themselves to a personal
co n flict, but need only manipulate the rules and exercise their authority to
make the oppositionist's work life difficu lt or impossible. A ttacks upon one's
career can be as damaging as physical or psychological assaults because work
provides the means to subsistence and leisure and, for many people, a purpose
for existence.
Dismissal is, o f course, the most extrem e job-related sanction and is a
measure frequently taken against dissidents. A psychiatric nurse who was
quoted in a news article as criticizin g the quality o f patient care and the
behavior of the medical sta ff at the Philadelphia hospital where she worked
was fired. (7) Also fired was a policeman who appeared on a television news
program and told about other police o fficers who had taken for their own use
recovered stolen property obtained in their regular course of duty. (8) A sales
execu tive at U.S. Steel blew the whistle on d e fe c tiv e pipes and was
discharged.
Ralph Nader and his associates analyzed this reprisal:
The reason given: insubordination. Apparently, even though he may
have saved the company substantial costs had the pipe been prema
turely marketed and saved users o f the pipe from physical and
financial injury, he had ignored the rules of the game and breached the
etiqu ette of hierarchical management. (9)
Y e t another example of retaliation by firing concerns a civilian doctor
working for the United States Arm y who blew the whistle. He charged that
there was "widespread negligence in m ilitary medical exams." The Army
expected him to handle 25 com plete physicals each day, while he claimed that
only ten could be performed adequately. He was fired on the grounds of
in efficien cy. (10)
In addition to being dismissed, oppositionists may also be denied letters of
recommendation or be blacklisted. In essence, they may be "ex iled " from the
profession, c ra ft, or career to which they have devoted much o f their lives,
and, th erefore, may suffer many o f the same problems, frustrations, and
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bitterness as political exiles. Less severe measures o f reprisal which also
damage the individual m aterially and socially are demotions and, if there is a
rating system, dem erits. Such form al reprisals are used when the authorities
believe that they can act with impunity, fre e from the scrutiny o f unions,
civil service commissions, or other groups to which they might be answerable.
When it is not prudent for administrators to rem ove a dissident from a
position, either by demotion or dismissal, their authority over the workplace
can be used to make the conditions of employment d ifficu lt or intolerable for
the targeted individual. Such measures cannot be grounds for court cases or
adm inistrative actions because they are within the discretion of o fficia ls, and
are usually not logged on the em ployee's permanent record. Interference with
a dissenter's work is a common bureaucratic practice, and is particularly
prevalent in governm ental agencies which are circumscribed by civil service
regulations. It can be used by im m ediate supervisors on their own in itiative
or as part o f an overall plan involving top agency o fficia ls. A congressional
report referring sp e cifica lly to whistle blowers employed by the federal
governm ent states: "Inform al harassment can in terfere with an em ployee’s
ability to do his work and result in disillusionment, resignation, or grounds for
form al rem oval." (11)
The aim of in terferen ce with an individual’s work can be to fo rce the
em ployee to resign, to set an example for other subordinates, or simply to get
even with the dissenter. The form s taken by such retaliation are myriad and
can be especially painful to the recipients when they are tailor-m ade
tortures, as w ere those described by G eorge O rw ell in 1984.
Many
bureaucratic oppositionists in itiate dissent just because they are dedicated to
high standards o f job performance. Reprisals that prevent them from doing
their work w ell are severe punishments.
For example, a high-level meat
grader for the Food and Drug Administration made the "m istake" of helping
to fo rce the resignations o f 70 percent o f the Chicago meat graders by
working with the FBI to prove their corruption. Since his involvement he has
been assigned a steady flow o f assistant supervisors. "By the tim e he finishes
training one to be o f any real assistance, transfer orders come in and the
process starts again." (12) J.A. Morris' bureaucratic opposition against the
National Institutes o f Health has been described previously. He was opposed
to the agency's policy o f promoting flu vaccines because his own research led
him to conclude that such programs w ere in e ffe c tiv e and potentially harmful.
The hierarchy's reprisal was to prevent him from doing any research. The
authorities destroyed thousands of his experim ental animals, forced him from
his laboratory into a small room, and crated away his research m aterials. (13)
When the targeted em ployee is not a dedicated and com m itted worker
there are other reprisals that can be taken by the administration. Among
em ployees in law enforcem ent agencies and school systems the measure most
feared is transfer to an undesirable area where, for example, the likelihood o f
physical attack is high. The power of corporations to make punitive transfers
is discussed by Anthony Jay. Employees "can be told to go and live in another
part o f the country, or another part o f the world, or to desert their wives and
children for months or years ...." (14) The authorities also have discretion
over perquisites, which are not only valued for their intrinsic worth, but for
the status-honor that they confer. Corner o ffic e s , a private secretary instead
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o f the typing pool, a convenient parking space, travel, and flex ib le schedules
are some of the privileges of certain jobs that give satisfaction and that may
be revoked.
More general measures of reprisal involve the denial o f possibilities for
promotion and salary increases. Advancement on the organizational ladder is
largely a function of loyalty. C ritical analysts of bureaucracy claim that
"individual workers gain promotion only by m anifesting m anagerially-defined
norms o f behavior and commitment and by accepting, without protest or
grumbling, authoritative commands from above." (15)
The individual's
perform ance is often d ifficu lt to evaluate, so promotion is frequently granted
on the basis o f loyalty to superiors and social conform ity. Robert Presthus
concurs:
For various reasons, including the desire to preserve internal unity and
discipline, L O Y A L T Y seems to have become the main basis for
bureaucratic succession. (16)
Presthus interprets bureaucracies "as miniature social systems that meet
many of the most basic needs of their members and expect in return loyalty
and conform ity." (17) Thus, punishing bureaucratic oppositionists by failing to
prom ote them, despite their competence, is a "natural" reprisal.
The retaliatory measures against oppositionists may be more or less
severe. Assuming that the authorities are instrumentally rational, one would
expect in return the strength o f reprisals to be commensurate with or at least
relative to the real or potential damage done by the opposition to the
administration. Bureaucratic oppositions which are grounded in policy abuses
rather than in rule violations, which have goals o f policy change rather than
o f personnel change, and which utilize tactics that reveal the opposition to
outside agencies rather than keep it within the organization are more
dangerous to the hierarchy o f authority and tend to call forth more severe
retaliation. Similarly, open political tactics threaten the chain of command
more than informing and, thus, w ill tend to be more severely suppressed.
Organizational reprisals against bureaucratic oppositionists may serve
purposes other than retribution and deterrence.
Adm inistrative measures
may be counter attacks to repulse the opposition's assault, to prevent the
erosion o f authority, and to stave o ff the changes in policy or personnel that
are the aims of the opposition. When the authorities attem pt to damage the
reputations o f dissenters they not only harm the individuals but diminish their
political effectiven ess.
Such techniques of character assassination are
spelled out in a manuscript known as the "Malek Manual," which was w ritten
for Nixon appointees with the intention o f helping them rule the federal
agencies. The measures advised in the Malek Manual are "designed to focus
attention on the em ployee and not his or her allegations." (18) The strategy is
similar to that used against rebels in the polity. "The rebel is depicted in
n egative terms by society, labeled 'irrational,1 'degenerate,' or at least
'irresponsible.'" (1 9 )
Destroying the reputations of dissidents robs them o f credibility, while
transferring them may deprive them o f access to the evidence needed to
prove the existence of an abuse. The Malek Manual laments the d ifficu lty of
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firing federal bureaucrats - "P o litica l disloyalty and insimpatico relationships
with the Administration, unfortunately, are not grounds for the removal or
suspension o f an em ployee." (20) Therefore, a number o f suggestions are
made
for neutralizing the em ployee, such as the "special assignment
technique (the traveling salesman)," "the layering technique," and the
"shifting responsibilities and isolation techniques."
The Manual condones
covert threats to fire, transfer, or dem ote em ployees, which may cause
oppositionists to abandon their project. (21)
R etaliation by the administration is the organizational counterpart of
punitive sanctions in society at large.
Reprisals are social control
mechanisms used to keep people in line when more pervasive inducements and
penalties, such as monetary reward, career advancement, social approval, and
guilt fail to elicit obedience. They are political tactics just as are the
maneuvers o f the dissidents.
A comparison o f opposition tactics with
adm inistrative reprisals shows just how many more resources are at the
disposal o f the authorities than are available to their subordinates.
Successful retaliation by the administration against a bureaucratic
opposition reasserts the organization’s chain o f command and is a signal to
dissenters that future a ctivities w ill be costly and likely to fa il. In many
cases, then, the consequences o f opposition include a lower probability that
open con flict w ill break out again. There are many reasons why opposition
may not be self perpetuating. Most important, unless the authorities are
irrational in their use of power, they w ill have learned how to prevent new
troubles by being alert to their causes. Perhaps they w ill re c tify the abuse,
but they may also learn how to cover it up better or devise new work rules
that monitor em ployees more closely, deprive them o f access to information,
or punish dissent more severely. In some cases the budget of a rebellious
department may be cut or certain o f its perquisites revoked, putting the
members on notice that they are not indispensable and that they no longer
have high status-honor. The ringleaders o f the opposition may be fired,
hounded out o f the organization, or transferred, removing the potential
initiators o f future dissent and destroying the solidarity of the struggle group.
Exemplary punishments may be meted out, showing em ployees what they can
expect if they disobey, or certain oppositionists may be coopted, weakening
the morale of the remaining members.
. Cooptation is a popular ta ctic for suppressing future con flict because it
allows the organization to keep an individual with leadership skills and also
destroys the mutual trust among dissenters necessary to maintain an
opposition.
There are many ways to coopt incumbents who em erge with views
inconsistent with existing ones.... co n flict may be resolved by
establishing a small program of the type proposed.... Over tim e, the
proposal backers may find that the ideas are less workable than they
originally thought and the unit may simply be disbanded.
Thus,
cooptation is less dramatic than...overt dismissal, but may w ell have
the same e ffe c t of resolving the strain without preciptating any type
o f structural change. (22)
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In addition to any measures directly taken by the authorities, the very
process o f opposition often has a chilling e ffe c t on future political a ctivity.
The costs of opposition in tim e, peace of mind, congeniality, ability to do
e ffe c t iv e work, and, perhaps, even money and health only become apparent
a fte r the struggle has been initiated. Having suffered such costs, form er
oppositionists may be reluctant ever to challenge organizational authority
again. The w ill to resist may be replaced by bitterness (especially if one's
friends have been fired or punished), cynicism, apathy, or expediency ("If you
can't beat 'em, join 'em !"). New em ployees who might in itiate action w ill
enter a dem oralized social context, and w ill be unable to inspire the zeal to
resist authority.
The very social relations among oppositionists may further dampen the
w ill to resist future abuses or to continue resisting abuses that have not been
corrected. Particularly in protracted oppositions, the members of the group
w ill d ifferen tia te themselves by their willingness to take risks, to support
their comrades em otionally, and to spend tim e devising tactics and
politicking.
Jealousies and rivalries may build up based on d ifferen tia l
contributions to the common e ffo r t.
Some members may give in to the
authorities and be branded as traitors, while others may escalate the con flict
and be branded as hotheads. People w ill also reveal the weaknesses in their
characters under stress and may be humiliated in front o f their colleagues.
By the tim e some protracted oppositions are over, their members w ill have
such animosity and distrust towards one another that future collaboration w ill
be ruled out. Opposition may sometimes be inspiring but it is rarely pleasant.
Even when struggle is successful group solidarity may be destroyed:
A group's com plete victo ry over its enemies is thus not always
fortunate in the sociological sense. Victory lowers the energy which
guarantees the unity of the group; and the dissolving forces, which are
always at work, gain hold. (23)
When the authorities are able to suppress an opposition thoroughly, the
chain o f command w ill be vindicated but the perform ance of the organization
may suffer.
Successful reprisals demonstrate the brute power of the
administration to overcom e dissent, but they do not enhance feelings o f
obligation and loyalty to the organization. An opposition may fail and may
even make future struggles less likely to occur, but organizational functioning
may become less effic ie n t. Obedience to organizational rules on the basis of
fear rather than on the grounds o f legitim acy has several interrelated results.
First, em ployees will respect only the le tte r, not the spirit, of the rules. The
consequence is similar to a greve du zele action. In most bureaucracies the
rules must be supplemented by common sense and used as flex ib le guidelines
rather than cookbook-style instructions.
O ver-rigid adherence to them
generally impairs e fficien cy . The informal practices which normally em erge
to shore up or complement o ffic ia l orders are either purposefully neglected
out o f fear o f reprisals or spite, or are not even considered. Developm ent of
inform al procedures requires both crea tivity and extra energy, both of which
are inhibited by fear. Presthus reflects on the e ffe c ts o f the anxiety to
please superiors that is caused by fear:
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Since the elite is rem ote and its w ill cannot always be defin itely
known, the individual attem pts to anticipate its expectations. As a
result such expectations may seem more com pelling than they are
meant to be.
The individual is not inclined in any case to
underestimate them for fear of impairing his career chances. In this
way organizational claims may be expanded beyond reason. Here the
federal government's loyalty-security program is illustrative.
The
going rationale was, "Don't take a chance, kick 'em in the pants." This
rule o f exaggerated response is a major dysfunction o f big organi
zations. (24)
Sim ilarly, fea rfu l or apathetic em ployees are unlikely to report in efficien cies
to higher authorities, thus depriving administrators o f valuable "feedback."
A second consequence of obedience from fear is a tendency for employees
to break rules when they believe that they w ill not be caught ("When the cat's
away the mice w ill play.").
In a study o f boys working under varying
conditions o f authority, noncompliance increased grea tly when the autocratic
leader le ft the room.
The im plication of this research is that obedience
requires constant supervision when it is obtained through fear.
When an
organization gains obedience by im plicit or explicit threat, it becomes similar
to a police state which must continually monitor its citizens and expend
appreciable resources to do so.
The more closely an organization must
supervise its personnel, the less e ffic ie n t it w ill be. Employees will take less
productive in itia tive and managerial overhead w ill increase. Authoritarian
states may have as their primary aim the assertion of a chain of command.
Organizational elites must usually seek other goals in addition to maintaining
control.
A final consequence o f obedience obtained through fea r, particularly
obedience to rules or superiors perceived to be abusive, is impairment of the
mental and/or physical health o f the em ployee.

(25)

They'd like to tell o ff their bosses but don't know how to do it. They
evade and repress their great dislike o f the situation because they fee l
powerless to win out over the boss.
This often leads to illness,
frequent absenteeism, regular tardiness, and poor work habits. (26)
Obviously such reactions damage both the e ffic ie n c y and the effectiven ess of
the organization.
The creation o f a clim ate o f fear in the wake o f an opposition
demonstrates the power of the organization's hierarchy but weakens, at least
tem porarily, its legitim a te authority. It is d ifficu lt to generalize about the
long-term e ffe c ts o f the exercise o f brute power in organizations. If the
opposition is isolated and its ring leaders are dismissed or otherwise
neutralized harsh reprisals w ill probably strengthen the authority system over
the long range, because em ployees w ill be aware that o fficia ls are prepared
to assert them selves decisively when they are challenged.
If, however,
oppositions are frequent or the organization as a whole is corrupt, in efficien t,
or otherwise abusive, stringent retaliation against a particular group of
dissidents w ill feed a cycle o f dem oralization and in efficien cy . Whether such
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a cycle is damaging to the authorities depends upon their commitment to the
o ffic ia l goals o f the organization and the pressure of constituencies and
governmental agencies on them to achieve those goals.
Oppositions, o f course, are not always e ffe c tiv e ly suppressed by organi
zational authorities. Sometimes they are successful in elim inating the abuses
that they have fought and sometimes they win concessions from higher
authorities.
When dissidents are successful, believe that they have
succeeded, or are not dispirited by administrative reprisals, they may create
a political culture at the workplace, making future oppositions more likely.
While suppressed dissent generally leads to dem oralization, at least in the
short run, opposition that is not crushed generates the b elief among
em ployees that they need not obey authorities without question, that they
have some power over their conditions or even over the policies that they
execute. A successful opposition within one department of an organization
may serve as a model for others to emulate, thereby weakening the chain o f
command. If it has been w ell enough publicized, an opposition may even be
im itated in other organizations.
Whether or not a bureaucratic opposition has achieved its goal, it may
help to make future oppositions possible by providing a base o f em ployees who
can be mobilized for action. One of the major difficu lties in undertaking an
opposition is finding em ployees who are willing to act and then form ing them
into a cohesive group. To the extent that the previous opposition group
remains solidary and politically m otivated, the likelihood o f future oppo
sitions is enhanced. During the first struggle the tactics used may have led to
a strong camaraderie and trust among the group members that remained a fter
the group's combat function was discarded. For example, tactics that involve
secrecy among the members, such as anonymous informing or making a
superior appear to be incompetent, often provide a sense of solidarity. This
result has been noted by those studying secret societies. (27)
Past exploits may lead to the continued coherence o f the group, not
m erely because the members share a common experience, but because of the
negative reaction of their colleagues. It is understandable that a state of
mutual animosity usually exists between those involved in the opposition and
those who might have been but refused to take part. Such hostile feelings
may linger long a fter the conclusion o f the opposition and may serve to
perpetuate the group, if only because of the enm ity they re ceive from and
fe e l towards the "scabs." In such cases the dissolution of the group from its
internal tensions w ill be avoided.
From a sociological viewpoint, the broadest generalization that can be
drawn about the consequences o f bureaucratic oppositions is that they tend to
weaken the legitim a te authority of the organization over at least some of its
em ployees. Max Weber, who was primarily concerned with the authority of
the state, argued that the grounds o f legitim acy could be traditional (from
inherited custom), charism atic (from the personal g ift of a leader), or legalrational (from a set of procedures).
Although bureaucracies develop
traditions and sometimes are taken over by charismatic figures, their major
basis o f authority in the Weberian scheme is legal-rational.
Thus, their
legitim acy can be impaired if their o ffic ia ls break the rules or if subordinates
challenge the rules.
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The fundamental proposition that rule infractions weaken bureaucratic
authority must be modified to account for the consequences of bureaucratic
oppositions. First, bureaucracies do not depend for their legitim acy only upon
legal-rational authority. Their rules must not m erely be form ally consistent
and explicit, but they must also prom ote the organization's pursuit of its
o ffic ia l aims.
Thus, bureaucratic authority is both legal-rational and
instrumental-rational. There may be a co n flict between these tw o grounds
for legitim acy when there is question about whether the form al rules serve
the organization's purposes. Some bureaucratic oppositions challenge legalrational authority in order to promote instrumental-rational authority, others
are aimed against o fficia ls who violate the rules, and still others are aimed at
o ffic ia ls who do not apply the rules e ffe c tiv e ly .
For the administrative myth, the rules of the organization are instrumenta lly adapted to its goals and the o fficia ls apply those rules universally and
e ffe c tiv e ly .
The conditions for myth to approximate reality include the
requirement that the goals be clear and consistent.
If multiple and
contradictory aims can be imputed to the organization, its legitim acy may be
impaired by dissensus over which should be given priority. For example, the
engineers who exposed the dangers of nuclear reactors believed that General
E lectric should not profit at the expense o f public safety. (28) Similarly, the
whistle blower who informed the D istrict A ttorn ey in Brooklyn that the Good
Humor Corporation was marketing ice cream with high bacteria counts
believed that a safe product was more important than high profits. (29) In
both these cases, the authority o f the organization was challenged on the
grounds o f value rationality, not on the grounds of instrumental rationality.
(30)
Thus, a second m odification o f Weber's scheme must include the
possibility that an organization's legitim acy is rooted in the purposes that it
pursues as w ell as in its form al consistency and its effic ie n c y and
effectiven ess.
Some employees may be com m itted to the goals that the
organization actually achieves, others may mount oppositions when the actual
goals con flict with the o ffic ia l purposes, and still others may dissent against
practices that breach moral standards. In the last case it is claimed that a
moral ideal should be the supreme goal of the organization or that it should at
least lim it the pursuit of its other aims.
Rule infractions, then, only necessarily weaken the organization's authori
ty when a) there is agreem ent on the organization's goals, b) the rules are
instrumentally rational with regard to those goals, and c) o ffic ia ls pursue
those goals com petently and e ffe c tiv e ly . If any of these three conditions are
not met, rule infractions may or may not weaken the organization's
legitim a te authority, depending upon the specific circumstances.
For
example, the overall authority of an organization may be strengthened when
em ployees are perm itted to bend or break the rules in order to achieve
greater effic ie n c y , or when the organization departs from its o ffic ia l goal in
order to provide more jobs at the sacrifice o f effic ie n c y .
Bureaucratic oppositions, then, do not weaken legitim a te organizational
authority m erely because they may break some of the rules, but because they
challenge the chain of command. W hatever e ffe c ts oppositions may have that
strengthen o vera ll authority in the long run, they always impair the principle
o f hierarchy in the short run. They show that the authorities have not been

CONSEQUENCES AND POLICY

117

wise enough to assure obedience, and, thus, they expose the weakness of the
structure. Even if an opposition is crushed, it turns the organization into
more of a power system than it was previously. In essence, bureaucratic
opposition creates a gap between the maintenance o f order and the purposes
o f work, between power and goodness, between ’’project orientation" and
"ob ject orientation." (31)
It politicizes the organization by opening up
disputes over goals, the means to achieve goals, or the e ffe c t iv e use o f
means. For as long as the opposition lasts subordinates take a responsibility
for the organization that is not theirs by form al right.
Opposition, then, reveals that some authorities have not been responsible,
that they have allowed grounded abuses to exist and that they have created
conditions in which subordinates can act to try to re c tify those abuses. A
functionalist might argue against the interpretation that successful
oppositions could increase the legitim acy o f the chain o f command by
elim inating incompetent or abusive personnel, by achieving the alteration o f
in efficien t practices, or by recom m itting the organization to its o ffic ia l
goals. A ll of these e ffe c ts may occur and may help to strengthen legitim acy
in the long run, but they w ill not elim inate the short-run e ffe c t of politicizin g
the organization. The functionalist might reply that the public punishment of
rule violators, the reasonable alteration of rules, or the rededication to
o ffic ia l aims may convince subordinates o f the essential goodness o f the
authorities and reinforce normative solidarity. It is d ifficu lt to assess the
strength o f this argument, but it may be noted that public rectifica tio n o f
abuses promotes solidarity most in communities whose members share an
identity of interest and have a "consciousness of kind." In such communities
public punishment makes the norms conspicuous by singling out isolated
deviants from the rest of the community, by focusing attention upon the
"exceptions who prove the rule."
Organizations are hierarchies, not
communities. Admission by o fficia ls that oppositionists w ere right probably
casts doubt upon their com petence more than it creates solidarity.
Such
admission may also reveal that the abuses are not exceptions, but the rule.
If oppositions are made public, they also impair the leg itim a te authority
of the organization in the wider society which may lead to new legal controls
over it, loss of its effectiven ess with clients or customers, or decline in its
status. Statements by o fficia ls that abuses have been or w ill be corrected
cannot, in the short run, counterbalance the suspicions created among those
who are a ffe c te d by or are dependent on the organization.
Further,
oppositions alert those outside the organization that the chain of command
has been challenged and that the authorities may not be able to speak for the
agency com petently or carry out their promises.
This consequence o f
opposition is probably the basic reason why o fficia ls are so concerned that
dissent be suppressed before it escalates and broadens its range beyond the
organization. In a com petitive environment the organization must speak with
one voice lest its adversaries sense weakness and take advantage o f it.
The belief that opposition might hurt the organization’s public standing
has even prevented the initiation of some bureaucratic oppositions, because
the effectiven ess o f the organization has consequences for the w elfa re of the
subordinates. Stanley Weir, in an analysis o f the International Longshore
man’s Workers Union, concluded that this b elief is responsible for
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... the refusal o f the working longshoremen to air the problems of their
union in public. They have fe lt that the ensuing scandal would create a
reactionary offen sive against the job-hiring process which the ILWU
controls jointly with the stevedoring com panies..« (32)
The vital tension of bureaucratic opposition springs from the fa c t that in
all organizations there are wide deviations from the administrative ideal, and
yet that attempts to correct these deviations from below weaken the chain of
command and invite disorder.
The same sort of tension marks all
authoritarian systems, because they do not institutionalize opposition. Such
systems rely on control from above and when that control fails the system
its e lf must be disrupted to correct abuses. When abuses becom e systemic,
the entire system must be revised or an unjust and stagnant order maintained.
In dem ocratic systems there are ways of airing grievances, publicizing abuses,
and altering policies in an orderly fashion, so opposition in them need not
always threaten leg itim a te authority. Organizations, which are predominant
ly authoritarian systems, are structurally incapable of taking full advantage
o f the benefits o f opposition. Their first concern is to suppress.

P O L IC Y

Bureaucratic oppositions, particularly those that have occurred in public
agencies, have alerted legislators, constituencies, and the general public to
organizational abuses. The m elioristic impulse is strong in the United States;
many people believe that the recognition o f a problem, an e vil, or a lack
requires self-conscious intervention to set things right. In the view of the
reform er it should be possible to provide an orderly means o f elim inating,
preventing, or at least lessening the abuses that have been exposed by the
irregular tactics o f oppositions. The preceding discussion has argued that
whether or not oppositions are successful, their general e ffe c t is to weaken
the organization’s chain o f command. Proposals to provide new agencies to
perform the functions o f oppositions or to make certain oppositions
leg itim a te w ill have the same e ffe c t of weakening the adm inistrative
hierarchy.
The most basic question o f policy directed at remediating
organizational abuses, then, is whether or not it is desirable, or even feasible,
to diminish the autonomy o f contem porary hierarchies. Some insight into the
dimensions o f this question w ill result from considering how adm inistrative
autonomy is currently lim ited.
In addition to the threat of bureaucratic oppositions, administrators in
com plex societies are constrained by a wide variety o f factors to elim inate
sadistic, insecure, or incompetent personnel, to promote effic ie n c y and
effectiven ess, and to refrain from making and implementing illegal, though
not always immoral, policy.
First, bureaucracies are enmeshed in a
com p etitive environment. Businesses must normally return a reasonable rate
o f profit to continue operating, and if they are ’’bailed out" o f trouble by
governm ent they are likely to suffer increased regulation. Colleges and
hospitals must have adequate enrollments and reasonable rates of occupancy
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or they face diminished contributions or budget cuts. Even governmental
agencies, which are monopolies, must com pete against one another for shares
o f budgets, and must at least appear to achieve a certain standard o f
perform ance. C om petitive controls are minimized for businesses which are
monopoly suppliers of an important product or service and for governmental
agencies concerned with security, such as the C IA . In both cases, a veil o f
secrecy inhibits e ffe c tiv e oversight.
A second lim itation on administrative autonomy is public regulation
through legislative oversight, independent regulatory agencies, executive
control, or the court system. Ever since the Progressive era at the beginning
o f the tw entieth century, many measures have been taken to correct
organizational abuses by employing the countervailing power of the public
sector. The preceding discussion has shown that government controls have
not prevented abuses that generate bureaucratic oppositions, though it has
not demonstrated that such controls have failed to lessen the number o f
abuses or their severity. O ften organizations have "colon ized" regulatory
authorities with sympathetic personnel or have "captured" them in order to
use them as tools for their own advantage. Even in such cases, however,
com peting interests have gained some leverage o ver the adm inistrative
hierarchy, reducing its autonomy.
A third set of restrictions on bureaucratic autonomy is provided by
organized interest groups and lateral organizations, such as civil rights
groups, consumer movements, unions, and professional associations. Whether
or not limitations on administrative power are w ritten into contracts, as they
sometimes are when an organization is checked by a union, or into consent
decrees, as they are when interest groups bring successful suits, hierarchies
are circumscribed by lateral organizations merely by the threats of decreased
support or of attem pts to seek legislative remedies. The preceding chapters
have shown that lateral organizations have been no more successful than
government agencies in preventing abuses but, again, it has not argued that
such interest groups have been entirely in e ffe c tiv e .
The present study o f bureaucratic oppositions has been biased in the
direction o f demonstrating just how in e ffe c tiv e the checks on complex
organizations have been. However, the conclusion need not be drawn that
more o f the same kinds o f checks would re ctify more of the abuses, or that
there are other kinds of constraints, consistent with the present order, that
have not yet been tried. Current measures have perhaps not been successful,
because the condition for effectiven ess would be the destruction o f the
organization as an authoritarian system. Those who o ffe r policy proposals to
correct organizational abuses w ill find that their plans fa ll into one of two
categories: either they w ill merely repeat previous e ffo rts or they w ill alter
the current authority system so much as to change the hierarchical principle
radically. If the first is the case, then the organization w ill still have the
autonomy to perpetrate and conceal abuses, barring opposition, while if the
second is the intent the present system itself w ill be put in question.
A few oppositionists and commentators have been aware o f the dilemma
of reform and have advocated drastic measures. In certain cases there have
been proposals to elim inate the offending organization altogether.
For
example, the nuclear engineers who resigned from General E lectric because
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they realized that nuclear safety was not technologically feasible joined
forces with anti-nuclear groups to urge legislation to ban all atom ic plants.
(33) Similarly, a group whose goal is the destruction of the C IA includes some
form er C IA employees, including Philip A gee.
Its plans involve the
establishment o f "a worldwide network o f agents to expose C IA personnel and
methods of operation.” (34)
Such attem pts to abolish organizations, o f
course, only apply to special cases and cannot be applied universally, unless
altern ative ways o f perform ing c o llective tasks are proposed and im plem ent
ed.
Sometimes oppositionists can create a new organization that is intended
either to supplant the old one or to com pete with it successfully enough to
spur changes. Such schismatic in itiatives are beyond the capabilities of most
em ployees, either because o f the enormous capital investment required to
start a new organization or because of the guaranteed monopoly of
governm ent agencies. There are some organizations where the possibility
exists, particularly those which are skill rather than capital intensive, such as
consulting firm s, advertising agencies, and especially religious organizations.
Papal authority was critically diminished by Martin Luther's bureaucratic
opposition.
Protestant asceticism makes schisms practicable because an
ornate church is not required. The abundance o f sects now in existence is
witness to the feasib ility o f starting new religious organizations. A group o f
"m oderates who believed they had become the victim s o f an 'ecclesiastical
tyranny"' within the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod split from the Church's
Concordia Theological Seminary in St. Louis. (35) A "seminary in ex ile" was
established and thousands o f church members w ere reform ed into new
congregations.
The leadership o f the parent Church then declared the
opposition group to be a separate church. (36)
Radical and comprehensive change has been suggested by those who
propose substituting participatory dem ocracy at the workplace for the
principle of hierarchy. The program o f worker self-m anagem ent involves
... the full and direct participation o f every working member in
decisions which vitally a ffe c t him. ... It involves the full decision
making process of discussion and selection of alternatives, coming to
agreem ent, implementing, and assessing consequences. (37)
Substituting participation for hierarchical authority attacks the very heart of
the bureaucracy. Higher administrators would no longer enjoy the secrecy
necessary to perpetrate many abuses.
As Weber noted, "Bureaucratic
administration always tends to be an administration o f 'secret sessions':
insofar as it can, it hides its knowledge and action from criticism ." (38)
D em ocracy in the organization means the institutionalization o f opposition.
It is the only plan that would dissolve the dilemma of authoritarian politics,
because it would elim inate them.
It is beyond the scope o f the present study to assess the practicability or
the desirability o f worker self-m anagem ent. The th eoretical and em pirical
literatu re about the subject is large and growing. (39) It is important to note
here, however, that dem ocratic machinery does not its e lf insure actual
dem ocracy, as unions and many local governments illustrate.
Employee
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’’culture," the im peratives o f technology, and the political and economic
clim ate in which an organization is embedded are just some of the factors that
need to be considered in any discussion about the possibility o f dem ocratizing
orgnaizations.
Further, in order to give worker self-management a "fa ir
chance" it would have to be universalized, which would demand both a
socialist economy and new forms o f citizen -con trolled public institutions.
Such a radical change may be desirable, but it is not currently a "live option,"
at least in the United States.
Most suggestions for eliminating organizational abuses are effo rts to work
within the present system o f controls and constraints.
The most popular
proposals concentrate on rectifyin g the specific abuses that have been
exposed by extending the kinds o f regulatory mechanisms developed since the
Progressive era to cover them.
For example, instituting a Cabinet
Department o f Consumer A ffa irs or strengthening the Consumer Product
Safety Commission is a proposed response to revelations about hazardous
products.
Similarly, there have been calls to reform the C ivil Service
Commission to enable administrators to more easily dismiss incompetent
em ployees. Such measures have been repeatedly tested for more than
years in a wide variety o f contexts. As noted above, their success has been
lim ited by the autonomy o f the organization’s administration.
Target
organizations w ill attem pt to colonize or capture regulatory authorities and
to blunt their effectiven ess. If their effo rts are unsuccessful some abuses
may be corrected, but perhaps at the cost of effic ie n c y or effectiven ess.
Similar to government regulation and tightened public controls are
measures that increase the power o f lateral organizations over the target
bureaucracy.
For example, various women’s groups, such as the National
Organization for Women, Working Women United, and the Women’s Equity
A ction League, provide how-to information and legal aid to oppositions
fighting superiors who sexually harass their fem ale subordinates, or policies
which discriminate against fem ale employees. Ralph Nader and his associates
call for the encouragement o f bureaucratic oppositionists by professional
societies and instruct these groups to "reform ulate their codes of ethics to
make them relevant to the employment relationship as w ell as to the clien tprofessional relationship." (40) Professional associations and unions may also
provide legal aid for members employed in abusive organizations. A self-help
organization has been form ed "to provide assistance to all em ployees o f
security-related agencies who wish to come forth and expose in efficien cy or
illeg a lity in the outfit they work for.
Legal assistance for the new
organization w ill be provided by the Am erican C ivil Liberties Union...." (41)
The Am erican Chemical Society has proposed the institution of a legal aid
fund to help oppositionists resist abusive practices. The S ociety’s president
argued:
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We are aware of many cases in industry, government laboratories and
even universities where scientists have been retaliated against when
their professional standards interfered with the interests of their
employers or funders. (42)
Chemists who opposed their organization's policies in the name of their
professional standards would be able to fight retaliation from their superiors
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in the courts with the A C S ’s aid.
Some bureaucratic oppositions have led to the form ation of lateral groups
to check the offending organization.
One such example is the Team ster
reform group mentioned earlier, PROD. In the main, PROD regularizes the
informing tactics o f many bureaucratic oppositions. One of its e ffo rts was to
support Team ster members in a New Jersey local who w ere being coerced
into contributing money to the legal defense com m ittee for Anthony
Provenzano. (43) He had once headed the local, but had been convicted in
court o f murder and extortion.
His victim had been his major rival for
leadership in the union. Members of the local w ere far too intimidated to
oppose the policy them selves but PROD was able to act on their behalf. Its
ta c tic was to inform to the Justice Department. A letter was sent to the
organized crim e and racketeering section head by Paul Poulos, PROD's
organizing director - " ... Poulos said his group has received calls and letters
from union members who believe they w ill face hardships on the job if they do
not contribute to Provenzano's defense.11 (44)
While the example of PROD shows some of the lim itations of unionism,
the result o f a few bureaucratic oppositions is the form ation o f a union to
provide a regular check on perceived abuses. If a union does em erge from a
bureaucratic opposition it is likely that the struggle was unsuccessful. Had
the dissidents achieved their goal they would not have seen the need to
continue to comm it resources to a co n flict. Some outsiders, unaware of the
fa iled attem pt to oust President Silber, could not understand why Boston
University's facu lty chose to unionize. An insider grasped the situation:
"This is the most status-anxious facu lty," says one of the Silber's
deans. "They are more royal than the king, m ore papal than the pope.
For this facu lty to have embraced unionism prior to John Silber was
unthinkable." (45)
Just as government regulation has a long history, so does the use o f
pressure by lateral organizations. The consequence o f such pressure may be
to lessen certain abuses, but unless the lateral organization shares power with
the ta rget bureaucracy it w ill probably not elim inate them. If the target
bureaucracy is able to coopt the lateral organization it will probably be even
m ore d ifficu lt than before for subordinates to resist abuses.
The same
conclusion applies to regulatory agencies that are colonized or captured by
the regulated. If the target bureaucracy is not successful at cooptation then
it may lost effic ie n c y because of the measures it takes to satisfy organized
interests. The values promoted and sacrificed by both government regulation
and intervention by lateral organization w ill depend on the balance of power
in each concrete situation.
In general, reform ers might remember
Santayana's dictum:
A thousand reform s have le ft the world as corrupt as ever, for each
successful reform has founded a new institution, and this institution
has bred its new and congenial abuses. (46)
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The use o f government regulation and lateral groups to check organi
zational abuses relies upon bringing external power to bear upon the target
bureaucracy, forestalling the need for spontaneous opposition from within or
at least giving such opposition leverage outside of the organization. Another
sort o f proposal for change is aimed at modifying the internal structure of the
organization to provide new channels for reporting abuses or legal protection
for those who blow the whistle. A law professor has, for example, suggested
the creation of
fu ll-tim e, w ell-sta ffed in-house probation o fficers which are either
appointed by the courts or regulatory agencies, and who are designated
to receive bad news. (47)
Such an o ffic ia l, similar to the ombundsman, would be a projection of outside
agencies into the organization. Depending on the powers assigned to the
o ffic e , the organization’s hierarchy would be more or less impaired. A t one
extrem e there would m erely be a new conduit for inform ation and at the
other there would be authority over management, such as is exerted in the
Soviet Union by Communist Party "control commissions." The same dilemma
applies to this proposal as to the other, more traditional, measures. If the
organization coopts the new o ffic e , then oppositionists w ill be more reluctant
to initiate action, but if the o ffic e is not coopted, the administration w ill lose
authority, not necessarily to subordinates, but to an external agency which
may its e lf be abusive.
In the case of "public directors," there would be
multiple centers o f authority within the organization, breaking the chain of
command.
Perhaps the most popular new remedy for organizational abuses is the
provision of legal protection from reprisals for em ployees who wish to blow
the whistle.
Basic to this reform is the extension to em ployees of some
constitutional rights that now exist only for citizens. Law professor David
Ewing, in his book Freedom Inside the Organization: Bringing C ivil Liberties
to the W orkplace, calls for the follow ing in a j*blll o f rights lor organization
people" - "freedom to c ritic iz e a company’s social and ethical policies.
Freedom to object to an immoral or unethical d irective." (48) Ewing argues
that
The First Amendment need not and should not be applied to all forms
o f em ployee speech and writing. If it is applied just to questions of
social responsibility, m orality, and ethics, the need is met. Then those
who know first and most about questionable corporate plans and
practices would be free to challenge management without losing their
jobs and chances for promotion. (49)
Bills submitted to the N in ety-fifth Congress attem pted to provide such
rights to em ployees o f the federal government.
For example, the
coordinated Senate bill, S. 3108, sponsored by Senators Leahy, Humphrey, and
Abourezk would " ... provide for the protection of government em ployees who
disclose information of illegal or improper actions within the governm ent" by
setting up a M erit Systems Protection Board to investigate complaints about
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abuses and to restore "aggrieved” em ployees to their status prior to improper
disciplinary action. For private employees, a w riter in a management journal
suggests that the corporation "should develop around a 'constitution* that
establishes the rights of the individual and the lim itation of the power of the
organization over him." (50)
Except for the suggestion that organizations be made constitutional,
which would acknowledge them to be political systems and change their
present form , the proposals to grant and protect em ployee rights are not
substantially differen t from the creation o f "public directors." Such rights, to
be e ffe c tiv e , would have to be enforced by an agency, perhaps a "m erit
systems protection board," which would be able to enter the organization,
investigate it, and discipline it in certain areas of administration. Short of
some form of self-m anagem ent, subordinates who mount oppositions must
rely on their own w its or on the power o f some external agency. A new
external agency to hear and perhaps redress complaints about abuses would
probably suffer the same fa te as the Inspector General in the Arm ed Services.
The in effectiven ess o f the Inspector General, discussed previously, was
attributed prim arily to the impossibility o f maintaining a dual structure o f
authority in a hierarchical organization. Just as in the case o f the "public
d irector," a merit systems protection board would inhibit opposition if it w ere
weak or coopted, or would take control o f the organization if it follow ed the
Soviet model o f control commissions. Under present conditions in the United
States the form er alternative would be the more likely outcome.
A ll o f the proposed reform s of bureaucratic abuses which work within the
present system confront a basic dilemma.
The ground o f hierarchical
adm inistrative authority is that a specific group o f o fficia ls should be held
responsible for the conduct and perform ance of the organization. The chain
o f command is a way o f localizing and fixing responsibility. The presence o f
abuses within organizations shows that in many cases the o ffic ia ls cannot or
w ill not behave responsibly, or that their interpretation o f responsible
behavior d iffers from that of other groups or individuals. R eform of abuses
concentrates on making o ffic ia ls accountable to other agencies.
Such
accountability, however, weakens their autonomy or, in the case of cooption,
allows them to be even more abusive and less accountable than they w ere
before. R eform , then, diffuses responsibility and gives o fficia ls excuses for
their failures.
They may actually becom e so hedged by regulations and
pressures that they cannot act e ffe c tiv e ly , or they may be able to blame
other agencies for their own misdeeds. Meanwhile there is no guarantee that
subordinates and publics will suffer any less abuse. Y e t the call for reform
responds to a situation in which the com petitive controls which supposedly
undergird organizational society have failed . It is, indeed, a vicious circle.
The choice seems to be between abusive organizations which maintain
their chains o f command, and irresponsible organizations in which authority is
fragm ented and diffused among plural agencies and groups - either "decen
tralized totalitarianism " or "hyper-pluralism." Much of the reason for this
prospect lies in the deep social conflicts in contem porary societies over the
purposes that organizations should serve. Within this atmosphere o f division
no consistent "public" policy for rectifyin g abuses can be form ulated. Each
measure w ill help some groups and hinder others. Those who disapprove o f
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the aims of current organizational elites w ill w elcom e the fragm entation of
their power, while those who approve o f those aims w ill deplore it. Probably
nothing w ill stop the abuses, or the spontaneous oppositions against them.
In the light of the policy alternatives, bureaucratic oppositions take on a
more favorable appearance.
They respond to sp ecific situations flexibly,
show people that at least for a moment they can resist, sometimes create
systems o f shared power, and keep elites aware that their employees are
persons, not "cheerful robots." Bureaucratic oppositions fu lfill more closely
than any other contemporary social phenomena the Jeffersonian ideal of
human beings fre e ly and periodically asserting their liberty against tyrannical
structures.
To attem pt to regularize them would deprive them o f their
essence and deliver them to dependence upon other hierarchies. To "manage"
them into submission would be to take another long step towards the one
dimensional society, the "crystal palace." To give them friendly encourage
ment, with a dash of realism, has been the purpose of this book.
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